NEWS ABOUT RELIGION IN RUSSIA

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Orthodox conservative sees conspiracy

NG--ABOVE RELIGION
by Anton Volynsky
Russkii vestnik, no. 27-28 (July 1998)

Today the "NG - Religion" supplement of the "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" occupies the first place among the forces which struggle with the renaissance of Orthodoxy.

The latest signal for the struggle with Orthodoxy was the meeting between George Soros, the Uniat Abbot Ignatii (Krekshin), the representative of the Soros Foundation in Moscow - a well-known collaborator of Fr. Chistiakov, - Sviridova and other heretics, and Ekaterina Genieva, the director of the Library of Foreign Literature. The initiative for this new and in this case a more serious attack on the Russian Orthodox Church but specifically against those bishops and priests who uncompromisingly stand in defense of Holy Orthodoxy was the sensational story of the "burning of books of Frs Schmemann, Meyendorff and Men by Bishop Nikon of Ekaterinburg.

As it turned out, no "book burning" took place. The specific reason for the attacks upon Bishop Nikon was his suspension of the renovationist [Fr] Oleg Vokhmyanin. Following this there was unprecedented pressure placed upon the Russian Orthodox Church initiated by the whole "progressive" faction of the mass media and the ultra liberal Orthodox Church in America. As a result Bishop Nikon, regretfully, removed the suspension against Fr Oleg Vokhmyanin. The results of this weakness became instantly pounced upon in " NG-religion" of 7-15-98 where Maksim Shevchenko, as usual reflecting the directives of Metropolitan Kirill, designated the stauropigial monasteries as candidates for a pogorm, with Valaam in first place. Orthodox monasticism, whichuncompromisingly exposes the heresy of ecumenism, may be subjected in the near future to serious attacks on the part of ecumenicists. It is natural that Shevchenko is completely determined to strike down Bishop Nikon. (In this, we Orthodox are directly responsible. We did not rise in the bishop's defense. But this time we have no right to make the same mistake).

It is no secret that the theology of the "Parisian" and the "American" schools is controversial. The writings of Fr Schmemann form a significant basis for many of the Kochetkovian experiments. But another fact is of even greater importance which was slipped out by another enemy of the Church, the "Moscow Comsomoletz" Sergei Bychkov in his book about the murder of Fr Alexander Men. He writes that as early as the seventies the American autocephalous church and other "interested" powers planned an ideological expansion of the OCA in Russia through an influx of personnel following the collapse of communism, with the aim of a liberal reform of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Another important aim of the ecumenists' and their yes-men's strategy and tactics was to prevent the unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in the fatherland with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. It was in 1994, prior to the Bishops' Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church that the well-known Mme Ilovaiskaya wrote in "Russkaya Mysl'" that it [the Sobor] would be a "unified front of reactionary forces." The authors of "NG - religion" take an evil delight that the enemies of church unity in Russia managed to break off discussions between the ROC and the ROCA. In connection with this the unified action of the "uncompromising" wing within the ROCA against union with the ROC and that of "our" ecumenists, who are against union with ROCA, is quite evident. They clearly understand that the union of the Russian Orthodox Church would spell the end of their ecumenical, Uniat and renovationist plans.

The "uncompromising" faction of the ROCA blasphemously accuse the ROC of being "without grace" and the ecumenists within the ROC-MP likewise blasphemously call the ROCA a "sect" and question the sanctity of John Maximovich. For the overwhelming majority of Russian Orthodox Christians the tragic division of the Russian Orthodox Church is a personal tragedy, a wound. For the ecumenists of the "NG - religion" and other objectors, the unification with the ROCA is frankly unbearable. For them the unity with heretics, Catholics and such others is more important. It should be pointed out that the present attack against the defenders of Orthodoxy is very serious and that the ecumenists are determined to carry it out to the end and that very strong forces are involved in this. The Orthodox Christians must unite, defend their own and stand unto death for the Orthodox Faith and Holy Russia. (translated by AS)

(posted 7 September 1998)

Religious pluralism in Russia

FREE FALL
by Alexei Bodrov
Christian Century, 29 July- 5 August, 1998

One cannot call the religious situation in contemporary Russia stable. There are divisions not only between different religions or Christian confessions, but within the Russian Orthodox Church. These intra-Orthodox divisions are even more serious and dangerous in their consequences than are interconfessional ones.

