

Jihad vs. McWorld



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T I M E S  B O O K S

R A N D O M H O U S E

Introduction

HISTORY IS NOT OVER. Nor are we arrived in the wondrous land of techné promised by the futurologists. The collapse of state communism has not delivered people to a safe democratic haven, and the past, fratricide and civil discord perduring, still clouds the horizon just behind us. Those who look back see all of the horrors of the ancient slaughter bench reenacted in disintegral nations like Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Ossetia, and Rwanda and they declare that nothing has changed. Those who look forward prophesize commercial and technological interdependence--a virtual paradise made possible by spreading markets and global technology-and they proclaim that everything is or soon will be different. The rival observers seem to consult different almanacs drawn from the libraries of contrarian planets.

Yet anyone who reads the daily papers carefully, taking in the front page accounts of civil carnage as well as the business page stories on the mechanics of the information superhighway and the economics of communication mergers, anyone who turns deliberately to take in the whole 360-degree horizon, knows that our world and our lives are caught between what William Butler Yeats called the two eternities of race and soul: that of race reflecting the tribal past, that of soul anticipating the cosmopolitan future. Our secular eternities are corrupted, however, race reduced to an insignia of resentment, and soul sized down to fit the demanding body by which it now measures its needs. Neither race nor soul offers us a future that is other than bleak, neither promises a polity that is remotely democratic.

The first scenario rooted in race holds out the grim prospect of a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization of nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and mutuality: against technology, against pop culture, and against integrated markets; against modernity itself as well as the future in which modernity issues. The second paints that future in shimmering pastels, a busy portrait of onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize peoples everywhere with fast music, fast computers, and fast food-MTV; Macintosh, and McDonald's-pressing nations into one homogenous global theme park, one McWorld tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce. Caught between Babel and Disneyland, the planet is falling precipitously apart and coming reluctantly together at the very same moment.

Some stunned observers notice only Babel, complaining about the thousand newly sundered "peoples" who prefer to address their neighbors with sniper rifles and mortars; others-zealots in Disney-land-seize on futurological platitudes and the promise of virtuality, exclaiming "It's a small world after all!" Both are right, but how can that be?

We are compelled to choose between what passes as "the twilight of sovereignty" and an entropic end of all history; or a return to the past's most fractious and demoralizing discord; to "the menace of global anarchy;" to Milton's capital of hell, Pandaemonium; to a world totally "out of control."²

The apparent truth, which speaks to the paradox at the core of this book, is that the tendencies of both Jihad and McWorld are at work, both visible sometimes in the same country at the very same instant. Iranian zealots keep one ear tuned to the mullahs urging holy war and the other cocked to Rupert Murdoch's Star television beaming in Dynasty, Donahue, and The Simpsons from hovering satellites. Chinese entrepreneurs vie for the attention of party cadres in Beijing and simultaneously pursue KFC franchises in cities like Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Xian where twenty-eight outlets serve over 100,000 customers a day; The Russian Orthodox church, even as it struggles to renew the ancient faith, has entered a joint venture with California businessmen to bottle and sell natural waters under the rubric Saint Springs Water Company; Serbian assassins wear Adidas sneakers and listen to Madonna on Walkman headphones as they take aim through their gunscoops at scurrying Sarajevo civilians looking to fill family watercans. Orthodox Hasids and brooding neo- Nazis have both turned to rock music to get their traditional messages out to the new generation, while fundamentalists plot virtual conspiracies on the Internet.

Now neither Jihad nor McWorld is in itself novel. History ending in the triumph of science and reason or some monstrous perversion thereof (Mary Shelley's Doctor Frankenstein) has been the leitmotiv of every philosopher and poet who has regretted the Age of Reason since the Enlightenment. Yeats lamented, "The center will not hold, mere anarchy is loosed upon the world," and observers of Jihad today have little but historical detail to add. The Christian parable of the fall and of the possibilities of redemption that it makes possible captures the eighteenth-century ambivalence-and our own-about past and future. I want, however, to do more than dress up the central paradox of human history in modern clothes. It is not Jihad and McWorld but the relationship between them that most interests me. For, squeezed between their opposing forces, the world has been sent spinning out of control. Can it be that what Jihad and McWorld have in common is anarchy: the absence of common will and that conscious and collective human control under the guidance of law we call democracy?

Progress moves in steps that sometimes lurch backwards; in history's twisting maze, Jihad not only revolts against but abets McWorld, while McWorld not only imperils but re-creates and reinforces jihad. They produce their contraries and need one another. My object here then is not simply to offer sequential portraits of McWorld and Jihad, but while examining McWorld, to keep Jihad in my field of vision, and while dissecting Jihad, never to forget the context of McWorld. Call it a dialectic of McWorld: a study in the cunning of reason that does honor to the radical differences that distinguish Jihad and McWorld yet that acknowledges their powerful and paradoxical interdependence.

There is a crucial difference, however, between my modest attempt at dialectic and that of the masters of the nineteenth century; still seduced by the Enlightenment's faith in

progress, both Hegel and Marx believed reason's cunning was on the side of progress. But it is harder to believe that the clash of Jihad and McWorld will issue in some overriding good. The outcome seems more likely to pervert than to nurture human liberty. The two may, in opposing each other, work to the same ends, work in apparent tension yet in covert harmony, but democracy is not their beneficiary. In East Berlin, tribal communism has yielded to capitalism. In Marx- Engelsplatz, the stolid, overbearing statues of Marx and Engels face east, as if seeking distant solace from Moscow: but now, circling them along the streets that surround the park that is their prison are chain eateries like T.G.I. Friday's, international hotels like the Radisson, and a circle of neon billboards mocking them with brand names like Panasonic, Coke, and GoldStar. New gods, yes, but more liberty?

What then does it mean in concrete terms to view Jihad and McWorld dialectically when the tendencies of the two sets of forces initially appear so intractably antithetical? After all, Jihad and McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one re-creating ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within, the other making national borders porous from without. Yet Jihad and McWorld have this in common: they both make war on the sovereign nation-state and thus undermine the nation-state's democratic institutions. Each eschews civil society and belittles democratic citizenship, neither seeks alternative democratic institutions. Their common thread is indifference to civil liberty. Jihad forges communities of blood rooted in exclusion and hatred, communities that slight democracy in favor of tyrannical paternalism or consensual tribalism. McWorld forges global markets rooted in consumption and profit, leaving to an untrustworthy; if not altogether fictitious, invisible hand issues of public interest and common good that once might have been nurtured by democratic citizenries and their watchful governments. Such governments intimidated by market ideology; are actually pulling back at the very moment they ought to be aggressively intervening. What was once understood as protecting the public interest is now excoriated as heavy-handed regulatory browbeating! Justice yields to markets, even though, as Felix Rohatyn has bluntly confessed, "there is a brutal Darwinian logic to these markets. They are nervous and greedy. They look for stability and transparency, but what they reward is not always our preferred form of democracy: " If the traditional conservators of freedom were democratic constitutions and Bills of Rights, "the new temples to liberty," George Steiner suggests, "will be McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken."

