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MOSCOW. Sept 6 (Interfax) - A Moscow Patriarchy official has criticized the latest statement of the U.S. Department of the State alleging that there is no true freedom of conscience in Russia.
The department's annual report on international religious freedom, published on Wednesday, argues that the Russian government does not always respect the provision for equality of religions.
This is another case of the United States interfering in Russia's internal affairs, the official told Interfax. He dismissed the accusations, saying that cult legislation is much tougher in numerous European countries and the term 'state religion' even exists.
Concerning Western criticism that the Russian authorities have very close ties with the Orthodox Church, the official said that "Orthodox Christianity has for a thousand years been the largest Russian confession, followed by an absolute majority of the country's citizens. While all traditional religions are equal before the law, they are not equal before history."
The official said he regrets Washington's silence "about unprecedented violations of the freedom of conscience in Ukraine, where the largest confession of that country, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy, is subjected to veritable physical terror."
2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: RUSSIA
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor U.S. Department of State,
September 5, 2000
(excerpts; full text available at U.S.
State Dept.)
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, although the Constitution also provides for the equality of all religions before the law and the separation of church and state, in practice the Government does not always respect the provision for equality of religions, and some local authorities imposed restrictions on some religious minority groups. The commitment of the new Government under President Vladimir Putin to adhere to international standards of religious freedom remained unclear by mid-2000.
There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report. . . .
Given the inadequacy of regulatory guidance from the federal authorities on how to apply the 1997 law correctly, the shortage of knowledgeable local officials registering by the end of 2000 is expected to be a significant obstacle for many religious groups. Human rights observers remain deeply concerned that President Putin has not expressed a firm commitment to freedom of religion publicly and point to the continued public association of the Presidential Administration with the Russian Orthodox Church as evidence of favoritism. . . .
On June 4, 2000, news reports surfaced alleging that Chief Rabbi of Russia Adolf Shayevich was urged by Presidential Administration officials to step down in favor of a prominent Lubavitcher rabbi, Berl Lazar. Rabbi Shayevich later denied that the incident had occurred. On June 12, 2000, authorities arrested media magnate Vladimir Gusinskiy, the President of the Russian Jewish Congress President and a critic of the Government. On the same day, the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia elected Rabbi Lazar Chief Rabbi of Russia, which created a schism in the Jewish community between supporters of Shayevich and supporters of Lazar. This sequence of events aroused serious concern among many observers that the Presidential Administration was attempting to meddle in intraconfessional affairs and prompted the Russian Jewish Congress to accuse the Administration publicly of a "divide and conquer" strategy against the Jewish community. In addition, on June 19, 2000, the Minister of Culture signed an agreement with the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia giving it, along with other organizations, the right to negotiate on behalf of the Jewish community for restituted property. . . .
Religious Demography
There are no reliable statistics that break down the country's population by denomination, but available information suggests that approximately half of all citizens consider themselves Russian Orthodox Christians (although the vast majority of these persons are not regular churchgoers). An opinion poll of 1,500 respondents conducted by Public Opinion in April 1999 found that 55 percent of the population consider themselves Orthodox Christian, 9 percent follow another religion, and 31 percent claim to be atheists. Another poll of some 4,000 respondents by the Center of Sociological Studies at Moscow State University in the spring of 1999 found that 43 percent claimed to be Orthodox Christians, while 51 percent described themselves as "religious believers" (not necessarily Orthodox). A separate poll found that in Moscow only 20 percent of respondents who identify themselves as Orthodox are regular churchgoers, while in the regions only 7 percent attend church regularly. According to January 2000 Ministry of Justice statistics, there are now 17,427 religious organizations registered nationwide. This figure represents a more than three-fold increase over the approximately 5,500 organizations registered in 1990. Over half of registered organizations are Russian Orthodox, 18 percent are Muslim, and 20 percent are Christian organizations other than Russian Orthodox. Jewish and Buddhist registered religious organizations each account for slightly less than 1 percent of the total number of organizations. Jehovah's Witnesses account for 2 percent of the total registered religious organizations, and the group reports that it has 250,000 members in the country. Ministry of Justice figures also show that approximately 5,000 nontraditional organizations are registered nationwide, representing a broad range of denominations and religious practices. Nontraditional registered organizations include Jehovah's Witnesses, Methodists, Presbyterians, Pentecostals, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), Evangelical Christian-Baptists, Roman Catholics, Hare Krishnas, Seventh-Day Adventists, Lutherans, Baha'is, and offshoots of Russian Orthodox Christianity, as well as 227 organizations representing less well-known denominations. Other religions, including Buddhism and Shamanism, are practiced in specific localities where they are rooted in local traditions.
An agreement signed on May 23, 2000, between two large Russian state radio networks and an international Christian broadcaster, Trans World Radio, provides for airing evangelical Christian programs on 750 transmitters throughout Russia. The broadcasts began on June 1, 2000 on Radio Mayak and Radio Yunost. . . .
