U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

May 1, 2000

[excerpts pertaining to Russia]

The Russian Federation

The Commission selected the Russian Federation as one of the three principal countries on which it would focus in its first year not because the human rights situation is comparable to that of China or Sudan, but because of: (a) its influence in the region, (b) the fact that the condition of religious freedom in Russia could deteriorate significantly in the near future, and (c) the impact of U.S. foreign policy on promoting religious freedom in Russia.

The U.S. Congress responded to this Russian law by passing the "Smith Amendment," to ensure the law would not be implemented in a manner so as to significantly diminish religious freedom in Russia.

The negative impact of the 1997 Religion Law appears, so far, to have been somewhat mitigated by the Russian federal authorities and by a 1999 Russian Constitutional Court decision. Most alarmingly, President-elect Putin issued a decree in March, which, while extending the registration deadline until December 31, 2000, would require the liquidation at that time of all non-registered groups. In addition, regional officials implementing the 1997 Religion Law have denied registration and sought the liquidation of unpopular religious communities in some cases using panels of "experts" to examine the beliefs and activities of the targeted group.

Also on the regional level, officials have harassed and interfered with the activities of religious communities. Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim indigenous believers and foreign missionaries have been harassed by security officials, and even expelled for propagating their faith. In addition, one-third of Russia’s constituent regions have enacted legal regulations on religious activities that are more restrictive and discriminatory than the 1997 Religion Law and that violate the Russian Constitution. The federal authorities have been unwilling, or unable, to discipline local officials or to bring these regional laws into compliance with the Russian Constitution.

While the conflict in Chechnya is based on political and geographic factors, the severity of the documented human rights abuses against the majority Muslim population requires the attention of this Commission and the U.S. government. The Russian government has used anti-Muslim rhetoric to promote the war and to justify reported acts of brutality.

Recommendations on Russia

o The United States should continue to monitor religious freedom in Russia, especially at the regional and local level. While addressing the continuing problems of non-Russian Orthodox Christian groups (including Catholics and Protestants) as well as Jews, it should seek more information on groups such as Muslims and dissident Orthodox groups such as the Old Believers about whom there is under-report.

o The United States should urge the Russian federal government to monitor more closely and respond to more effectively the actions of regional and local officials who interfere with religious freedom and to ensure conformity of local government behavior on religion issues with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards incorporated in IRFA.

o The State Department should make the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya a high priority issue in United States-Russian relations.

o Congress should maintain the "Smith Amendment" until President Putin’s commitment to religious freedom becomes clearer.

o The United States government, as an urgent diplomatic priority, should press President Putin to reverse the edict requiring liquidation of non-registered religious groups.

o The United States should urge the Russian government to extend the length of visas for religious workers or at least allow them to renew their residency permission from within the country.

o The United States should provide support to willing non-governmental organizations, journalists, and academic institutions engaged in programs to prevent intolerance and support international religious-freedom standards. The United States should also promote tolerance through exhibits, conferences, the Internet, and broadcasts in regions where intolerance is a serious problem.

o The United States should promote contacts between leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church and other Russian religious communities who may benefit from traveling to the United States and meeting with American political and religious leaders. The U.S. government should encourage American religious leaders traveling to Russia to discuss tolerance and religious freedom.

o The United States should promote both the activities of willing Russian public-interest organizations that defend religious freedom in Russian courts, as well as exchanges between Russian and U.S. judges, lawyers and legal rights organizations.

o The United States should encourage Russia to agree to a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. . . .

4. The Russian Federation and the Newly Independent States The Commission noted a regressive trend toward violations of religious freedom in Russia, along with the link between extreme nationalism and religious persecution.

Commission staff met separately with Russian Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Ukrainian Christian representatives to explore the difficulties they are experiencing in Russia and the newly independent states. The Commission, in a public statement, called the Russian government to task for using religious bigotry to fuel the conflict in Chechnya. In another statement, the Commission welcomed a Russian constitutional court decision in November that benignly reinterpreted portions of the restrictive 1997 law regarding the registration of religious groups. Commission travel to Russia is tentatively planned for later this year. The Commission’s report and recommendations on Russia are found in Part II C.

Meanwhile, Commissioner Firuz Kazemzadeh traveled on the Commission’s behalf to Turkmenistan, where religious repression has reached alarming proportions, including outright demolition of a Seventh-day Adventist church and the arrest, imprisonment, and deportation of Baptist pastors. He also testified for the Commission at a March 21 hearing on Turkmenistan held by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission). . . .