In being reduced to a choice between the market's universal church and a retribalizing politics of particularist identities, peoples around the globe are threatened with an atavistic return to medieval politics where local tribes and ambitious emperors together ruled the world entire, women and men united by the universal abstraction of Christianity even as they lived out isolated lives in warring fiefdoms defined by involuntary (ascriptive) forms of identity: This was a world in which princes and kings had little real power until they conceived the ideology of nationalism. Nationalism established government on a scale greater than the tribe yet less cosmopolitan than the universal church and in time gave birth to those intermediate, gradually more democratic institutions that would come to constitute the nation-state. Today, at the far end of this

history, we seem intent on re-creating a world in which our only choices are the secular universalism of the cosmopolitan market and the everyday particularism of the fractious tribe.

In the tumult of the confrontation between global commerce and parochial ethnicity, the virtues of the democratic nation are lost and the instrumentalities by which it permitted peoples to transform themselves into nations and seize sovereign power in the name of liberty and the commonweal are put at risk. Neither Jihad nor Mc World aspires to re secure the civic virtues undermined by its denationalizing practices; neither global markets nor blood communities service public goods or pursue equality and justice. Impartial judiciaries and deliberative assemblies play no role in the roving killer bands that speak on behalf of newly liberated "peoples," and such democratic institutions have at best only marginal influence on the roving multinational corporations that speak on behalf of newly liberated markets. Jihad pursues a bloody politics of identity McWorld a bloodless economics of profit. Belonging by default to McWorld, everyone is a consumer; seeking a repository for identity, everyone belongs to some tribe. But no one is a citizen. Without citizens, how can there be democracy?

From Self-Determination to Jihad

NOT LONG AGO, Daniel Patrick Moynihan predicted that the next half hundred states likely to come into existence over the next fifty years will all be defined by ethnic conflict: that is to say, by civil war. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have together already produced twenty or more new (old) "nations" or national fragments. In the most egregious cases, the United Nations sends peacekeeping forces, although its member nations are increasingly loath to put their soldiers at risk. Currently; it has stationed troops in eighteen countries-in nearly every case, arrayed against forces of domestic insurrection and civil discord. The Carter Center in Atlanta has a still more nuanced and thus expansive list that is more or less mirrored in the forty-eight trouble spots charted by The New York Times at the beginning of 1993.⁹ Amnesty International reports political prisoners and political executions in more than sixty countries.

In this tumultuous world, the real players are not nations at all but tribes, many of them at war with one another. Their aim is precisely to redraw boundaries in order to divide--say in Kurdish Iraq or Muslim Sudan or Serbian-populated sections of Croatia. Countries like Afghanistan, recently fighting a foreign invader in the name of its national independence, have been effectively dismembered: divided among Panthans, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. This is ethnic membership enhanced via national dismemberment-or by expulsion or expunction of unwanted contaminants, as has occurred in slaughter- happy Rwanda. Is this pandaemonium just an extension of benign efforts at multiculturalism? A natural consequence of a centuries-old impulse to self-determination? Or the appearance of a new disease that has corrupted integral nationalism and opened the way to ethnic and religious Jihad?

Jihad is, I recognize, a strong term. In its mildest form, it betokens religious struggle on behalf of faith, a kind of Islamic zeal. In its strongest political manifestation, it means

bloody holy war on behalf of partisan identity that is metaphysically defined and fanatically defended. Thus, while for many Muslims it may signify only ardor in the name of a religion that can properly be regarded as universalizing, (if not quite ecumenical), I borrow its meaning from those militants who make the slaughter of the "other" a higher duty. 'O I use the term in its militant construction to suggest dogmatic and violent particularism of a kind known to Christians no less than Muslims, to Germans and Hindus as well as to Arabs. The phenomena to which I apply the phrase have innocent enough beginnings: identity politics and multicultural diversity can represent strategies of a free society trying to give expression to its diversity. What ends as Jihad may begin as a simple search for a local identity, some set of common personal attributes to hold out against the numbing and neutering uniformities of industrial modernization and the colonizing culture of McWorld.

America is often taken as the model for this kind of benign multiculturalism, although we too have our critics like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for whom multiculturalism is never benign and for whom it signals the inaugural logic of a long-term disintegration." Indeed, I will have occasion below to write about an American Jihad" being waged by the radical Right. The startling fact is that less than 10 percent (about twenty) of the modern world's states are truly homogenous and thus, like Denmark or the Netherlands, can't get smaller unless they fracture into tribes or clans.' In only half is there a single ethnic group that comprises even 75 percent of the population.' As in the United States, multiculturalism is the rule, homogeneity the exception. Nations like Japan or Spain that appear to the outside world as integral turn out to be remarkably multicultural. And even if language alone, the nation's essential attribute, is made the condition for self-determination, a count of the number of languages spoken around the world suggests the community of nations could grow to over six thousand members.

The modern nation-state has actually acted as a cultural integrator and has adapted well to pluralist ideals: civic ideologies and constitutional faiths around which their many clans and tribes can rally. It has not been too difficult to contrive a civil religion for Americans or French or Swiss, since these "peoples" actually contain multitudes of subnational factions and ethnic tribes earnestly seeking common ground. But for Basques and Normans? What need have they for anything but blood and memory? And what of Alsations, Bavarians, and East Prussians? Kurds, Ossetians, East Timorese, Quebecois, Abkhazians, Catalonians, Tamils, Inkatha Zulus, Kurile Islander Japanese-peoples without countries inhabiting nations they cannot call their own? Peoples trying to seal themselves off not just from others but from modernity? These are frightened tribes running not to but from civic faith in search of something more palpable and electrifying. How will peoples who define themselves by the slaughter of tribal neighbors be persuaded to subscribe to some flimsy artificial faith organized around abstract civic ideals or commercial markets? Can advertising divert warriors of blood from the genocide required by their ancient grievances?

Like McWorld, Jihad can of course be painted in bright as well as dark colors. Just as McWorld's sometimes-rapacious markets have been advanced in the name of democratic free choice, so Jihad's combative interests can be touted in the name of self-

determination. Indeed, the ideology of self-determination may be the source of more than a few of Jihad's pathologies. President Woodrow Wilson's own secretary of state, Robert L. Lansing, failed to share his chief's enthusiasm for the idea, asking would not self-determination "breed discontent, disorder and rebellion? The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes, which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!"