While there were few efforts at liquidation, local authorities resisted the registration efforts of congregations belonging to a number of faiths. Jehovah's Witnesses report a total of 1,000 congregations in Russia, not all of which require registration. In 1998 and 1999, local authorities were refusing to register some local organizations of Jehovah's Witnesses, pending federal level registration and the resolution of a Moscow municipal court case against Jehovah's Witnesses in that city under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law. Jehovah's Witnesses and religious rights activists welcomed the Ministry of Justice's April 30, 1999 decision to reregister Jehovah's Witnesses at the federal level, and Jehovah's Witnesses reported in May 2000 that since the new religion law went into force on October 1, 1997, it has registered a total of 337 local religious organizations in 65 regions of the country. However, as of April 2000, local authorities in 14 regions refused to register local Jehovah's Witnesses organizations, and no Jehovah's Witnesses organizations have been registered in St. Petersburg, although there are some 7,000 members of Jehovah's Witnesses there, according to the group's representatives. As of May 2000, the Moscow directorate of justice refused registration to Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow eight times, despite the precedent set by the Ministry of Justice's April 30 decision to reregister Jehovah's Witnesses at the federal level. Although there is no legal basis to do so, the directorate may be refusing registration pending resolution of the outstanding civil case against Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow. The civil case against the Jehovah's Witnesses has been adjourned for over 1 year, following a March 1999 municipal ruling to refer the case to an expert panel for a recommendation. In the absence of reregistration, the group is subject to liquidation by court order after December 31, 2000. Moreover, according to representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses, as of May 31, 2000, there were liquidation warnings and actions to ban Jehovah's Witnesses at various levels of the judicial system in Novokuznetsk, Pechora (Komi), Prokhladnyi (Kabardino-Balkaria), Saratov, and Ushaly (Bashkortostan). An appellate court in Lipetsk ruled in favor of Jehovah's Witnesses after the group's registration was denied, and Jehovah's Witnesses intend to challenge decisions in some of the 14 other regions where congregations have been denied registration.
Jehovah's Witnesses report that their applications for local registration in some regions have been referred to local expert panels, despite a recommendation by the federal Ministry of Justice expert panel which, according to the Ministry of Justice, obviates the need for such review. Local expert studies of Jehovah's Witnesses have stalled registration efforts in Mari-El, Khabardino-Balkaria, Novgorod, and Orel. In Lipetsk a local expert study recommended the registration be refused, but in April 2000 the Lipetsk regional court ordered the Lipetsk justice department to register Jehovah's Witnesses under their standard nationwide charter. . . .
At mid-June 2000, Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow were continuing their effort to avoid legal "liquidation." Acting on a complaint from the Committee to Save Youth from Totalitarian Cults (a group allegedly linked to the Russian Orthodox Church), a Moscow municipal procurator is seeking "liquidation" of the Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses organization under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law for its alleged antisocial, antifamily character. In March 1999, the trial was suspended pending review of the case by a panel of court-appointed religious experts. On June 28, 1999, the Moscow city court upheld the decision of the Golovinskiy municipal court to appoint an expert panel. As of mid-2000, the expert panel still was reviewing the case and was expected to render a split recommendation. Meanwhile Jehovah's Witnesses are preparing an appeal to the Supreme Court. . . .
Disputes concerning the return of religious property confiscated by the Soviet government are some of the most frequent complaints cited by religious groups. For the most part, synagogues, churches, and mosques have been returned to communities to be used for religious services. The Federal Government has met the requirements of the 1993 presidential decree on communal property restitution, and the decree continues to guide the ongoing process. According to statistics from the Ministry of State Property, over 2,000 federally owned properties have been returned to religious communities since 1989. However, jurisdiction in most cases is at the regional level, and there is no centralized source of information on these cases. A Ministry of Culture official responsible for restitution of religious historical monuments estimated in early 1999 that over 3,600 transfers of religious buildings had occurred at the regional level and that approximately 30 percent of property designated for return had been transferred back to its original owners at both the federal and regional levels. Nonetheless there continue to be reports of religious property that has not been returned. For example, the Church of the Immaculate Conception in Ryazan still has not been returned to the local Catholic community. The Moscow Patriarchate has claimed and taken possession of properties owned by other branches of Orthodoxy and, in certain cases, property of other religions. In some property disputes, religious buildings have been "privatized," and there are long delays in finding new locations for the current occupants, as required by law. Local authorities often refuse to get involved in property disputes, which they contend are between private organizations. Even where state or municipal authorities still have undisputed control of properties, a number of religious communities continue to meet significant obstacles when they request the return of religious buildings. The Jewish community, which has met with some success on communal property restitution, faces the same obstacles as other religious communities and has concerns about the return of Torah scrolls, many of which are in state museum collections. The federal Government turned over 61 Torah scrolls to the Jewish community in May 2000. . . .
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on March 29, 2000, then-President-elect Putin approved an interagency plan to combat extremism and promote religious and ethnic tolerance. Broad in scope, the plan calls for a large number of interagency measures, such as the review of federal and regional legislation regarding extremism, required training for public officials on how to promote ethnic and religious tolerance, and the design of new educational materials for use in public educational institutions. Implementation of the plan, which is to be guided by an interagency commission on combating extremism, has not yet begun. This plan has attracted little public commentary so far. In a March 2000 open letter to members of the U.S. Congress released by the Kremlin press service, President Putin called anti-Semitism "an inadmissible display of aggressive nationalism incompatible with civilized society in Russia."
The federal Government reports that it has moved forward on other promised
initiatives against extremism and anti-Semitism. In May 1999, the Moscow
city duma adopted a law forbidding the distribution and display of Nazi
symbols, and the Moscow regional duma passed similar legislation in June
1999. However, on September 2, 1999, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper
reported that then-Moscow oblast governor Anatoliy Tyazhlov refused to
sign the law, stating that the draft law threatened not only artistic and
academic freedom of expression, but also freedom of religion, as swastikas
are displayed by some religious groups. Regional duma members are working
to redraft the law. . . .
Section II. Societal Attitudes
Relations between different religious groups are frequently tense, and there continue to be instances of religiously motivated violence.
Many Russians firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian, and Russian Orthodoxy is considered in conservative nationalist circles as the de facto official religion of the country.