The problem is that the Russian Orthodox Church, the church of the majority in Russia, is strongly politicized. This reflects political life in Russia, where just a few years ago we had only one political party. Today there are several dozen different parties. Although this situation is not unique to Russia, we lack experience living in a pluralistic society.

What is genuinely new in contemporary Russian reality is the attempt to create a pluralistic society in which different forms of social, cultural and religious life can coexist peacefully. The term "pluralistic society" includes two opposite notions: "pluralism," meaning difference and diversity, and "society," meaning cooperation and unity. So when speaking about pluralistic society, we actually imply unity in diversity.

This is good theoretically. But how can we preserve the balance and avoid extremes? How do we avoid a unity that tries to smooth, suppress and eliminate diversity? And how do we avoid a relativism that emphasizes diversity only to spawn formlessness and nihilism? The rejection of other traditions and the fear of outside influences lead to isolation within one's own tradition (cultural or religious), escapism into a "ghetto," transformation into a sect. Sectarian consciousness rejects dialogue and reconciliation. This is illustrated by the recent passage of an antidemocratic law on religion-and by the growing antiecumenical mood within the Russian Orthodox Church.

The problem lies not in the coexistence of different views or traditions but in the hostility of their adherents toward each other. The same is true for different religions or religious movements.

The root of the conflicts lies not in different theologies or dogmatics but in political, national or religious situations and in emotion, fanaticism and lack of experience and knowledge.

Unfortunately, the "wind of change" and the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe did not result in dialogue between churches. Instead, we are experiencing a lack of confidence and considerable tension in interchurch relations. (On a serious theological level, dialogue is possible. The Second Vatican Council, which proclaimed "the dialogue of love between the sister churches," provided a good example.) The problem of' intraconfessional (intra-Orthodox) dialogue is even more acute, and intra-Orthodox conflicts are more intense and painful. But until we have reconciliation inside our church, we cannot speak seriously about reconciliation between churches. The recovery of the health of each church will help to heal interchurch relations.

Unfortunately, the Russian Orthodox hierarchy was unprepared for religious freedom and the new conditions of social life. For a long time, the hierarchy was occupied with preserving the tradition and the church itself. Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the communist state were not simple. The very existence of the church was threatened more than once during that time.

There was also a traditional gulf between church and society that existed not only during the Soviet period, but even before the Bolshevik Revolution. Only in the beginning of this century did we begin the work of building a bridge between church and society, Christianity and culture, theology and science. The famous Church Council of 1917-18 could have become "Vatican II" for the Russian Orthodox Church, but the process was interrupted.

The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church is often criticized for failing to give spiritual guidance and for seeming to be incapable of working in new conditions of social and religious freedom-and for being passive and unprepared to solve acute social and religious problems.

Instead of cooperating with the healthy forces present in the society, the church is afraid to initiate any changes that might help to solve problems and thus to raise the authority of the church. The dread of schism and the fear of setting loose its influence are so great that church authorities tend to adopt an "ostrich" policy, emerging with only general declarations on the necessity of developing more religious education, more cooperation with society and youth, and new church activities. Alas, these are only words.

The church lacks an adequate policy of church mission and preaching the gospel to modern believers. It must take into account the modern mentality and try to understand people's problems. It must speak with them in their own language and not offend them with persistent denunciations of their spiritual condition and devotional life. Instead, we worship in a poorly understood language with a lack of modern Russian translations of the Bible and a persistent gulf between Christianity and culture, religion and science, church and society.

It's a twofold problem: we must help church people to understand (or just not to reject) the values of secular culture, science and society. And we must help secular people (the majority of the population) to understand the values of Christianity and the rich church tradition.

The Russian Orthodox Church must remember that the church is not only clergy but laity as well. I would even say that the laity are the first priority. They are church people, a "royal priesthood. " There is and can be no opposition between clergy and lay people. We need competent, well-educated priests and laity, people who are free of political, national and confessional prejudices and capable of laborious, painstaking work in order to bridge the gulf between the two groups and to move Christianity from a marginal to a more central position in society.

The root of innumerable conflicts-both intra-and interconfessional ones-is ignorance. It was and is the reason for many divisions, hostilities and even open confrontations. It is very painful to see waves of hatred flow over the body that is called to be the church of reconciliation. Political disagreements and disputes about how to preach the gospel become more important than the gospel itself.