Lansing's anxieties seem well justified. In Wilson's own time, the politics of self-determination balkanized Europe, fanned nationalist wildfires, and created instabilities that contributed to the rise of fascism. Today there is no tribe, no faction or splinter group or neighborhood gang, that does not aspire to self-determination. "Don't dis me!" shouts the gangsta rapper, "I gotta get some respect." The futile Owen- Vance map for the partition of Bosnia, multiplying boundaries as it narrowed the compass of ethnic communities, finally 'med to give respectability to a gang logic, trying to write into law the absurdity of treating nearly each city block as a nation, almost every housing unit a potential sovereign. In other times, this bankrupt political arrangement, sanctioned for a considerable time a desperate United Nations Security Council, would carry the me anarchy.

One cannot really blame the cartographers or peacemakers for ad's absurdity, however. They do not rearrange the scene, they just take snapshots of it. Multiculturalism has in some places conjured anarchy. Self-determination has at times amounted to little more- m other-extermination. Colonial masters did still worse in their le, drawing arbitrary lines across maps they could not read with .1sequences still being endured throughout the ex-colonial world, above all in America and the Middle East. Jihad is then a rapid response to colonialism and imperialism and their economic children, capitalism and modernity; it is diversity run amok, multiculturalism turned cancerous so that the cells keep dividing long after their division has ceased to serve the healthy corpus.

Even traditionally homogenous integral nations have reason to 1 anxious about the prospect of Jihad. The rising economic and communications interdependence of the world means that such nations, however unified internally; must nonetheless operate in a Teasingly multicultural global environment. Ironically, a world It is coming together pop culturally and commercially is a world whose discrete subnational ethnic and religious and racial parts are o far more in evidence, in no small part as a reaction to McWorld. Forced into incessant contact, postmodern nations cannot sequester their idiosyncracies. Post-Maastricht Europe, while it falls well short earlier ambitions, has become integrated enough to force a continent-wide multicultural awareness whose consequences have by means been happy, let alone unifying. The more "Europe" hoves into view, the more reluctant and self-aware its national constituents become. What Gtinter Grass said of Germany- "unified, the Germans were more disunited than ever"-applies in spades to Europe and the world beyond: integrated, it is more disintegral than ever. Responding to McWorld, parochial forces defend and deny; reject and repel modernity wherever they find it. But they also absorb and assimilate, utilizing the native's strategy against every colonizer to have crossed a border since the Romans came to Gaul. When

the Hilton came to the Hills of Buda, a local architect grafted the new structure onto a thirteenth-century monastery: When the French restored the Champs Elyseés to its former glory, they banished the arch from McDonald's. When American music invaded the Caribbean, Orlando Patterson reminds us, the Caribbean reacted with enormous music production of its own, of which reggae is only one well-known example.¹⁹ Yet to think that indigenization and globalization are entirely coequal forces that put Jihad and McWorld on an equal footing is to vastly underestimate the force of the new planetary markets. The Budapest Hilton's "monastery" houses a casino; Paris's McDonald's serves Big Macs and fries with or without the arch; reggae gets only a tiny percentage of MTV play time even in Latin markets. It's no contest.

A pattern of feudal relations does, however, persist. And so we are returned to the metaphor of feudalism, that puzzling world of fragments knit together by the abstraction of Christianity. Today's abstraction is the consumers' market, no less universal for all its insistent materialist secularism. Following McDonald's golden arch from country to country, the market traces a trajectory of dollars and bonds and ads and yen and stocks and currency transactions that reaches right around the globe. Grass's observation works the other way around as well: disunited, pulled apart by Jihad, the world is more united than ever. And more interdependent as well.

The Smalling World of McWorld

EVEN THE MOST DEVELOPED, supposedly self-sufficient nations can no longer pretend to genuine sovereignty. That is the meaning of ecology, a term that marks the final obsolescence of all man-made boundaries. When it comes to acid rain or oil spills or depleted fisheries or tainted groundwater or fluorocarbon propellants or radiation leaks or toxic wastes or sexually transmitted diseases, national frontiers are simply irrelevant. Toxins don't stop for customs inspections and microbes don't carry passports. North America became an assimilate, utilizing the native's strategy against every colonizer to have crossed a border since the Romans came to Gaul. When the Hilton came to the Hills of Buda, a local architect grafted the new structure onto a thirteenth-century monastery: When the French restored the Champs Elysees to its former glory, they banished the arch from McDonald's. When American music invaded the Caribbean, Orlando Patterson reminds us, the Caribbean reacted with enormous music production of its own, of which reggae is only one well-known example. Yet to think that indigenization and globalization are entirely coequal forces that put Jihad and McWorld on an equal footing is to vastly underestimate the force of the new planetary markets. The Budapest Hilton's "monastery" houses a casino; Paris's McDonald's serves Big Macs and fries with or without the arch; reggae gets only a tiny percentage of MTV play time even in Latin markets. It's no contest.

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The environmental tocsin has been sounded, loudly and often, and there is little to add here to the prodigious literature warning of a biospherical Armageddon. We have learned well enough how easily the German forests can be devastated by Swiss and Italians driving gas-guzzling roadsters fueled by leaded gas (the Europeans are far behind the Americans in controlling lead). We know that the planet can be asphyxiated by greenhouse gases because Brazilian farmers want to be part of the twentieth century and are burning down their tropical rain forests to clear a little land to plow, and because many Indonesians make a living out of converting their lush jungles into toothpicks for fastidious Japanese diners, upsetting the delicate oxygen balance and puncturing our global lungs. Ecological interdependence is, however, reactive: a consequence of natural forces we cannot predict or fully control. But McWorld's interdependence and the limits it places on sovereignty is more a matter of positive economic forces that have globalism as their conscious object. It is these economic and commercial forces-the latest round in capitalism's long-standing search for world markets and global consumers-that are the primary subject of this book.

Every demarcated national economy and every kind of public good is today vulnerable to the inroads of transnational commerce. Markets abhor frontiers as nature abhors a vacuum. Within their expansive and permeable domains, interests are private, trade is free, currencies are convertible, access to banking is open, contracts are enforceable (the state's sole legitimate economic function), and the laws of production and consumption are sovereign, trumping the laws of legislatures and courts. In Europe, Asia, and the Americas such markets have already eroded national sovereignty and given birth to a new class of institutions-international banks, trade associations, transnational lobbies like OPEC, world news services like CNN and the BBC, and multinational corporations-institutions that lack distinctive national identities and neither reflect nor respect nationhood as an organizing or a regulative principle. While mills and factories sit somewhere on sovereign territory under the eye and potential regulation of nation-states, currency markets and the Internet exist everywhere, but nowhere in particular. Without an address or a national affiliation, they are altogether beyond the devices of sovereignty.^{2°} Even products are becoming anonymous: whose national workforce do

you fault on a defective integrated circuit labeled: Made in one or more of the following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of origin is unknown.²¹ How are the social and political demands of responsibility preserved under such remarkable circumstances?