There is no large-scale movement to promote interfaith dialog, although on the local level different religious groups successfully collaborate on charity projects and participate in interfaith dialog. In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Russian Pentecostal and Baptist organizations also have been reluctant to support ecumenism. Traditionally, the Russian Orthodox Church has pursued interfaith dialog with other Christians on the international level. . . .
Anti-Semitic themes continue to figure prominently in hundreds of extremist publications in Krasondar and Samara regions, among others. However, traditionally anti-Semitic publications with a large distribution, such as the newspaper Zavtra, while still pursuing anti-Semitic themes, such as portraying Russian Oligarchs as exclusively Jewish, appear to be more careful than in the past about using crude anti-Semitic language. Some Jewish groups believe that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) uses anti-Semitism as a political tool to build populist support, which is seen by many to be decreasing.
Observers in the country and abroad are assessing whether anti-Semitic rhetoric represents a sustained pattern of intensified anti-Semitism. There were several reports of major crimes or acts of intimidation linked to anti-Semitic groups or motives in the early months of the period covered by this report. However, the number of anti-Semitic incidents reportedly decreased beginning in the fall of 1999. Observers differ as to whether these incidents represent an increase in violence, but human rights proponents agree that anti-Semitism remains a very serious societal problem and that the Government and civil society must continue to build institutions to protect the rights of religious minorities.
On July 13, 1999, Jewish Cultural Center director Leopold Kaymovskiy
was wounded severely in a knife attack in his office at the Moscow Choral
Synagogue. Kaymovskiy's attacker, 20-year-old Nikita Krivchun, said that
he acted alone and that he considered Jews "evil." Krivchun was charged
with attempted murder for reasons of national, racial, or religious hatred,
and subsequently was declared mentally incompetent and placed in a psychiatric
institution. Initial press reports quoted statements by Krivchun implying
that he belonged to an anti-Semitic group, but investigators did not uncover
evidence of such a connection and made no other arrests. On July 25, 1999,
a bomb was found in the Bolshaya Bronnaya Lubavitcher synagogue. The bomb
was removed by synagogue workers and later detonated by the FSB, causing
some damage to the synagogue. Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov criticized the
bombing and attended a July 29, 1999 service at the synagogue. The FSB
is investigating the bomb as a terrorist act, but has made no arrests in
the case. Vandals desecrated six Jewish graves in Tomsk on August 2, 1999.
Also, on August 2, 1999, then-President Yeltsin told visiting Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak that the Government would prosecute anti-Semitic crimes
and proposed Israeli-Russian cooperation in combating anti-Semitism. No
progress was reported in investigations of two May 1999 bombings near the
Moscow Choral Synagogue, the May 1998 bombing of the Marina Roshcha Synagogue
in Moscow, the vandalism of synagogues in Novosibirsk and in Birobidjan
in early 1999, or the May 1998 desecration of 149 Jewish graves in Irkutsk.
There was a more positive outcome to the June 5, 2000 incident in which
some 40 gravestones in the Jewish part of a cemetery in Nizhnii Novgorod
were destroyed. The teenage vandals were quickly captured by local police,
and they and their parents were required to work with their children to
help clean up the cemetery. . . . (posted 15 September 2000)
UCSJ Protests Antisemitic Article
from Union of Councils for Soviet Jews
11 September 2000
On September 7, Aleksandr Ignatov, the General Director of the Information Analytical Agency of the Department of Affairs, which is part of the Presidential Administration, wrote an article in the influential national newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta accusing a "Chasidic-paramasonic grouping" of controlling the process of globalization, which will lead to a World Government under its control. In Mr. Ignatov's own words, "This circumstance, the usurpation of power in the World Government by the Chasidic-Para-Masonic group, requires immediate correction." As was first reported by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Mr. Ignatov alleges that this same Jewish group also controls the Russian government.
"This hateful, paranoid article needs to be immediately disavowed by Mr. Ignatov's employer- the Russian government," said Leonid Stonov, Director of International Bureaus and Activities at the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. "Today we have launched a campaign to pressure the Kremlin to renounce this article and have sent a letter to the editors of Nezavisimaya Gazeta demanding that they print an apology for publishing this attack on the world Jewish community."
Aside from the obvious antisemitic themes within the article, Mr. Ignatov
called for measures that would negatively affect Jews and other religious
minorities. "As soon as possible," he wrote, "we should introduce
in legislative order the concept of 'state religion,' to which Orthodoxy
and Islam should be relegated." In addition, he called for, "Limiting
the departure of trained specialists and persons of childbearing age for
permanent residence abroad, by means of introducing a departure tax," an
idea that dates back to Soviet efforts to limit Jewish emigration in the
early 1980s. Especially given current economic conditions in Russia,
such a move could make Jewish emigration to Israel and other countries
inordinately difficult. Finally, Mr. Ignatov called for the creation
of a Ministry of Ideology and Propaganda in Russia to manage "tasks in
the ideological sphere."
A STRATEGY OF GLOBALIZATION LEADERSHIP FOR RUSSIA
Urgent indirect strategic actions for guaranteeing national security
by Alexander Ignatov
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 7 September 2000 (excerpts, original article
is appr. 2700 words))
Even the most superficial analysis gives us the complete right to consider globalization as a fundamental process of the past 500 years of the history of humanity.
This phenomenon must be views in several interrelated aspects, of which the basic ones are
1. "Mental" or cultural and ideological globalization. This is a complex process that has a long history, affecting traditions, religion, culture, and ideology.
The process of religious globalization began with the appearance of the first monotheistic religions and at the present time the world is "divided" among six religious systems that control the power (Christianity and Judaism), finances (Judaism and Islam), labor resources (Hinduism and Confucianism), and the "mental" sphere (Islam and Buddhism).