C. The Russian Federation

1. Background on Russia

When the Commission selected Russia as one of the principal countries on which it would focus, it was not because the religious freedom situation was then comparable to that of China or Sudan, but because of:

(a) Russia’s influence in the region,

(b) the possibility that the conditions of religious freedom in Russia could deteriorate significantly in the near future, and

The protection of freedom of religion in Russia today is dramatically better than during the Soviet period, and the Russian government has taken some positive steps to promote religious freedom. Unfortunately, Russia took a significant step backward in 1997 by enacting a federal law (1997 Religion Law) that replaced legislation adopted in 1990 that provided broad protections for the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and for the equality of religious communities. The 1997 Religion Law creates a hierarchy of religious organizations and effectively restricts the rights, powers, and privileges of smaller, newer, and foreign religious communities. It also establishes an onerous and intrusive registration process and other mechanisms of state interference with the activities of religious organizations. The negative impact of the 1997 Religion Law on religious freedom appears, thus far, to have been mitigated to some extent by the Russian federal authorities and by a 1999, decision of the Russian Constitutional Court.

On March 26, 2000, President Putin quietly signed an amendment to the 1997 Religion Law that contained one positive and one very negative provision. On the positive side, it extended the registration deadline for religious organizations by one year until December 31, 2000. On the other hand, the law now requires that non 49 registered groups be "liquidated" after that date. (The original law provided only that unregistered groups could be liquidated.) It bears close watching whether Russian officials, at all levels, will make good faith efforts to register religious groups and whether unjustifiable liquidations will take place in 2001. In addition, in January 2000, President Putin signed an important directive specifying that one of the measures necessary to protect Russian national security is a "state policy to maintain the population’s spiritual and moral welfare and counter the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries." Regional officials implementing the 1997 Religion Law have denied registration and sought the liquidation of unpopular religious communities including Baptists, Pentecostals, Charismatic churches, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, and Orthodox groups not associated with the Moscow Patriarchate in some cases using panels of "experts" to examine the beliefs and activities of the targeted group.

Also on the regional level, some officials have harassed and interfered with the activities of religious communities, preventing them from renting suitable places for worship, distributing religious publications, and conducting religious education.

Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim indigenous believers and foreign missionaries have been harassed by security officials, and even expelled, for propagating their faith. In addition, one-third of Russia’s constituent regions have enacted legal regulations on religious activities that are more restrictive and discriminatory than the 1997 Religion Law and that violate the Russian Constitution. The federal authorities have been unwilling, or unable, to discipline local officials or to bring these regional laws into compliance with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards and international human rights standards. They have themselves harassed foreign priests and pastors, particularly Roman Catholics, by issuing them visas for a three-month stay only and then requiring them to return to their home countries for visa renewal.

While the conflict in Chechnya is primarily political and ethnic in nature, religion appears to play a role on both sides of the conflict. Chechens are Muslims and Islam is a part of their nationalistic identity. Russian authorities, meanwhile, have played upon deep-seated and historic prejudices against Muslims to rally domestic support for the war, portraying Islam and Muslims as synonymous with terrorism and extremism.

Three widely shared attitudes in Russia exacerbate the impact of the defects in the legal system (and ultimately may be more significant to the protection of religious freedom). First, many hold prejudices against ethnic and religious minorities, including, most importantly, Muslims, Jews, and various Christian groups other than the Russian Orthodox Church. Second, among many Russians, longstanding nationalistic resentment against "foreign influences" affects the treatment of religious groups that are perceived to have strong foreign ties (such as Roman Catholics, Protestants and some Muslim groups). Third is the related belief among some that the Russian Orthodox Church, or the "traditional" religions of Russia, should be accorded special privileges and protection in contrast to smaller, newer, and "foreign" religious groups.

2. Commission Recommendations on Russia

Based on these threats to religious freedom in Russia, the Commission recommends the following policies to the U.S. government.

Recommendation 3.1: Ongoing U.S. Government Monitoring

The Commission believes that the State Department has made commendable efforts to keep religious freedom a priority in its bilateral agenda with the Russian government. The Commission also believes that the U.S. embassy in Moscow has done an effective job of monitoring the religious-freedom situation. Nevertheless, many interferences with the activities of religious groups occur in regions outside major population centers and involve groups that have not had regular contacts with American officials. It is important that monitoring efforts continue and be expanded to cover effectively the most significant religious-freedom problems in Russia.