The market imperative has in fact reinforced the quest for inter.; national peace and stability, requisites of an efficient international economy, without improving the chances for civic responsibility, accountability, or democracy, which mayor may not benefit from commerce and free markets and which, although it depends on peace, is not synonymous with it. The claim that democracy and markets are twins has become a commonplace of statesmanship, especially in light of the demise of state socialism, which has left capitalism's zealots free to regard themselves not only as victors in the Cold War but as the true champions of a democracy that (they are certain) markets alone make possible. Thus have they managed to parlay the already controversial claim that markets are free into the even more controversial claim that market freedom entails and even defines democracy: President Clinton employed the phrase democratic markets as a mantra during his historic visit to Eastern Europe and Russia at the beginning of 1994.²² His foreign policy aides have consistently done the same.²³

This stealth rhetoric that assumes capitalist interests are not only compatible with but actively advance democratic ideals, translated into policy, is difficult to reconcile with the international realities of the last fifty years. Market economies have shown a remarkable, adaptability and have flourished in many tyrannical states from) Chile to South Korea, from Panama to Singapore. Indeed, the state, with one of the world's least democratic governments-the People's Republic of China-possesses one of the world's fastest-growing market economies. "Communist" Vietnam is not far behind, and was opened to American trade recently; presumably on the strength of the belief that markets ultimately defeat ideology. Capitalism requires consumers with access to markets and a stable political climate in order to succeed: such conditions mayor may not be fostered by democracy, which can be disorderly and even anarchic, especially in its early stages, and which often pursues public goods costly to or at odds with private-market imperatives environmentalism or full employment for example. On the level of the individual, capitalism seeks consumers susceptible to the shaping of their needs and the manipulation of their wants while democracy needs citizens autonomous in their thoughts and independent in their deliberative judgments. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wishes to "tame savage capitalism," but capitalism wishes to tame anarchic democracy and appears to have little problem tolerating tyranny as long as it secures stability.

Certainly the hurried pursuit of free markets regardless of social consequences has put democratic development in jeopardy in many nations recently liberated from communism.²⁶ Social insecurity and rampant unemployment for peoples accustomed to the cradle-to- the-grave ministrations of paternalistic socialist bureaucracies are unlikely to convert them to a system of democracy for which they have otherwise had no preparation. This is perhaps why majorities in all but a handful of ex-Soviet lands have been busy reelecting former Communist officials (usually wearing new party labels and

carrying new ideological doctrines) to their new democratic legislatures. In economist Robert McIntyre's blunt words: "Communists and former Communists are winning because the Western economic advice has led to pointless, dysfunctional pain, while failing to set the foundations for politically and socially viable future growth." The right to choose between nine VCR models or a dozen automobile brands does not necessarily feel like freedom to workers whose monthly ~ salaries can hardly keep up with the rising price of bread, let alone to women and men with no jobs at all. Capitalists may be democrats but capitalism does not need or entail democracy; And capitalism certainly does not need the nation-state that has been democracy's most promising host.

This is not to criticize capitalism in and of itself: joint-stock, limited-liability corporations are quite properly interested primarily in profits and pursue civic liberty and social justice only where they do not interfere with the bottom line. Indeed, they have certain conspicuous virtues beyond their intrinsic economic utilities like efficiency, productivity, elasticity, and profitability. They are enemies of parochialism, isolation, fractiousness, and war and are hostile to constraints on economic choice and social mobility, although this hardly makes them friends of justice. Market psychology also can attenuate the psychology of ideological and religious cleavages and nurture concord among producers and consumers, identities that ill-suit Jihad's narrowly conceived ethnic or religious cultures. But it also undermines the psychology of skeptical inquiry upon which autonomous judgment and resistance to manipulation are founded.

In the world of McWorld, the alternative to dogmatic traditionalism may turn out to be materialist consumerism or relativistic secularism or merely a profitable corruption.²⁸ Democracy's ties to McWorld are at best contingent. Shopping, it is true, has little tolerance for blue laws, whether dictated by pub-closing British paternalism, Sabbath-observing Jewish Orthodoxy, or no-Sunday-liquor-sales Massachusetts Puritanism; but intolerance for blue laws is hardly a condition for constitutional faith or a respect for due process. In the context of common markets, international law has largely ceased to be a vision of justice and has become a workaday framework for getting things done: enforcing contracts, certifying deals, regulating trade and currency relations, and supervising mergers or bankruptcies. Moralists used to complain that international law was impotent in curbing the injustices of nation-states, but it has shown even less capacity to rein in markets that, after all, do not even have an address to which subpoenas can be sent. As the product of a host of individual choices or singular corporate acts, markets offer no collective responsibility. Yet responsibility is the first obligation of both citizens and civic institutions.

While they produce neither common interests nor common law, common markets do demand, along with a common currency, a common language; moreover, they produce common behaviors of the kind bred by cosmopolitan city life everywhere. Commercial pilots, computer programmers, film directors, international bankers, media specialists, oil riggers, entertainment celebrities, ecology experts, movie producers, demographers, accountants, professors, lawyers, athletes—these compose a new breed of men and women for whom religion, culture, and ethnic nationality are marginal elements in a working identity. Although sociologists of everyday life will continue to distinguish a Japanese from an American mode, shopping has a common signature throughout the world. Cynics

might even suggest that some of the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe had as their true goal not liberty and the right to-vote but well-paying jobs and the right to shop. Shopping means consumption and consumption depends on the fabrication of needs as well as of goods in what I will call the infotainment telesector of the service economy.

Mc World is a product of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce. Its template is American, its form style. Its goods are as much images as materiel, an aesthetic as well as a product line. It is about culture as commodity, apparel as ideology: Its symbols are Harley- Davidson motorcycles and Cadillac motorcars hoisted from the roadways, where they once represented a mode of transportation, to the marquees of global market cafes like Harley-Davidson's and the Hard Rock where they become icons of lifestyle. You don't drive them, you feel their vibes and rock to the images they conjure up from old movies and new celebrities, whose personal appearances are the key to the wildly popular international cafe chain Planet Hollywood. Music, video, theater, books, and theme parks-the new churches of a commercial civilization in which malls are the public squares and suburbs the neighborless neighborhoods-are all constructed as image exports creating a common world taste around common logos, advertising slogans, stars, songs, brand names, jingles, and trademarks. Hard power yields to soft, while ideology is transmuted into a kind of videology that works through sound bites and film clips. Videology is fuzzier and less dogmatic than traditional political ideology: it may as a consequence be far more successful in instilling the novel values required for global markets to succeed.