Another important aspect of "mental" globalization is the uninterrupted process of the unification of the cultural preferences of humankind. Beginning with the Italian Renaissance, cultural globalization went through "French," "English", and "American" influences with an expanding geographic reach.
2. Territorial globalization is a process of strengthening state
and superstate structures. . . .
3. Economic globalization. . .
4. Information and communication globalization is at the present time the most signification of the integrational processes. . .
5. Ethnic globalization comprises two basic processes, the growth of the total population of the planet and the mutual assimilation of various ethnic groups.
6. The key factor influencing contemporary globalization processes is the activity of the World government. Without going into the blood curdling details that are sketched out for us by numerous conspiracy theories, it is necessary to recognize that this superstate structure is quite effectively fulfilling the role of the general staff of the "New world order." However in its work this organization is oriented toward the interests of a small elite that is united by ethnic kinship and the initiative of lodges of a destructive tendency. This circumstance, namely the usurpation of power within the World government by a hasidic-paramasonic group, requires immediate correction.
We shall try to define in general terms the basic tendencies of world development in the twenty-first century.
1. A unified religion, the necessity of which has always been spoken about by the most brilliant minds of humankind, in its fundamental form will appear no sooner than the second half of the twenty-first century. In the sphere of cultural globalization the integrating processes have less inertia and thus it is possible to expect the appearance of a global superculture in the next ten to fifteen years. The contours of such a superculture can be seen already today; it is a synthesis of established cultural traditions (classical European culture, American mass culture, Latin American culture, far eastern culture, and Muslim and Indian culture) joined with new forms (the Internet and cyberculture).
2. Territorial globalization will develop in the following directions:
a) a strengthening of states of the traditional type in Latin American, Southeast Asia and the countries of the former USSR.
b) creation of unions and associations of states in Europe, North American, and the Islamic world;
c) appearance of continental territorial structures: North American, South American, European, Far Eastern (Pacific) and Islamic;
d) strengthening of continental territorial structures . . .
The general conclusion which can be drawn from the results of an analysis of the current state of our country takes the following form: Russia as a historical community and state has objectively participated in the processes of globalization, but subjectively it is not ready for it, which does not permit it to occupy a worthy place among the leaders. The greatest problem for Russia always has been posed by the informational and communications aspect of globalization. Enormous unmastered territories have brought to life the problem of getting administrative orders into the regions within an acceptable length of time. Any information is outdated sooner than it can reach the administrators.
It is necessary to consider that one roadblock to our country's becoming one of the leaders of globalization is the unconstructive position of the World government. When it [i.e., the Club of Rome] put forward the theory of the "golden billion" the World government artificially restricted the number of people and countries which had the right to participate in leading roles in globalization processes. In the opinion of the hasidic-paramasonic group, Russia should not be among those leaders and it is viewed exclusively as the source of raw materials for the "New world order."
Russia faces three possible variants for future development:
1. If it tries in the near future to stay outside of the globalization processes of the present time, then in the next 25 years our country will cease to exist as a state, nation, and cultural community.. Russia's elite will also go out of existence along with the country.
2. If Russia simply follows the globalization processes, then there is a high risk of its becoming a supplier of raw materials for the "New world order."
3. The third possibility is that Russia could become one of the leaders of the "New world order," assuring for its people and its elite a worthy place in the future history of humankind. As is said, if you have to fight the traffic, you should be leading it.
The writer does not pretend to be able to give a complete exposition of the topics regarding what must be done in order to take the leadership of the "New world order." This article is intended to outline the general contours of a strategy for "globalization leadership." The role and place of Russia in the future planetary construction will depend in the first instance on the condition of four "critical" resources: the "mental" sphere, the demographic situation, the degree of globalization of administration, and the "power" block.
1. Russia can and should become the first state where the policy of the integration of the world religions is accomplished. It is necessary as quickly as possible to establish by legislation the concept of a "state religion," which should entail Orthodoxy and Islam. All the other religions should receive the status of "state supported religions." It is especially important to recognize the unique significance for Russia of Orthodoxy and Islam as religious systems that have been professed by a united Slavic-Turkic ethnic community. This step will permit the creation of a new level of relations with the Islamic world, from receiving investment resources from the Islamic banks to a termination of support of the Chechen bandit groups. For accomplishing the tasks in the ideological sphere it would be useful to create in Russia a Ministry of Ideology and Propaganda. This suggestion is not an attempt to revive the Ideological Department of CC CPSU or the German Ministry of Propaganda, but the specific experience of the work of such organizations could be used in carrying out the strategy of "globalization leadership."
2. .In carrying out the following tasks in the area of demographic policy, the goal is to achieve a rate of population growth so that Russia in the twenty-first century will again be in third place behind China and India :
a) improve the health of the population; . . .
b) raise the birth rate; . . .
c) promote processes of ethnic assimilation; by means of mixed marriages and a program of resettlement of ethnic groups;
d) restrict the emigration of trained specialists and persons of child bearing age for permanent settlement abroad by means of the institution of a departure tax. . . .
5. When I spoke of the need for correcting the situation involving the position of the World government, I had in mind the following: the Russian elite should join the World government and its structure with the intent to make substantial corrections in the goals and means of globalization. To accomplish this end, all means are justified.
a) It is necessary to place Russian personnel in as many international organizations as possible on the level of executive organs (apparats) and not only in the representative structures;
b) The Russian business elite should raise the issue of the need for creating something like the United Nations in the area of supercorporation relations, where Russians should play an active role. One important and sensitive matter is the task of incorporating Russian representatives into the numerous secret organizations that constitute the invisible foundation of the power of the World government, the masonic and paramasonic lodges, "secret" orders, and other such associations. Russia should have the possibility of influencing the decisions made by secret international power structures. . . . (tr. by PDS, posted 13 September 2000)
Yesterday, September 11, 2000, a District Court of Moscow acquitted a conscientious objector. Muscovite Ivan Kovalev had been accused of avoiding military service by the District procuracy.