What are the reasons for our divisions, our mutual lack of understanding and our hostility? Are they concealed in deep, essential historical and theological differences, or do they lie in the fields of the psychology of religion, politics or sociology?

I think we suffer most from emotionalism. The higher the level of ignorance, the stronger our emotions, and the greater our inability to understand each other, ourselves and our own tradition.

We must emphasize enlightenment, education and the necessity of' well-founded information concerning dialogue and reconciliation. A serious theological investigation of' these problems and a critical revaluation of history may reduce the level of distrust and hostility and create the base for a discussion of controversial questions.

Although some modern notions of tolerance do not coincide with the gospel approach, the practice of tolerance may give us room to maneuver and time for reflection and prayer. Reconciliation does not mean agreement, but an absence of hostility. If Christians can unite for joint service and mission in the modern world, relations with other religions can acquire the nature of "peaceful coexistence" and cooperation in solving common problems.

In recent years, Russia has seen a vast number of neophytes come to the church. Their almost total ignorance of religious issues creates new problems. Because they lack experience and information about their own traditions, these people often behave in an intolerant way toward adherents of other traditions or views. Enthusiastic neophytes incline to fundamentalism.

To improve this situation we need Russian translations of biblical, liturgical and theological texts to create a base for serious theological education. This will help to solve the problem of personnel-our acute shortage of teachers, catechists, translators, editors and other specialists.

As only a small number of clergy have a high level of theological education, the revival of theological education for clergy and the establishment of religious education for the laity is a great challenge for Christians in Russia. Conferences and theological periodicals will stimulate discussion and encourage the exchange of experience. Training people with varied experiences and strong educational backgrounds will help to bridge the gulf between church and society and to promote better understanding of those who belong to different religious, cultural or ethnic traditions.

If the religious situation in Russia is to develop in the right direction, we must have links and cooperation with universities and religious organizations abroad. The experience and knowledge gained through such co-operation and exchange will help us and our Western colleagues to better understand our respective situations.

(Alexei Bodrov is rector of St. Andrews Biblical Theological College in Moscow.)

(posted 7 September 1998)

Interview with Nikita Struve

WHAT FUTURE FOR THE RUSSIAN CHURCH?
Sourozh, no. 73 (1998)

Q: You have just returned from a stay of several days in Moscow. In your eyes, what is the situation of the Russian Church today?

A: One must be very cautious in making general judgements concerning a Church which is great both in its extent and in the human resources which it has been able to bring into play over the past ten years. In this sense my impressions are contradictory. I believe we are entering a period somewhat different from that of those first years when the Church regained its freedom, reconstituted itself and found that it had to position itself vis-a-vis a State which was either neutral or sought its support, as well as vis-a-vis financial, political and other powers, and vis-a-vis a certain aggressiveness -- or perhaps lack of tact -- on the part of Western religious confessions which saw in Russia a terrain favourable to their witness and expansion.

But this period, symbolized by the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, has now passed. It is obvious that it is easier to build with stones than to construct, also on ruins, a living, vigorous and creative Church. This latter task is much more difficult. We are entering upon a new period when a certain number of tensions within the Russian Church are appearing, tensions which disturb many people within Russia itself -- and also here in the West.

Q: Why is this happening?

Because these tensions reflect an increase in authoritarianism in the Church and show the predominance of a tendency which one might call conservative and even fundamentalist, a tendency which can have its place in the Church, but which ought not to dominate the Church. Certain developments which have occurred during the past few months in Moscow -- and, more recently, in other dioceses, in the provinces -- show that this tendency is growing in strength, or, at least, that it permits itself to act in an authoritarian manner, even to utter interdicts which run the risk of putting a brake on the expansion of the Church, in particular among intellectuals and young people who, attracted by the Church, might easily be put off by these aspects of its life.

Q: YMCA-Press, the publishing house which you run, has furthered the witness and transmission of the theological and philosophical thought of Christian Russia by printing and distributing the works of the great thinkers of the Russian emigration which were forbidden at the time by the Soviet regime and which are now denounced as 'heretical' by certain circles within the Church itself. How can one explain this rejection of all that constituted the intellectual and spiritual ferment behind the re-Christianization of part of the Russian intelligentsia in the 1970s and 1980s?