McWorld's videology remains Jihad's most formidable rival, and in the long run it may attenuate the force of Jihad's recidivist tribalisms. Yet the information revolution's instrumentalities are also Jihad's favored weapons. Hutu or Bosnian Serb identity was less a matter of real historical memory than of media propaganda by a leadership set on liquidating rival clans. In both Rwanda and Bosnia, radio broadcasts whipped listeners into a killing frenzy. As New York Times rock critic Jon Pareles has noticed, "regionalism in pop music has become as trendy as microbrewery beer and narrowcasting cable channels, and for the same reasons." The global culture is what~ gives the local culture its medium, its audience, and its aspirations. Fascist pop and Hasid rock are not oxymorons; rather they manifest the dialectics of McWorld in particularly dramatic ways. Belgrade's radio includes stations that broadcast Western pop music as a rebuke to hard-liner Milosevic's supernationalist government and stations that broadcast native folk tunes laced with antiforeign and anti-Semitic sentiments. Even the Internet has its neo-Nazi bulletin ~;-~ boards and Turk-trashing Armenian "flamers" (who assail every use ~: of the word turkey, fair and fowl alike, so to speak), so that the abstractions of cyberspace too are infected with a peculiar and rabid cultural territoriality all their own.

The dynamics of the Jihad- Mc World linkage are deeply dialectical. Japan has, for example, become more culturally insistent on its own traditions in recent years even as its people seek an ever greater purchase on McWorld. In 1992, the number-one restaurant in Japan measured by volume of customers was McDonald's, followed in the number-two spot by the Colonel's Kentucky Fried Chicken.³¹ In France, where cultural purists complain bitterly of a looming Sixieme Republique ("la Republique Americaine"), the

government attacks "franglais" even as it funds EuroDisney park just outside of Paris. In the same spirit, the cinema industry makes war on American film imports while it bestows upon Sylvester Stallone one of France's highest honors, the Chevalier des arts et lettres.³² Ambivalence also stalks India. Just outside of Bombay; cheek by jowl with villages still immersed in poverty and notorious for the informal execution of unwanted female babies or, even, wives, can be found a new town known as SCEEPZ--the Santa Cruz Electronic Export Processing Zone--where Hindi-, Tamil-, and Mahratti-speaking computer programmers write software for Swissair, AT&T, and other labor- cost-conscious multinationals. India is thus at once a major exemplar of ancient ethnic and religious tensions and "an emerging power in the international software industry."³³ To go to work at SCEEPZ, says an employee, is "like crossing an international border." Not into another country; but into the virtual nowhere-land of McWorld.

More dramatic even than in India, is the strange interplay of Jihad and McWorld in the remnants of Yugoslavia. In an affecting New Republic report, Slavenka Drakulic recently told the brief tragic love story of Admira and Bosko, two young star-crossed lovers from Sarajevo: "They were born in the late Ig60's," she writes. "They watched Spielberg movies; they listened to Iggy Pop; they read John le Carre; they went to a disco every Saturday night and fantasized about traveling to Paris or London."³⁴ Longing for safety, it seems they finally negotiated with all sides for safe passage, and readied their departure from Sarajevo. Before they could cross the magical border that separates their impoverished land from the seeming sanctuary of McWorld, Jihad caught up to them. Their bodies lay along the riverbank, riddled with bullets from anonymous snipers for whom safe passage signaled an invitation to target practice. The murdered young lovers, as befits emigres to McWorld, were clothed in jeans and sneakers. So too, one imagines, were their murderers.

Further east, tourists seeking a piece of old Russia that does not take them too far from MTV can find traditional Matryoshka nesting dolls (that fit one inside the other) featuring the nontraditional visages of (from largest to smallest) Bruce Springsteen, Madonna, Boy George, Dave Stewart, and Annie Lennox.³⁵

In Russia, in India, in Bosnia, in Japan, and in France too, modern history then leans both ways: toward the meretricious inevitability of McWorld, but also into Jihad's stiff winds, heaving to and fro and giving heart both to the Panglossians and the Pandoras, sometimes for the very same reasons. The Panglossians bank on Euro-Disney and Microsoft, while the Pandoras await nihilism and a world in Pandaemonium. Yet McWorld and Jihad do not really force a choice between such polarized scenarios. Together, they are likely to produce some stifling amalgam of the two suspended in chaos. Antithetical in every detail, Jihad and Mc World nonetheless conspire to undermine our hard-won (if only half-won) civil liberties and the possibility of a global democratic future. In the short run the forces of Jihad, noisier and more obviously nihilistic than those of Mc World, are likely to dominate the near future, etching small stories of local tragedy and regional genocide on the face of our times and creating a climate of instability marked by multimicrowars inimical to global integration. But in the long run, the forces of McWorld are the forces underlying the slow certain thrust of Western civilization and

as such may be unstoppable. Jihad's microwars will hold the headlines well into the next century, making predictions of the end of history look terminally dumb. But McWorld's homogenization is likely to establish a macropeace that favors the triumph of commerce and its markets and to give to those who control information, communication, and entertainment ultimate (if inadvertent) control over human destiny; Unless we can offer an alternative to the struggle between Jihad and Mc World, the epoch on whose threshold we stand- postcommunist, postindustrial, postnational, yet sectarian, fearful, and bigoted- is likely also to, be terminally postdemocratic.

Essential Jihad: Islam and Fundamentalism

Nowhere IS THE tension between democracy and Jihad more evident than in the Islamic world, where the idea of Jihad has a home of birth but certainly not an exclusive patent. For, although it is clear that Islam is a complex religion that by no means is synonymous with Jihad, it is relatively inhospitable to democracy and that inhospitality in turn nurtures conditions favorable to parochialism, antimodernism, exclusiveness, and hostility to "others"-the characteristics that constitute what I have called Jihad. While Jihad is a term associated with the moral (and sometimes armed) struggle of believers against faithlessness and the faithless, I have used it here to speak to a generic form of fundamentalist opposition to modernity that can be found in most world religions. In their massive five-volume study of fundamentalisms, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby treat Sunni and Shiite Islam but pay equal attention to Protestantism and Catholicism in a variety of European, and North and South American forms, to Hinduism, to the Sikhs, to Theravada Buddhism, to Confucianist Revivalism, and to Zionism. Marty and Appleby take fundamentalist religions to be engaged in militancy, in a kind of permanent fighting: they are "militant, whether in the use of words and ideas or ballots or, in extreme cases, bullets." They fight back, struggling reactively against the present in the name of the past; they fight for their religious conception of the world against secularism and relativism; they fight with weapons of every kind, sometimes borrowed from the enemy; carefully chosen to secure their identity; they fight against others who are agents of corruption; and they fight under God for a cause that, because it is holy; cannot be lost even when it is not yet won. The struggle that is Jihad is not then just a feature of Islam but a characteristic of all fundamentalisms. Nevertheless, Jihad is an Islamic term and is given its animating power by its association not just with fundamentalism in general but with Islamic fundamentalism in particular and with the armed struggles groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad have engaged in. There are moderate and liberal strands in Islam, but they are less prominent at present than the militant strand.