Kovalev was defended in court by the Slavic Centre for Law and Justice.
In the course of criminal proceedings against Kovalev the court found that his actions did not constitute a crime. Charges were brought against Kovalev on June 20, 1998, after he had declared to the drafting commission that military service contradicted his convictions of a pacifist. Earlier Kovalev had lodged petitions to official bodies asking for substitute civilian service. All of those petitions were rejected.
The first hearing on the case took place back in December 1998. The
prosecutor who brought charges against Kovalev was unable to prove them.
Since then the hearing had been repeatedly postponed under various pretexts
for nearly two years. This is a very typical tactics of the official bodies
in the cases of conscientious objectors, say the SCLJ lawyers. On the other
hand, acquittals in these cases are few. (posted 12 September 2000)
by Yury Vasiliev
Moskovskie novosti, 5 September 2000
Archimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov, abbot of the Moscow monastery of the Presentation, is called the spiritual counselor of the president. However the very possibility of the closeness of this dear father to the Kremlin has already occasioned alarm.
Archimandrite Tikhon refused an interview with MN several times through a secretary: "He is busy; he has worked a lot at the bishops' council." There was nothing left for me to do but to go on the last day of the council to the one whom the press and persons known around the church call "the spiritual counselor of the president," at his cloister, the Moscow monastery of the Presentation on Bolshaia Lubianka.
In the church a weekday service was going on. Inside, in the wide yard of the Presentation monastery, roses bloomed; alongside a police captain with a club strolled; he was clearly at home and spoke familiarly with the priests. Right next door construction of a large building for the brotherhood was going on and the noise drowned out the vespers bell. Near the monastery office was Fr Tikhon's vehicle, a black business Audi of the eight series (they say it is armored; I do not know, I did not check). Finally the service ended and the archimandrite walked quickly to the office, cutting through the believers pressing toward him for a blessing.
"Well what can I know about the relationship between the church and the state after the council? After all, I was there as a guest. There were 120 bishops at the council; talk with them. I am not a bishop, praise the Lord!"
His speech was rapid but clear and soft; his gaze was clear; his handshake, for some reason Fr Tikhon grasped my left wrist, was gentle but firm.
"However many are talking about your closeness to the supreme authority in Russia," I pressed straight ahead in desperation.
"What nonsense!" Shevkunov snorted, withdrew his hand and began to laugh, surrounded by the flock that had heard it all, and he went into the office and disappeared from sight.
I do not like it when people lie, especially publicly. Back in May Fr Tikhon gave a short interview to the Internet agency "FreeLance Bureau," where he stated quite clearly, "I voted for Putin because I know him personally. And for a pastor to cast his vote, it doesn't matter what his responsibility is." The media have pointed out still more concrete claims of the archimandrite according to which "Vladimir Putin regularly makes confession to him. It is he who guides the president in his spiritual life" (Mos.kom. 16.08.2000). What one believes or not here, let it remain on Fr Tikhon's conscience.
However in any case we should look more closely at the past and present actions of the archimandrite, upon whom, whether he recognizes it or not, rumor has laid the heavy burden of being the spiritual advisor of the first person of the Russian state.
Singer of the New Authority
Actually, Fr Tikhon became one of the very first church leaders, after Patriarch Alexis II, who publicly congratulated Vladimir Putin upon his ascent to the Russian throne. There would not be anything strange in this if the archimandrite's congratulations to the new president were not accompanied, to put it mildly, by a demonstration of disrespect to the departing head of the Russian federation. By a strange coincidence, the latest major informational project of Shevkunov's Presentation monastery, the "Pravoslavie--2000" web site, appeared on the Internet precisely on 31 December of last year, the day of Boris Yeltsin's resignation. Archimandrite Tikhon and his fellow monks called Yeltsin's departure "the best gift for the jubilee which Boris Nikolaevich make for his people," and they defined the time of the transfer of authority to Putin as the "most optimal" and they noted with satisfaction the "repentant notes" in the farewell address of the first president of RF.
It is not known to what extent such interference in secular affairs was authorized by Patriarch Alexis II, with whose blessing "Pravoslavie-2000" operates. But at least the attitude of the "dark pastor" of the second president toward the thesis of the "continuity of policy" which was widely proclaimed by the Kremlin was expressed quite definitely. It is quite certain that Fr Tikhon, by virtue of being a priest close to Putin, received the right of "letting the cat out of the bag" that no continuity at all, despite official declarations, was foreseen. For the Orthodox patriotic community with which Shevkunov "works," this was supposed to be a sign: only on condition of a complete break with "Yeltsinism" would it agree to support Putin. However, Archimandrite Tikhon has the experience of resolving delicate problems by means of "direct action."
Warrior for the faith
One of the most notorious operations conducted by Fr Tikhon in the field of Orthodox education took place in 1994. It consisted in the expulsion from the church in which we met him, the Vladimir cathedral of the Presentation monastery, of the Presentation society of Father Georgy Kochetkov, who is renown for his attempt to modernize Orthodoxy.