A: The fundamental problem of the Russian Church today is the problem of clergy and their training. The striking progress of the Church in the course of these past ten years has necessitated the rapid training of clergy and this has not always met their real needs. I do not believe that one can say that this or that book or this or that Orthodox theologian has been condemned. There are currents in the Church that would like to see this happen, but they do not dare to do so explicitly. Indirect methods are used to condemn people or actions which are not in themselves reprehensible.

This was obviously the case with Fr Georgii Kochetkov,(1) who, as we all know, was forbidden to serve. He and eleven of his lay associates have been in this situation for almost a year.(2) Fr Kochetkov had created an enormous community of around a thousand people who used the Russian language in their services and tried to give to certain features of Orthodox liturgy their original significance. It was not a question of innovation, but rather of a return to more ancient practices. Fr Kochetkov found himself the object of a press campaign waged by a group of Moscow priests over a period of several years. No official measures were taken against him, however, and it was only in June of last year that there took place a fabricated incident -- a 'provocation', one might say -- which ensured that Fr Kochetkov ended up by being sanctioned in a particularly cruel manner.(3)

As you can see, it was necessary to use very complex and indirect methods to condemn a tendency in the Church which advocates a return to more mission- and catechetically-oriented practices, to practices which, if you wish, are commonly adopted in Orthodox communities both in Western Europe and North America. These practices are based on the missionary experience of the Russian student movement in France and the theological work of the St Sergius Institute in Paris and St Vladimir's Seminary in New York.

The fact that this condemnation was possible in spite of its manifestly unfounded and unjust character -- since Fr Georgii Kochetkov is hardly to be held responsible for an incident which, as was shown by the testimony of witnesses and the conclusions of the police enquiry, was provoked by his adversaries, has perhaps had the unfortunate effect of inciting other bishops to follow the same path. The condemnation of two priests in Tomsk could be mentioned, a condemnation which was later reversed by the Holy Synod. Rather curiously, the condemnation was issued without trial, and its reversal was also carried out without trial, through a decision coming from the central authority of the Church. One can only observe that in neither case was there reference to an ecclesiastical court, nor the possibility of an appeal. More recently, in the diocese of Ekaterinburg, three priests were summoned by their bishop and told to swear on the Bible that they would never again use as inspiration for their sermons the works of Fr Alexander Men, Fr Nikolai Afanassieff and Fr John Meyendorff, and that they would cease to read them or recommend them to their parishioners ...

Q: Does this not amount to 'putting them on the Index'?

A: No, because it was a personal administrative decision, imposed in an authoritarian manner by a diocesan bishop, and not an official condemnation pronounced by the Church. We know what was placed on the Index in the West and the effects that this had. But here, we have to do with an arbitrary act. Two of the priests, out of fright, acquiesced, but the third, Fr Oleg Vokhmianin, did not do so and was suspended. The fact that such things are possible raises a number of questions.

The first concerns the development within the Church of a press campaign seeking to cast suspicion on the theological work carried out in the Russian emigration, which can be considered a continuation of the work of the Moscow Sobor of 1917-18. The fact that this press campaign has been partially successful seems dangerous for the Church.

A second question arises concerning the structures of the Church: how should the Church proceed when faced with cases of this kind? It would probably be best if the Russian Church were to return to its own canon law, which does not allow for a priest to be suspended without a trial.

And this raises a third question of a more general nature: is it not time for the whole Church to return to the principles of the Council of 1917-18? At the present time there is little indication that a return to the principles of that council is desired...

Q: It was this Council which reflected at length on 'modernity'. Is such reflexion now impossible in Russia?

A: I do not believe that it is impossible, but it does seem difficult. And the fact is that it has not yet taken place. No general council of the Russian Church has been held since the restoration of freedom in 1990. There have been only episcopal assemblies. A Council is announced for 2000, but has preparation taken place? Let us not forget that the Council of 1917-18 had been prepared for many years, perhaps against the wishes of the episcopate, which wished to meet sooner. But today, one does not see many preparatory studies...

Q: Yes, one even has the impression that problem issues are being postponed until the Council...