As a religion, Islam has universalist tendencies and while hardly ecumenical, it has displayed considerable tolerance for other religions, even when practiced by minorities dwelling in Muslim countries. Historically; it has shown a greater reluctance to proselytize than Christianity. It has had its empires, but nothing to rival the Crusades or the colonial empires of Britain and France. Yet Islam posits a world in which the Muslim religion and the Islamic state are cocreated and inseparable, and some observers argue it has less room for secularism than any other major world religion. Thus, while there are

fundamentalist tendencies in every religion, in Islam, such tendencies have played a leading political role since the eighteenth century: This has created special problems for democracy and human rights in predominantly Muslim countries throughout the Middle East, North America, and Asia. Moreover, in such countries the struggle of Jihad against McWorld has been much more than a metaphor for tribalism or a worried antimodernism. It has been a literal war on the values, culture, and institutions that make up liberal society. Even Arab friends of the West feel constrained to raise doubts about Western values. In an advertisement intended to allay the worries of Americans about its Saudi Arabian ally, Ambassador Prince Bandar Ibn-Sultan nonetheless felt compelled to write: "Foreign imports are nice as shiny or high-tech 'things.' But intangible social and political institutions can be deadly " An official of the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance can afford to be less oblique. About satellite programs being beamed in to Teheran, he says: "These programs, prepared by international imperialism, are part of an extensive plot to wipe out our religious and sacred values."³ With *Dynasty*, *Donahue*, *Dinky Dog*, and *The Simpsons* being beamed in courtesy of Star TV to compete with what Iranian skeptics call "the man on the balcony" (the late revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini delivering interminable speeches), it is hardly surprising that the Iranian state believes "the satellite is exactly against the honorable Prophet" and is trying to ban the import, manufacture, and use of satellite dishes!

Jihad has been a metaphor for anti- Western antiuniversalist struggle throughout this book. The question here is whether it is more than just a metaphor in the Muslim culture that produced the term. An empirical survey of existing governments in Islamic nations certainly affirms a certain lack of affinity between Islam and democracy; In nearly all Muslim nations, democracy has never been tried or has been pushed aside after unsuccessful experiments. In Algeria, following elections that, because fundamentalists triumphed, -were annulled, it is in deep peril; in Egypt, where democracy has not really been fully tried, minimal liberties are being eroded by a fearful government trying to track down fundamentalist enemies; in Kuwait, even after the war to "liberate" it from the Iraqi oppressors, democracy is invisible. Nations like Pakistan and Afghanistan and Sudan have become or seem likely to become even less democratic than they were as Islamic fundamentalists become more powerful, while American allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the oil emirates are hard-pressed to keep up the pretense of being democratic as they pursue their antifundamentalist struggle, even though it is in the name of democracy that they do battle.

Indeed, fundamentalism may have a better record as an enemy of despots in the Middle East than have had the secular systems constructed to put down fundamentalism and to realize Western aspirations. Yet though fundamentalism has often stood against tyranny, it has never created democracy. The historical record is poor enough to have led some observers like John Waterbury to credit an "exceptionalist" thesis: that Islam creates an exceptional set of circumstances that disqualify Islamic countries from becoming democratic and fates them to an eternal struggle against the Enlightenment and its liberal and democratic children.⁵ Hilal Khashan says simply, "All of the...democratic prerequisites are lacking in the Arab world. Arab democracy along Western terms is wishful thinking."

Yet as one might expect, there are rival interpretations of Islam within the Islamic world, and no single monolithic argument goes unchallenged. Although Islam has no word for democracy and uses the Greek term (but then, as it happens, so do we) and though it often regards democratic political systems as unique to the West-what in Arabic is denominated as the strange, dark, fear-inspiring "Gharb" where the sun sets on the home of alien and aggressive peoples-it is not without its own Islamic Enlightenment sources. In at least one version of its history, Islam too is a story of the struggle between reason and belief, between consent and authoritarianism, between resistance to tyranny and tyrants. The Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi insists that "throughout its history Islam has been marked by two trends: an intellectual trend that speculated on the philosophical foundations of the world and humanity, and another trend that turned political challenge violent by resort to force." The first trend offered a meditation on reason akin to Western humanism; the second "simply thought that by rebelling against the imam and sometimes killing him they could change things."⁷ Both traditions "raise the same issues that we are today told are imports from the West," issues of resistance and accountability-that is to say, of democracy. There is thus a sense in which Islamic fundamentalists are genuine resisters against corrupt worldly political authority, much as the early Christians were. The zealots who assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 were members of a group called literally "Jihad" and when, their bloody deed done, they shouted, "I have killed Pharaoh, and I do not fear death," they were speaking the language of martyrs of liberation.⁸ In Algeria, fundamentalists came to power by the ballot in 1991 and it was the secular party of national liberation under the tutelage of the army that shut down democratic institutions rather than turn them over to its adversaries, who had vanquished them in the polls. Observers thus continue to believe that Islam and democracy have a future together. At a 1992 conference held by the United States Institute on Peace, conferees spoke of a "new synthesis" in which the "clash of opinions on the relationship between Islam and democracy could yield a new synthesis view in which Islamic notions enhance and give new meaning to democratic concepts beyond their current western-dominated usages."

How real is this promise? Is democracy in Islamic countries more a victim of colonial repression and postcolonial exploitation than of indigenous Islamic forces, as critics like Edward W Said contend. Or is Islam an "exception" that rules out a free civil society and thus precludes real democracy? If democracy means Western democracy and modernization means Westernization, there would seem to be little hope for reconciliation since Islam regards Western secular culture and its attending values as corrupting to and morally incompatible with its own. But if democracy takes many forms, and is an ancient as well as a modern manifestation of the quest for self-governing communities, then perhaps it can be adapted to notions found in the Koran such as umma (community), shura (mutual consultation), and at maslaha (public interest). As other Islamic scholars have argued, understood this way; Islam may not be "antithetical to the telos of democratic values." ¹¹ Islamic fundamentalists may insist that since Allah's will is sovereign, the people's will cannot be, but moderates point out that this still leaves ample room for the majority to exercise political authority as long as it does so within a framework that acknowledges the ultimate hegemony of divine power. Neither France

nor Italy has a formal constitutional separation of church and state and both have constructed relatively viable democracies. Ultimate obedience to God can act as a brake on authoritarian and licentious worldly government, while affording a moderate people, constrained by faith, room to govern themselves democratically in the manner of Calvinist Geneva or Puritan Massachusetts before the Revolution.