At the beginning of the nineties the Kochetkovites began conducting worship services in the cathedral in which previously there had been a dormitory that belonged entirely to another building on Lubianka. After making repairs they began to conduct services in the contemporary Russian language; they even allowed laity like the well educated Sergei Averintsev to deliver sermons. Such "neorenovationism" clearly could not help but evoke dissatisfaction among traditionalists of RPTs which in the end took the shape of a decree from Patriarch Alexis II. According to the decree, Kochetkov's congregation was moved to a neighboring church of the Dormition, which at the time was occupied by a naval museum and was not convenient for services, while the more than loyal Fr Tikhon was assigned to the Presentation monastery. Kochetkov and his flock had no special desire to leave the cathedral they had reconstructed; then Fr Tikhon himself showed up at their church.
"Shevkunov came to us apparently friendly," some of the evicted witnesses of the Kochetkovite Presentation congregation recall. "In a quiet and sympathetic voice he apologized: 'I understand that you restored the Vladimir cathedral yourselves, but one cannot do anything about an order from His Holiness.' And it went on that way for almost three hours."
I vividly imagined how Shevkunov could babble this way so long; I can do it myself for a short time. But the conclusion of the conversation relayed by the Kochetkovites, in such a quiet and meek tone, literally shook me: "But in the end Fr Tikhon said: 'If you do not leave, we will conduct our services in the monastery yard. And the next day we will conduct them in the yard. And on the third day the Cossacks will arrive.'"
Everything happened just that way. Cossacks under the command of the ataman of the Moscow host of Orenburg Cossacks, Viacheslav Demin, actually showed up at the Presentation congregation on the third day, right on the day of the Presentation. Demin is an extremely colorful figure. A former criminal, at the beginning of the nineties he became an active participant in the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, through which he preached the notion of Jewish ritual sacrifices. Then in 1994 in the "storming of the Kochetkovite stronghold" he was helped by the valiant warriors of "the Black Hundred," headed by Alexander Shtilmark, who had broken away from the "Pamiat" society. The Black Hundreds were responding to a summons to do battle with the "judaizing" Father Georgy, who was considered such because of the contemporary Russian language rather than Church Slavonic communion with God.
But the Kochetkovites left on their own after meeting the Cossacks and Black Hundreds with open doors on the Vladimir cathedral. A pogrom did not occur and Fr Tikhon calmly took charge of the Presentation cloister, having been confirmed however in his own unique "patent" for violent resolution of internal church problems in democratic Russia.
The Devil's Nemesis
Besides "heresy," Fr Tikhon has also struggled with the devil himself in his various manifestations; true, not with such success. Thus Shevkunov was not able to keep Russian people from attending the recent shows of David Copperfield by claiming that the "magic tricks of this vulgar American Woland" would make the audience "dependent upon the most evil and destructive powers." Much less comical was Fr Tikhon's opposition to such manifestations of "American globalization of the world" as computer bar codes on commodities, which, in the opinion of Shevkunov and his like minded associates, contain the satanic number 666. One must nevertheless treat this seriously because Fr Tikhon's article "The Schengen zone," which was published two years ago and is definitive for the Orthodox fundamentalists on this matter, was printed not only in the "Russkii dom" magazine but also in the newspaper of Barkashov's RNE, "Russkii poriadok." "In New York I was struck by the immense quantity of the numbers 666. . . . Three gigantic sixes were emblazoned on a skyscraper and on the roof of a taxi and these same numbers adorned telephones. . . Without restraining myself I asked one of the city's residents why they had such a quantity of these numbers. My interlocutor answered. . . with surprising seriousness: 'Really can't you guess?' I answered that I could guess with alarm, but I was trying to ascribe my guess to my own 'Orthodox obscurantism' and 'fundamentalism.' 'You should not ascribe anything,' he answered just as seriously. 'Your ideas are completely correct. It is simply that we are more lucky with them.'" (Russkii dom, no. 3, 1998)
Judging by the fact that an Orthodox "jihad" against the United States has still not been declared, one can conclude: Shevkunov still has not been permitted to get into solving problems of foreign policy. But just let the America of Fr Tikhon wait a bit.
Archimandrite Tikhon's story would not be so important for society if he, as a spritual advisor or even simply a pastor who knows the president personally, in any case did not have substantial "spiritual" influence on the Kremlin. It is possible that the choice of such an intimate by Vladimir Putin was accidental. But whether this choice is final--that is the main question.
"MN" dossier
Presentation monastery is the chief ideological center of Orthodox fundamentalism and antiwestern propaganda. The "Russkii dom" magazine is published here and the "Pravoslavie-2000" web site is edited here. According to information in the collection "Economic Activity of RPTs," the publishing office of the Presentation monastery puts out almost half of all Russian Orthodox literature, with more than a million copies of publications yearly, while other Orthodox presses usually have ten to fifty thousand.
"The Black Hundred" is a radical national patriotic Orthodox fundamentalist organization of a distinctly monarchist type. It was organized in June 1992; it publishes its own newspaper with the same title. It advocates the unification of all monarchist forces despite dynastic disputes. It devotes much attention to the so-called "ritual murders" of which it accuses Jews. Its leader, Alexander Shtilmark, is the son of the writer Robert Shtilmark, author of the adventure novel "Heir from Calcutta." In 1994 Shtilmark played a key role in the schism of ROCOR, having accused its Russian prelate, Bishop Valentin of Suzdal, of homosexuality.
Archimandrite Tikhon (secular name, Georgy Alexandrovich Shevkunov) was born in 1958. He graduated from the drama department. He was a novice at the Pskov caves monastery under the direction of Fr Ioann Krestiankin, who is an influential elder in RPTs, and then he worked in the publishing department of the Moscow patriarchate. He came out as an ideologue of Orthodox fundamentalism for the first time ten years ago when he published the article "Church and state" in "Literaturnaia Rossiia," where he maintained that "a democratic state . . . will inevitably try to weaken the most influential church in the country."