3.1. The U.S. government should actively continue to monitor conditions of religious freedom in Russia in particular, interference with the activities of religious groups at the regional and local level as well as the implementation of the 1997 Religion Law. It should make additional efforts to document interferences with the right to freedom of religion or belief and discrimination against groups on which there is under-reporting, including, for example, Muslims and other Orthodox groups (such as Old Believers).

Interference with religious activities by regional and local officials in those areas known to be problems in the past should be given particularly close attention. Since religious denominations and organizations in other countries often have more ongoing communications with Russian religious communities, the U.S. government should expand its consultation with such groups (both inside and outside Russia), to obtain a more comprehensive picture of existing problems.

Recommendation 3.2: Ongoing Russian Monitoring of Local Regulations

The State Department reports that 30 of the 89 constituent regions of the Russian Federation have adopted, in violation of the Russian Constitution, legal regulations that restrict the activities of religious institutions. Many of these regulations specifically target members of foreign religious groups for restrictions on their activities. Difficulties encountered by religious groups in Russia are related to the enforcement of these restrictive regional and local laws as they provide the mechanism, or in some cases the pretext, for local officials to harass or interfere with religious activities. Apparently, significant action has not been taken by the federal authorities to discipline local officials or to bring regional and local laws into compliance with the Russian Constitution.

3.2. The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to monitor the actions of regional and local officials that interfere with the right to freedom of religion or belief, and to take steps to bring local laws and regulations on religious activities into conformity with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards.

The U.S. government should urge the Russian federal authorities to monitor local officials effectively and, if appropriate, to investigate and punish officials whose actions are in violation of the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards. In addition, Russian officials reportedly have stated that many regional and local laws and decrees concerning religious activities violate the Russian Constitution.

The U.S. government should urge the government of Russia to act consistent with their constitutional system to bring such laws into conformity with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards.

Recommendation 3.3: Chechnya as a High Priority Bilateral Issue

The Russian government has inadequately responded to the concerns expressed by the international community over the humanitarian situation in Chechnya and the allegations of serious human rights abuses by Russian forces. These responses fall short of allowing full access to affected regions by human rights monitors and humanitarian organizations ready to provide aid to civilians affected by the fighting.

While the conflict in the Caucasus is primarily political and ethnic in nature, religion appears to play a role on both sides of the conflict. Islam forms the basis of Caucasian Muslim identity, and it is a significant element of resistance to domination by Moscow. Russian authorities, meanwhile, have played upon deep-seated and historic prejudices against Muslims to rally domestic support for the war, which in turn has fueled anti-Muslim attitudes in Russia by making Islam and Muslims synonymous with terrorism and extremism. These actions apparently have had a direct impact on the religious freedom of Muslims who are independent of the officially-sanctioned Muslim organizations.

3.3. The U.S. State Department should make the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya a high priority issue in its bilateral relations with Russia.

The U.S. government should make it clear to the Russian government that its handling of the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya is an important consideration in U.S. government policy toward Russia. The U.S. government should also deplore any efforts on the part of the Russian government to use intolerance against Muslims as a mechanism to fuel public support for its offensive in Chechnya, or the offensive in Chechnya as a justification to violate the religious freedom of Muslims in Russia.

Recommendation 3.4: Re-enactment of the "Smith Amendment"

3.4. The Congress should continue to include the "Smith Amendment" in its appropriations bills, at least until it becomes clear whether the Putin administration will work to ensure that Russian laws do not discriminate against groups on the basis of religion.

Following the adoption of the 1997 Religion Law in Russia, the U.S. Congress enacted an amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations act that would prohibit foreign assistance to the government of Russia unless the President determines that "the Government of the Russian Federation has implemented no statute, executive order, regulation or similar government action that would discriminate, or would have as its principal effect discrimination, against religious groups or religious communities in the Russian Federation in violation of accepted international agreements on human rights and religious freedoms to which the Russian Federation is a party." This provision commonly known as the "Smith Amendment" (after its sponsor, Senator Gordon Smith) has been included in the foreign assistance appropriations bills for fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

The Commission believes that the "Smith Amendment" has been an effective tool for promoting religious freedom in Russia and urges Congress to reenact it until it becomes clearer the direction that Russia will proceed under its new president.

Recommendation 3.5: Liquidation of Religious Organizations

3.5. The U.S. government should continue, as a major diplomatic priority, efforts to ensure that legitimate religious groups that have not registered by 2001 are not liquidated.

The President of the United States should communicate directly with President Putin on this issue.