The trouble with this path to reconciliation is that fundamentalist Islam is not first of all opposed to democracy but to modernization, particularly as manifested in Westernization. Democracy has ancient antecedents and in its premodern and preliberal forms is not necessarily at odds either with fundamentalist Islam nor with fundamentalist Christianity. The City of God for Christians and Muslims alike is constituted by brother believers who are equal in their filial posture vis-a-vis God. But unlike democracy; which can be compatible with religion (Tocqueville actually thought it depended on religion), modernity is tantamount to secularism and is almost by definition corrupting to all religion, above all to that religion that assumes the "comprehensive and universal nature of the message of God as presented in the Qur'an."¹² This comprehensive and universal sovereignty of God creates thorny problems for Islam that Christianity circumvented by postulating a "two swords" doctrine in which God ruled in His domain and Man, through kingship, ruled in his own. Pope Gregory's use of the New Testament accommodationist maxim, "Render unto God those things that are God's and unto Caesar those that are Caesar's," represented a preconstitutional separation of church and state that has no analog in Islam, which prefers that men render everything unto Allah, ecclesiastic and worldly, spiritual and temporal alike. Such a monolithic arrangement may discomfit democrats, although it also discomfits kings (since neither have a domain exclusive of Allah's in which to practice their sovereignty or their despotism; Allah does not tolerate rivals).

Nevertheless, democracy has always found a way to accommodate religion, and Jihad's war has been less with democracy than with McWorld. In the 1920s, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was railing against "the wave of atheism and lewdness" engulfing Egypt, a wave that "started the devastation of religion and morality on the pretext of individual and intellectual freedom." Al-Banna could be reproaching Rupert Murdoch or Barry Diller when he assailed Westerners for importing "their half-naked women into these regions, together with their liquors, their theaters, their dance halls, their amusements, their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their whims, their silly games, and their vices." He had taken the measure of McWorld long before McWorld had jelled sufficiently to take the measure of itself. Grasping the superior corrosiveness of knowledge over arms and of communications over armies, he warned in the 1920s that the culture of the West "was more dangerous than the political and military campaigns by far." Where colonial empires failed, he seemed to prophesy, McWorld would succeed.

Al-Banna's indignation goes to the very heart of Jihad's campaign against the modern, the secular, and the cosmopolitan. It captures the essence of fundamentalism as it has existed since the seventeenth century, growing up alongside the devil modernity to which it has played angel's advocate for Puritans and Muslims, Buddhists and born-again Baptists

alike. Compare al-Banna's fiery rhetoric with the mad sermonizing of the British Puritan Prynne. In his nearly hysterical genealogy of theatrical vices called "Histriomastix," Prynne condemns stage plays as "the very pompes of the Divell which we renounce in Baptisme ...sinfull, heathenish, lewde, ungodly spectacles, and most pernicious Corruptions," and then goes on to asperse as "wicked, unChristian past times" a host of modern pursuits including "effeminate mixt dancing, Dicing, lascivious pictures, wanton Fashions, face-painting, health-drinking, long haire, love-lockes, Periwigs, womens curling, pouldering and cutting of their hair, Bone- Fires, New-yeares gifts, Maygames, amorous Pastoralls, lascivious effeminate Musicke, excessive laughter, luxurious disorderly Christmas keeping. .." and a dozen other amusements that together compose a catalog of McWorld's progenitors. 14 Is there a single item here a fervent mullah could not also condemn? We can also hear al-Banna's outrage in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's calculated rant against capital cities as coffins of true justice and morals, cities full of scheming, idle people without religion or principle. Is Rousseau's complaints are the complaints of Provence peasants against effete Parisian courtiers and modernizing Parisian Jacobins; they are the bitter remonstrances of Alabama farmers against the cultural elites in Hollywood and New York and the out-of-touch "pols" playing special interest games "inside the beltway;" For the revolt against modernity is a rebellion against cosmopolitanism and its urban culture and urbane entertainments. Not without good reason, the antic cosmopolitan animus that drives all fundamentalist reaction has come to distrust Enlightenment: for economic growth brings burgeoning worldly needs and an obsession with gratification while the arts and sciences undermine simplicity and the natural faith of simple women and men. Enlightenment breeds secularism and secularism destroys not just formal religion but the morals on which it is based and thus the social fabric that holds communities together.

Finally, al-Banna is not so far from Pat Robertson and Pat Buchanan and the Christian Right's campaign for a return to nineteenth-century family values—family values understood as direct emanations of church going, school prayer, and a Protestant Christian America. As the Muslim Brotherhood saw in Christianity a crusading corruptor, Know-Nothing American Protestants back in the 1880s saw in Mediterranean Catholic immigrants a grave peril to the American Republic, just as nervous Californians today worry about illegal Latino immigrants as a burden not only on their pocketbooks but on the moral order of their unraveling communities. To Americans, Jihad is often taken to be a foreign phenomenon, a feature of Middle Eastern politics and the Holy War between Muslim diaspora and Zionist settlers mutually obsessed with holy turf. But we can today also speak of an American Jihad. Not the American Jihad promulgated by the media focused on the World Trade Center bombers or on Arab-American supporters of Hamas—the American Jihad about which Stephen Barboza wrote his recent book.

The American Jihad that counts is rather the antiestablishmentarian fundamentalism of the Christian Right, the Jihad of profoundly antimodern fundamentalist Protestants who rebel against the culture of disbelief generated by the McWorld that is in their midst; the McWorld they unearth on their prime-time television programming and rebury on their talk-radio rants; and in the secular public square where despised "liberal" politicians undermine their belief systems, with textbooks that preach evolution and schools that bar prayer.

Modernity has enemies other than Islamic Holy War, then, some of them on McWorld's own American home turf. At least since the 1730s, when America experienced its first "Great Awakening" in Protestant fundamentalism, this country has periodically felt the zeal of reactive religion. Mainstream Christian Coalition leaders today offer what is relatively speaking a moderate version of Jihad. Jerry Falwell, the president of the Moral Majority, thus sermonizes against Supreme Court that has "raped the Constitution and raped the Christian faith and raped the churches" and implores followers to "fight against those radical minorities who are trying to remove God from our textbooks, Christ from our nation. We must never allow our children to forget that this is a Christian nation. We must take back what is rightfully ours."¹⁸ Pat Buchanan tells the Republican National Convention in 1992 that the country faces a cultural war for Its very survival and victorious Republicans following the 1994 elections accuse President Clinton of countercultural and un-American attitudes. Less conventional warriors such as Randall Terry, the intiabortion crusader, are far more blunt: "I want you to just let a wave of intolerance wash over you. I want you to let a wave of hatred wash over you. Yes, hate is good. ...Our goal is a Christian nation.