In 1991 Shevkunov publicly accused believers of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia of "malicious arson" of the small cathedral of the Don monastery as "agents of western intelligence." He turned down the request to provide evidence for the accusation. The obvious absurdity of the charge seemed quite logical in the context of the real threat that existed in 1991 that a substantial portion of parishes of the Moscow patriarchate would transfer into the jurisdiction of ROCOR, which had to be compromised at any cost. Soon an investigation found the real arsonist, a drunk security guard who fell asleep with a cigarette.
Fr Tikhon is a member of the editorial board of the fundamentalist patriotic magazine "Russkii dom," and one of the chief spiritual leaders of the television program of the same name. The editorial board also includes retired KGB General Lieutenant Nikolai Leonov, one-time deputy commander of the First Main Administration of state security, in which Vladimir Putin served. More important, it was through Leonov that Shevkunov got access to the current president of Russia, although Fr Tikhon himself maintains secrecy on this matter. (tr. by PDS, posted 10 September 2000)
Hundreds of nationalists shouted insults at President Leonid Kuchma and other high-ranking guests at the Independence Day consecration of the Uspensky Sobor (Assumption Cathedral) Aug. 24.
But aside from heckling dignitaries with taunts, such as "traitors," and "Moscow Patriarchate is a prison for Ukraine," those who came to protest the blessing of the newly reconstructed church by the Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, did so without causing riots or fistfights.
That was a relief for Kyiv authorities and for the throngs of riot police who stood by during the ceremony in case trouble erupted. In the days leading up to the church blessing, authorities feared that the conflict between the two divided branches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church would erupt into violence during the ceremony.
Ukrainian nationalists geared up to protest after it was announced that the refurbished cathedral would be blessed by Senior Priest Volodymyr, who represents the Russian Orthodox patriachate in Moscow.
That angered nationalists of the Orthodox church that serves the Kyiv Patriarchate. The dispute over who should bless the cathedral - the Kyiv or Moscow patriarchate - had received a barrage of media coverage in the past month. The leaders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate and the nationalist party UNA-UNSO warned of mass protests against the Moscow Patriarchate.
Apparently expecting trouble, Ukrainian authorities tried to prevent potential troublemakers from attending the ceremony. On the eve of the Independence Day event, six to eight busloads of people coming from western Ukraine for the ceremony were stopped and detained, according to the Kyiv human rights group Helsinki 90.
"Four buses finally made it to Kyiv, but only after the consecration ceremony was over," said Evgeny Diky, director of Helsinki 90.
Another bus carrying supporters of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate came from the southeastern city of Kremenchuh some 600 kilometers from Kyiv. That bus was not stopped, apparently because it did not originate from western Ukraine where most of the protesters were from.
Another group of people from UNA-UNSO were detained at the Lviv train station and were not allowed to board the train for Kyiv. Police identified them as protesters because they were carrying flags and other paraphernalia, Diky said.
In Kharkiv, the leaders of the UNA-UNSO party were ordered by Ukrainian law enforcers not to leave the city during the holiday period. Also Tatiana Chernovol, the press secretary of UNA-UNSO party, was detained at the Kyiv train station when she went there to pick up a package containing 5,000 posters.
The newly restored cathedral, which was destroyed by the Communists in 1941, is one of the oldest churches in Ukraine and is located on the grounds of the Kyivo-Pechersk Lavra, owned by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate.
"Assumption Cathedral is a Ukrainian national sacred place," Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate said on the eve of the consecration. "And he who owns the sacred thing of the people, also owns the soul of people. We shall protest against any alien church [controlling] it," he concluded.
The largest group of demonstrators were elderly people clad in Ukrainian national costumes and young men.
"Half of these people drink and use foul language and have never been to church, and I think that their protests have nothing to do with God," said Tatiana, a passersby, who refused to give her last name.
She wasn't the only one turned off by the scene. Kuchma also expressed regret about the protests: "This will not help the unification of the Orthodox church in Ukraine."
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate was founded by Filaret, who was the metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate in 1992. Filaret proclaimed himself patriarch of Ukraine, a move that is impossible according to Orthodox rules, which spell out a specific procedure for the selection of a patriarch. This angered many Orthodox who considered it an anathema. He was excommunicated by the Moscow Patriarchate.
Still, Filaret is widely supported by some nationalists who think Ukraine should have its own patriarchate.
Currently, the parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate are more numerous than the ones of the Kyiv Patriarchate. A few parishes belong to a third branch of Orthodoxy in Ukraine - the Ukrainian Autocepfalous Church.
The question of unification is still open and many think it won't be decided any time soon. Patriarch Filaret thinks the initiative of reunification of the churches belongs to the Kyiv Patriarchate.
"If a center of the Orthodoxy of Ukraine is located outside Ukraine," Filaret said, "then the independence of Ukraine is also undecided. A state cannot exist without a united church for long." According to Filaret, Moscow has tried to thwart unification of the Orthodoxy in Ukraine and gives no sound reason for not wanting to unite.
"We want to have a unified church in Ukraine," said Bishop Paul, the father superior of the Kyivo-Pechersk Lavra. "We are for a united Orthodox church, but we will not unite with Filaret [and his church]. We don't want to have anything to do with anathema."
Filaret doesn't consider that a sound reason.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate is not recognized by any other Orthodox church, including the Greek and Russian Orthodox churches.
"There is no church of Kyiv or Moscow patriarchates; there is only one Ukrainian Orthodox Church," Bishop Paul said.