As explained in the opening section on Russia above, President Putin signed an amendment to the 1997 Religion Law in March 2000. The amendment requires the liquidation of religious organizations that are not registered by December 31, 2000.

The U.S. State Department and the President should engage in serious diplomacy with the Russian government to ensure that no legitimate religious organizations are liquidated.

Recommendation 3.6: Promoting Religious Tolerance

As described above, there are significant societal attitudes in Russia that undermine the promotion of religious freedom and encourage intolerance and discrimination on the basis of religion or belief. These include negative attitudes toward Muslims, Jews and non-Orthodox Christians and the view that the Russian Orthodox Church and the so-called "traditional" religions of Russia should have privileges and protections not afforded to other religious communities. The United States cannot impose religious freedom in Russia, and religious freedom will be vigorously protected only when the people and the government of Russia themselves seek to promote and protect it. Therefore, the U.S. government should take positive steps to support Russian efforts at promoting religious freedom and opposing intolerance.

3.6. The U.S. government should actively promote religious tolerance in Russia by providing support to willing non-governmental organizations, journalists, and academic institutions engaged in programs aimed at preventing intolerance and discrimination and supporting international standards on freedom of religion or belief. The U.S. government should also promote religious tolerance through appropriate activities such as exhibits, conferences, and media and Internet broadcasting, particularly in regions where numerous manifestations of intolerance have occurred.

One of the means by which religious freedom can be promoted in Russia is for the United States to identify Russians who themselves seek to promote international standards of religious freedom and tolerance. The United States can provide support to these individuals by such measures as providing support for NGOs and providing for educational, journalistic, and academic exchanges in Russia and the United States. The U.S. government can also promote religious tolerance by conducting and supporting activities in Russia such as exhibits, media broadcasting, and Internet postings directed toward that end.

Recommendation 3.7: Hosting Russian Religious Leaders

One of the impediments to promoting religious freedom in Russia is the distrust of Western (particularly American) ideas and the identification of international human rights standards related to religious freedom with those ideas. A number of leaders of Russia’s major religious communities have criticized the activities of unfamiliar and foreign religious groups and have supported efforts to restrict the activities of such groups, including the 1997 Religion Law and discriminatory regional laws.

3.7. The U.S. government should promote contacts with leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church and members of other religious communities in Russia who may benefit from traveling to the United States and meeting with American political and religious leaders. The U.S. government also should encourage appropriate American religious leaders and seminarians in traveling to Russia to discuss issues of tolerance and religious freedom.

Russian religious leaders may benefit significantly from travel in the United States and exposure to American political and religious leaders who concern themselves with the process of the protection and promotion of religious freedom and with interreligious dialogue and action in the United States.

Recommendation 3.8: Supporting Legal Defenders

Effective legal advocacy is important for the protection of religious freedom in Russia. Russians have only begun to use the judicial process to seek effective remedies for violations of the right to freedom of religion and to reform federal and local law in accordance with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards.

Legal representation is necessary for religious groups to effectuate their rights under federal and local law and to protect their activities from undue interference by the authorities.

3.8. The U.S. government should promote the legal protection of freedom of religion or belief in Russia by supporting the activities of Russian public interest organizations that defend the right to freedom of religion or belief in Russian courts. The U.S. government should promote exchanges between Russian judges, lawyers, and legal rights organizations with their counterparts in the United States.

Many religious groups, in particular small and indigenous Russian communities, do not have the resources to secure adequate legal representation to challenge state action and defend their rights in court. Public interest organizations exist in Russia for these purposes, but their effectiveness is limited due to a lack of resources. The U.S. government should support such organizations in ways that do not compromise their independence or integrity.

Recommendation 3.9: Visit By UN Special Rapporteur

3.9. The U.S. government should, on a bilateral basis, encourage the government of Russia to agree to the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to visit Russia.

In his 2000 report to the UNCHR, the Special Rapporteur for Religious Intolerance noted that the Russian government has not responded to his request for a site visit. The U.S. government, which previously agreed to such a site visit by the Special Rapporteur, should urge the Russian government to do so as well.

Recommendation 3.10: Visas

3.10. The U.S. government should, to the extent possible, encourage the Russian government to extend the length of visas for religious workers, or at least allow them to renew their residence permission from within Russia.

The obtaining of visas is an ongoing problem for foreign clergy and missionaries who wish to work in Russia. The U.S. government should raise this issue with appropriate Russian officials and urge that the length of visas be extended or permit visa renewals to be obtained from inside Russia. . . .