A: In my view, this would be dangerous, because the Council will not have time to discuss the issues. A council is difficult to organize. History has shown us to what extent certain councils were unfortunate, precisely because they were not sufficiently prepared. Think, for example, of the councils of seventeenth-century Russia which condemned the Old Believers.(4)

A council, to function well, must be well prepared. This does not appear to be the case today, even if, in Moscow, there seems to exist a certain pluralism of theological opinions, since, in addition to the Moscow Theological Academy, located in the Trinity-St Sergius Monastery,(5) which seems rather conservative, there are also three, even five, Orthodox theological institutes in Moscow which produce numerous publications. In that sense one might even say that in-depth work is taking place. But one would also have to say that the works of the theologians of the Russian emigration -- though if we say 'of the emigration' it is perhaps misleading, since these works were written abroad only because such efforts were not possible in Soviet Russia -- are now being reprinted, translated and read in Russia. If resistance to this heritage, now available in Russia, is noticeable, this perhaps shows that, on the contrary, it is only slowly being assimilated.

Q: Orthodoxy in Russia in the nineteenth century suffered perhaps less from being a State religion than from being a bureaucratic institution characterized by 'the absence of any breath of the spirit' to use the expression of Dostoyevsky. Is there not great danger of a similar tendency today?

A: Analogies of this kind are always difficult to make. The administrative and bureaucratic paralysis of the Russian Church in the nineteenth century coexisted with a great upsurge of monasticism, of which Dostoyevsky was well aware, a spiritual witness which produced such great personalities as St Seraphim of Sarov and the startsi of Optino. There was also a great missionary movement, even if at the beginning this movement was slowed down, and even persecuted, by the State and Church authorities. There too, the Church, in spite of its bureaucratic yoke, gave evidence of astonishing vitality. It is enough to mention St Innocent of Moscow (6) and St Nicholas of Tokyo.(7) And then there was the bridge established at the beginning of the twentieth century, before the Revolution, between the intellectuals and the Church, in spite of all the difficulties and pitfalls...

It is clear that at the moment there is a danger that the Russian Church will slide into a form of authoritarian bureaucracy. This can be explained, perhaps, by the absence of striking personalities at the moment within the Church. It might be time to return to the practice of electing diocesan bishops by clergy-lay assemblies -- as was so brilliantly done in 1917, with the election of Metropolitan (later Patriarch) Tikhon in Moscow and Metropolitan Benjamin (who died a martyr in 1922) in Petrograd -- or even to go further and return to the election of priests by their parishes, as was done in the Russian Church until the eighteenth century.

The problem is, however, that Russia is a country which in the course of seventy years has forgotten how to make use of freedom. The Church, like Russian society as a whole, has regained its external freedom, but it is much more difficult to acquire inner freedom. It is that inner freedom which seems to be lacking. We are, no doubt, in a transitional phase. We must hope the living forces of the Church will be able to restore a measure of equilibrium.

Q: What future do you see for Orthodoxy in Russia?

A: It is difficult to foresee the future. However, my recent impressions are on the whole encouraging. To be sure they say that according to sociological studies, the Easter midnight celebrations were attended by only 1% of the population of the Russian capital. Nevertheless, during my stay in Moscow I visited many churches and was struck by the social profile of the communities, which are not numerically significant -- though it must be said that there are now very many churches in the Centre of the city -- but which are made up, for the most part, of young people of both sexes, something which seems to augure well for the future. This is much less noticeable in the countryside, where the picture is very much what it was under the Soviet regime, with congregations made up largely of elderly women. But this could also change in the future, since it seems to me that there is in Russian society a great need for faith and a vision of life centred on the Christian revelation.

It remains to be seen whether, on the one hand, this tendency is confirmed, and, on the other, whether the Church will be able to respond to these expectations -- or more exactly, whether it will be able not simply to respond to them, but to encourage and create them. Certain pessimistic observers consider that the Church has missed the opportunity it was given with perestroika. I am not entirely of that opinion. And what do we mean by 'the Church'? If one is speaking of the administrative structures or the clergy, it is hardly their fault if in 1990 they were not prepared for a change which no one expected. It is difficult to predict anything at all as to the direction the Church will take. The eighteenth century was a century of deep depression in the Russian Church. But in the first part of the nineteenth century we saw an astonishing renaissance which is not rationally explicable and which nothing would have enabled one to foresee. It would appear that religious life goes through cyclic phases, and that 'lean years' follow on 'rich years' and vice versa. Christianity is not in very good condition in today's world. It seems to be slowing down. But it is not the first time this has happened in history...

Q: May it not be the case that a great part of the future of Christianity is being played out in Russia?