We have a biblical duty, we are called by God, to conquer this country."¹⁹ These Christian soldiers bring to their ardent campaign against time and the modern world all the indignation, all the impatience with moral slackness, all the purifying hatred, of the zealots in Teheran and Cairo. They indulge McWorld only in order to use it high-tech communications to organize voters or its rock music to sugar-coat salvation lyrics. Groups like Gospel Gangstas and A- I S.W.I.F.T. press drive-by shootings into the service of Jesus:

In this scrap the Word of God's my A-K
Pointed at your Dome
'Cause my aim is straight, hey. ..
You wanna be set free
Then you gotta be saved
Better do it now
Move with the quickness
Or else I'll hit you with the
Drive by Witness.²⁰

They may not be angels, these pious gospel cowboys, but they are not madmen either: they are winning local elections and helped win Congress for the Republicans in 1994, and they are continuing to push the Republican Party further and further rightward. They raised millions for Colonel Oliver North's senatorial campaign in Virginia and nearly won. They are astute not merely in their political tactics but in their judgment on McWorld. There is much in McWorld that is sickening, much that outrages elementary justice and morals, much that demeans religion and religious belief, much that belittles both human beings and the larger spirit to which-if they are to feel human-they feel they must belong. The yearning of American suburbanites for the certainties of a literal New Testament are no less ingenuous than the yearning of Arabic martyrs for the certainties of a literal Qur'an. They both want to be born again so as to be born yesterday; born into a

former epoch before Nietzsche tried to persuade us that God had died; they want martyrdom before Weber's prophecy that rational men and bureaucratic governments will disenchant the world can come true. Some join fundamentalist collectives, others cultivate a pioneer solitude, going "off the grid" to combat the "new world order" they believe is endangering the anti-modern values they cherish.²² They may break their heads against time itself, but time has not been a friend to either religion or morals in recent centuries. Even the pragmatists who are prepared to live with what history delivers may seek deliverance from the lives they are bequeathed.

Moreover, there is a new breed of American pragmatist: a fearsome pragmatist of holy war who acts out the rage he has carefully cultured from seeds of deeply felt resentment. He may be a veteran but not necessarily, and he probably belongs not just to the National Rifle Association but to a hate group like the White Aryan Resistance or the Order or one of the rapidly spreading "militias" that are forming in nearly every state in America. He is fascinated by the destructive technology of McWorld-its assault weapons and explosives-even as he identifies McWorld's globalism with the loss of his own American style "ancient" liberty. His anger reflects a kind of studied perversion of the civil religion. To him, the constitution means the second amendment (the right to bear arms), liberty means the law stops where his property begins (federal officers are agents of totalitarianism), and government is a demon "it" fronting for communists and the United Nations against which a defensive war must be organized and waged to prevent it from taking over the country.

As befits the paranoid style, his heroes are driven loners like Robert Jay Matthews, a leader of the Order who back in 1984 murdered Denver talk show host Alan Berg and was himself killed in a subsequent fire; Randy Weaver, a white supremacist whose wife and son were killed in a shootout with the authorities in 1992; David Koresh, the Davidian "martyr" whose immolation in Waco in the 1993 government raid has become a call to vengeance for thousands of McWorld castoffs; and Richard Wayne Snell, a self-styled Nazi who murdered a black Arkansas state trooper and was executed on April 19, 1995.

April 19, 1995: that was the same day--exactly two years after the Waco tragedy--a handful of zealots "honoring" these predecessors blew up the federal building in Oklahoma City in what was the most costly terrorist episode in American history; The authorities immediately suspected Jihad. They were right, although mistakenly they thought Jihad meant foreign: Islamic or Arab or Iranian. But Jihad had come home to America in all its native ferocity. Home-grown, it stalks the heartland. .
If McWorld in its most elemental negative form is a kind of animal greed--One that is achieved by an aggressive and irresistible energy, Jihad in its most elemental negative form is a kind of anima fear propelled by anxiety in the face of uncertainty and relieved by self-sacrificing zealotry--an escape out of history ²³ Because history " has been a history of individuation, acquisitiveness, secularization, aggressiveness, atomization, and immoralism it becomes in the eyes of Jihad's disciples the temporal chariot of wickedness, a carrier of corruption that, along with time itself, must be rejected. Moral preservationists, whether in America, Israel, Iran, or India, have no choice but to make

war on the present to secure a future more like (the past: depluralized, monocultured, unskepticized, reenchanting).

Homogenous values by which women and men live orderly and simple lives were once nurtured under such conditions. Today, our lives have become pulp fiction and Pulp Fiction as novel, as movie, or as life * promises no miracles. McWorld is meager fare for hungry moralists and shows only passing interest in the spirit. However outrageous the deeds associated with Jihad, the revolt the deeds manifest is reactive to changes that are themselves outrageous.

This survey of the moral topography of Jihad suggests that Mc World-the spiritual poverty of markets-may bear a portion of the blame for the excesses of the holy war against the modern; and that Jihad as a form of negation reveals Jihad as a form of affirmation. Jihad tends the soul that McWorld abjures and strives for the moral well being that McWorld, busy with the consumer choices it -- mistakes for freedom, disdains. Jihad thus goes to war with McWorld and, because each worries the other will obstruct and ultimately thwart the realization of its ends, the war between them becomes a holy war. The lines here are drawn not in sand but in stone. The language of hate is not easily subjected to compromise; the "other" as enemy cannot easily be turned into an interlocutor. But as McWorld is "other" to Jihad, so Jihad is "other" to McWorld. Reasoned communication between the two is problematic when for the partisans of Jihad both reason and communication appear as seductive instrumentalities of the devil, while for the partisans of McWorld both are seductive instrumentalities of consumerism. For all their dialectical interplay with respect to democracy, Jihad and McWorld are moral antinomies. There is no room in the mosque for Nintendo, no place on the Internet for Jesus-however rapidly "religious" channels are multiplying. Life cannot be both play and in earnest, cannot stand for the lesser gratification of a needy body and simultaneously for the greater glory of a selfless soul. Either the Qur'an speaks the Truth, or Truth is a television quiz show. History has given us Jihad as a counterpoint to McWorld and made them inextricable; but individuals cannot live in both domains at once and are compelled to choose. Sadly, it is not obvious that the choice, whatever it is, holds out much promise to democrats in search of a free civil society.

Should would-be democrats take their chances then with McWorld, with which they have shared the road to modernity but that has shown so little interest in them? Or try to reach an accommodation with Jihad, whose high moral purpose serves democracy's seriousness yet leaves but precious little space for its liberties? As it turns out, neither Jihad nor McWorld-and certainly not the quarrel between them-allows democracy much room.