A: This is true, and this is one of the reasons why we are suffering from the crisis which the Orthodox Church in Russia is going through. This Church is one of the most important in the world, if only because of the religious witness of Russian culture, which is striking. And this is why we follow with anxiety and with hope what is taking place in that Church and why we feel concerned, even if we live in the West.

I might also add that the reality of faith is often difficult to capture by analysis. During my frequent travels across Russia I have been struck by the intensity of popular faith. There, too, it is difficult to measure the positive effects on the Church of this popular faith, which has an intensity not often met in Western Europe. It seems to me that, in spite of the difficulties, the witness of the Russian Church is of fundamental importance for the whole of the Orthodox Church and, in general, for the future of Christianity in the twenty-first century.

In any case, one of the fundamental problems remains, in my eyes, the encounter between the Russian Orthodox Church and modernity. There is a great danger that we may see certain elements of the Church institution, in particular a clergy which is zealous but turned inward, oppose modernity in the best that it might have to offer -- culture. This is an old problem for Russia, and this encounter has always taken place, throughout history, in a tense, conflictual and even dramatic fashion. The number of priests who at different times have been suspended or persecuted because they were in advance of their times is impressive. The problem, moreover, does not concern only modernity, but also secular culture. There is sometimes a confrontation between the ascetic bias of Russian Orthodox spirituality and secular culture, whereas in fact Russia has developed one of the most remarkable Christian cultures of the modern period. It would be sad -- and contradictory -- for the Russian Church to enter into conflict with the most important and most beautiful things, besides sanctity, it has created. We must hope that this time, in spite of the tensions which are inevitable, the encounter with modernity will take place for the greater glory of God.
--------------------------
NOTES

(1) A Moscow priest known for the 'reformist' character of his pastoral and liturgical experiments and for his catechetical and missionary activity.

(2) His lay associates were excommunicated.

(3) During the celebration of Sunday matins on 29 June 1997 a second priest recently appointed to the parish of Fr Kochetkov, Fr Mikhail Dubovitskii -- who was openly opposed to Fr Georgii's pastoral initiatives -- had to be removed from the church during a schizophrenic episode which ended in his hospitalization. The Orthodox radio station 'Radonezh' nevertheless gave another version of these events, declaring that Fr Mikhail had been beaten before being given psychotropic drugs. It was this version, though unconfirmed by the police enquiry, which was accepted by his superiors in the diocese of Moscow and used to justify depriving Fr Kochetkov of the fight to celebrate.

(4) Adversaries of the liturgical reforms introduced by Patriarch Nikon who were condemned by two councils held in Moscow in 1666 and 1667, at which Patriarch Nikon was also condemned.

(5) At Sergiev Posad, about 50 miles north of Moscow.

(6) A missionary bishop in Siberia and Alaska, canonized in 1977.

(7) Another missionary, canonized in 1970.

(courtesy of Fr Victor Sokolov)

(posted 5 September 1998)

Patriarchate responds to criticism

ANSWERS OF THE PATRIARCHATE TO "OGONYOK" QUESTIONS
Ogonyok, 24 August 1998

An open letter by the priest Vsevolod Chaplin

In Ogonyok no. 28 Mikhail Pozdniaev posed "Ten questions to the patriarchate," and declared right away that he could not hope to expect answers. It is sad that a journalist who, I know, has been occupied with church themes for several years has forgotten that the church has answered the majority of these questions many times fully and in public. Overlooking the superior, self-assured tone of Mr. Pozdniaev's article, I shall recall these answers briefly, for which I have the permission of the most holy patriarch who read the article in Ogonyok intently.

And so, the first question. Was the current patriarch freely elected? Unquestionably, yes. This is attested by the atmosphere and course of the local council of 1990. All bishops over the age of forty and resident on the native canonical territory of the Russian church were candidates in the first round. Many nominations received support from more than 100 members of the council. The second participant in the deciding round, Metropolitan Vladimir, received not very many fewer votes than Metropolitan Alexis. I never heard anything about a "secret KGB directive" that had been sent about the dioceses to vote for Metropolitan Alexis; if there had been such a thing, believe me, there would have been people at the council who would have published it. Each diocesan bishop can attest that there were no instructions about whom to vote for. It is possible that someone "awaited orders." To be sure there were even statements in oral form about the "wishes" of the staff of the Council of Religious Affairs of the time; incidentally, these were not in favor of the current patriarch. However there was nothing even close to a kind of unanimous "voting on command."

Then on the church commission which studied the documents about contacts of clergy and laity with KGB personnel. This commission was created not in order to condemn the incidents of contact with representatives of authority (which possibly had connections even to the KGB). Such contacts in and of themselves could be used either for both evil and good. Whether they actually were used to harm the church and people the commission was unable to determine inasmuch as it was hampered by anonymous sources including the once notorious "lists of agents with code names" and it did not receive a single reliable document.

The "affair" of former Metropolitan Filaret. Actually, at the first bishops' council in 1992 there was a possibility of immediately removing him from the position of metropolitan of Kiev and all-Ukraine. However one could imagine how negatively the deposition "in Moscow" of the Kievan metropolitan would be received by the Ukrainian public and even by many in Russia--I dare say that even Mr. Pozdniaev would not have approved at the time. The church nevertheless gave Filaret a final chance to get out of the complicated situation decently, the more so that he vowed before the cross and New Testament to resign his position. However, even the former metropolitan's violation of his vow was not by any means the decisive factor in the development of the schismatic movement in Ukraine. It had appeared long before Filaret and he and his folowers only continued the unholy matter that had been begun and the responsibility for the results lies exclusively on the schismatics themselves.

Fourth question: regarding the conversations in St. Daniel's monastery during the political crisis of the autumn of 1993. In fact they did not "run into a dead end" at all but they nearly reached a peaceful, compromise resolution of the conflict. But I submit that this fact did not calm the radical forces. Soon open calls for violence erupted after which it became extremely difficult to prevent the violent stage of the confrontation. However even at that moment the most holy patriarch Alexis II urged a cessation of the bloodshed. Meanwhile nobody but the church was able to get the opposing sides to sit down at the table and it is quite possible that without the dialogue in the monastic calm everything would have ended in greater bloodshed.

Fifth question, which is formulated in such a way that I don't wish to repeat it even in summary. The church stood on the side of the "leftist forces" and forgot the "anathemas of communism"? First, I would advise Mr. Pozdniaev to reread the official church documents of the period of the revolution and civil war. There is no anathema of any ideology, including communist. There is an anathema of those who were resisting God and hating people. Second, in the church documents of the present period you will not find a single word of support for any political party, "left" or "right." True, representatives of the church have met with politicians, including the "leftists." But after all probably even Mr. Pozdniaev also has met with them in his line of activity. If so, then is he apparently also for the "left"? Obviously the views of the church on individual problems of society sometimes coincide with the positions of the "left" now and the "right" later (I note that the "left" accuses us of supporting the "right" at least as often as the "right" accuses us of support of the "left"). But no political force has ever said that the church fully and exclusively supports it, because it is known that it isn't true. However priests and laity have their personal political convictions and no one is forbidden to have them.

The impossibility of the church's participation in the political struggle does not mean a refusal to have an active public position. It is impossible to accuse us of the absence of such a position: the events in Chechnia were the basis for at least six declarations by the primate of the church in which the error of a military approach was stated quite clearly, for example: "The bloodshed in Chechnia should be immediately stopped. . . . The church lifts its voice in defense of the innocent victims. . . . I ask and beg government leaders of Russia and the Chechen leaders, all whose hands are taking the sword, to cease immediately all military actions." Is this an "indistinct reference" (quoting Mr. Pozdniaev, seguing to his sixth point)? In recent years the church has expressed itself very clearly on many other problems of society. Indeed, its voice is not heard because it does not have its own information media and because other mass media do not attempt to report the decisions and declarations of the church hierarchy. But a reporter writing on religious subjects should be aware of the latest events in the sphere of church-public activity. I am profoundly convinced that participation of the church and clergy immediately in the political process is ruinous and dangerous. If in parliament and other legislative assemblies we had ten, twenty, or a hundred Yakunins, arguing among themselves for the interests of various parties, or if priests dispensed budgetary items, the unity of the church and then the unity of Russia would be threatened.

Mr. Pozdniaev's next question, about Hegumen Zinon Teodor. He really is rightfully considered one of the best Russian icon painters and it is no accident that he was the one commissioned to paint the copy of the Vladimir Mother of God for the six hundredth anniversary of its coming to Moscow. However one must not confuse the talent of an icon painter with church discipline. The imposition by the local bishop of canonical sanctions upon Fr Zinon happened because he committed a clear violation of church rules: he received communion during a mass conducted by priests of the Roman Catholic church, with which the Orthodox church does not have eucharistic fellowship.

Now I shall try to answer the eighth question, although this will be difficult since Mr. Pozdniaev placed together several completely disparate topics. The parishes of the Russian Orthodox church in Estonia have existed many centuries and nobody has committed there a "march," because there was no need. Quite the contrary: what was a relatively new phenomenon was the establishment in Estonia of a church structure under the Constantinople patriarchate. Now believers have gotten the chance to choose between two jurisdictions and one hopes that they will be able to live peacefully with one another. The church diaspora of the Moscow patriarchate in the far abroad also has existed for centuries. The transfer to it of the Trinity monastery in Hebron in Palestine, which was in no way "seized by force," is merely the restoration of justice inasmuch as the monastery historically belonged to Russian believers, the heirs of whom have the right at least to go there and conduct services there. They had been deprived of this right by the leadership of the Russian Church Abroad, whose ties with the country now are practically broken. The so-called Russian Orthodox Free Church which was created by it is, simply speaking, a religious novelty and thus in principle it cannot have any rights to property created by societies of believers or by the state before the revolution. It is completely incomprehensible what relation there is of these questions to the discussion of the possibility of a meeting between his holiness Patriarch Alexis II with the Roman pope John Paul II. This meeting now is premature because the crisis in interconfessional relations in western Ukraine has not been overcome. Our church also is concerned about Catholic proselytism, that is, the attempt to draw people who have been baptised and brought up in Orthodoxy into Catholicism, which does not square with the Vatican's declarations of recognition of the Orthodox church as a saving church and a church with grace, like the Catholic church. If this is so, then why receive people who are switching faith?

Further, regarding the so-called trade in tobacco and alcohol. Actually among the humanitarian aid sent from abroad over a number of years there were spirits and cigarettes which church organizations transferred into the secular trade network for cash and some of the funds received were used for the needs of the church. When the negative reaction to this arose among certain segments of society, the most holy patriarch addressed the prime minister with a suggestion not to view these wares as humanitarian aid any further. However, the indicated commercial operation never transgressed the bounds of legality and the ties of the patriarchate with the criminal world which the author of the Ogonyok article mentions, as far as I know, absolutely do not exist.

Finally, the last, tenth question, about the recent events in Ekaterinburg. In that place extra journals in the library of the Ekaterinburg ecclesiastical seminary actually were destroyed by burning. However this purely technical action attracted inordinate attention from the press and the most holy patriarch called to the attention of Bishop Nikon of Ekaterinburg and Verkhotursk that such a means for disposing of waste paper is viewed badly in contemporary society and thus is inappropriate. Nobody burned any books of famous Orthodox theologians, and certainly not publicly.

I shall also try to answer a question that is not on the list, but which appears in passing in Mr. Pozdniaev's article itself, regarding the attitude of the church on the "Ekaterinburg remains" and the canonization of the new martyrs of this declining century. The writer of the article states that the cause of the current situation is not at all in the clash of world views between materialism and idealism that divides the government and church in this matter. To be sure, any other versions are not mentioned in the article. But the essence of the misunderstanding is at a point where Mr. Pozdnaev does not wish to see it. I remind him that the isse is not about common people who have died but about the bodies of people whose possible canonization will be reviewed by the local council soon. That means that after the possible canonization of the royal family there cannot be two opinions in the church about the identification of the remains. This is why for the government, which is extremely distant from ecclesiastical concerns, the main thing now is the conclusions of a certain portion of the scholarly community, but for the church it is the will of God. If God himself by mysterious action reconciles the spiritual experience of the church with the conclusions of science, then all of the problems will vanish like smoke. Haste in making decisions on such an important matter, and more so under pressure from the state, has always harmed the church. We recall how the Church Abroad canonized along with the tsarist servants the Catholic Trupp and we recall how much misunderstanding was left when some people were included among the assembly of new martyrs, for example Fr Pavel Florensky, while others continue to argue over his ideas.

However, these really are questions upon questions which I hope to be able to put to Mr. Pozdniaev in a personal exchange of opinions so that the answers which the church has given once will not have to be repeated over and over.

Fr Vsevolod Chaplin, secratary for relations between church and society of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow patriarchate. (tr. by PDS)

(posted 2 September 1998)

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