In early August, Kuchma requested an assembly of bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church to grant the Kyiv Patriarchate autonomy. After the request was rejected, the Kyiv Patriarchate called its own assembly of bishops to "answer the forces attempting to foil talks on the creation of a united Orthodox church in Ukraine."
The Ukrainian Orthodox churches under the Moscow Patriarchate are not under financial control from Russia, Bishop Paul emphasized.
"None of the financial activity of the Church has had anything to do with [Russia] since the early 90's," Bishop Paul said. "And all the property of the Church also belongs only to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, [not Russia]."
KYIV PATRIARCHATE CONFIRMS DESIRE TO CREATE UNITED ORTHODOX CHURCH IN
UKRAINE
Kyiv Post,
22 August 2000
Efforts on the part of the Moscow Orthodox Church to disrupt negotiations on the creation of a Ukrainian United Orthodox Church have become the topic of discussion at Tuesday's extraordinary Council of Bishops of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Patriarch Filaret said, according to PartorgUA.
The Council of Bishops of the Moscow Orthodox Church recently refused to grant autonomy to Ukraine's Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and confirmed its status, adopted in 1990.
"There have been no changes at the time of the existence of the Ukraine Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, and we feel that they will not happen as the Moscow Patriarchate stands against the separation of Ukraine's church from the Russian one," Filaret said.
Filaret offered that the council's participants support Ukraine President Leonid Kuchma's letter on the creation of the United Orthodox Church in Ukraine.
Patriarch Filaret noted that the Moscow patriarch would participate in the consecration of the Uspensky Cathedral at Kyiv’s Pecherska Lavra.
According to Filaret "this virtually means transferring the national sacred object to the Moscow church, and this calls for indignation on the part of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic community in Ukraine."
The patriarch expressed firm confidence that the Uspensky Cathedral should belong to Ukraine's United Orthodox Church. Until the united church is created, Filaret believes that all three branches of Ukraine's Orthodox Church should conduct divine services there in turns.
According to poll results provided by Patriarch, 59 percent of Kyiv residents think that the Uspensky cathedral should belong to the Kyiv Patriarchate, 31 percent voted for alternating divine services, and 7.5 percent think that the Uspensky cathedral should belong to the Moscow Patriarchate.
Filaret added that Ukraine's Orthodox church would not seek a conflict during the consecration ceremony.
(posted 6 September 2000)
On 4 September 2000 the warden of the church of St. Theodore the Studite at Nikitsky gates of Moscow was summoned to the chancellery of the Moscow patriarchate. Without any explanation whatever he was handed an order with the terse note saying that Vadim Rudolfovich Serov was relieved of duties as chairman of the parish council in connection with the appointment of the rector of the church to this position.
The church of St. Theodore the Studie is one of several churches opened at the beginning of the nineties by the brotherhood of the Presentation. The new rectors appointed to the Vladimir church of the Presentation monastery in 1994 and to the church of the Dormition of the Mother of God in Pechatniki in 1997 demonstrated a consistent and tendentious hostility toward members of the brotherhood (sometimes extending to physical violence). Members of the brotherhood left both churches, but they tried to preserve their last parish. They patiently endured persecutions from monastic priest Ermogen Golin, who last year replaced the former rector who was beloved by all parishioners. Now Fr Ermogen, who actively persecutes his parishioners, has become their warden as well.
In his interview given to the Internet magazine "Sobornost" at the beginning of June, V. Serov spoke out against the destruction of the parish community by Fr Ermogen and the transfer to another church of the former rector, Fr Pavel. "The patriarch blessed Fr Pavel at those diocesan meeting for charitable and philanthropic work and he used him as an example for other parishes. Now today we stand at the brink of destruction. How does one understand this? Really does the chancellery of the patriarchate have such power that it acts in defiance of the patriarch itself? Perhaps these experiences should be understood as an attack of the church bureaucracy which crushes church life. Is this really the outcome of the life of the Russian Orthodox church in the twentieth century?"
Parishioners of the church of St. Theodore the Studite
(tr. by PDS, posted 6 September 2000)
by Natalia Sharova
Segodnia, 1 September 2000
One can select a school in various ways. Some parents are more concerned for the reputation of an academic institution, some for location, some for the prospects of entry into higher educational institutions. Believing parents who seek a school with a certain "religious" orientation have a quite special situation.
Each desire has its own suggestion. According to Margarita Leontieva, the director of the department of general secondary education of the Ministry of Education, "parents at their own discretion and own will" can place a child in a private religious school. Confessional educational institutions usually are founded by private persons or organizations (Christian parents, church parishes, the "Radonezh" society, or the patriarchate). The Ministry of Education gives accreditation and monitors the level of the teaching of "secular" subjects.
Moscow is the most advanced in the area of religious education; there are approximately twenty Orthodox schools here. It is possible to divide them conditionally on the principle of strictness and religiosity into two approximately equal subgroups.
Academic institutions of the first type could provisionally be called "schools of Orthodox orientation." Religious disciplines, for example, the Law of God, liturgics, and church music, are studied voluntarily and optionally. There are other subjects the pupils choose: archaeology, numismatics, information technology, etc. Classes in each subject are held once or twice a week. These schools have predominantly children from believers' families, but there can be exceptions to the rule. These schools were created with a goal of giving education to believers' children in conditions that suit them, so that Orthodox people teach and learn. Here there are no classes on the twelve church feast days and on fast days the cafeteria has appropriate food, holidays are linked to religious feasts, in the summer pilgrimages are made to monasteries, and prayers are read at the beginning and end of each school day. Name days are celebrated as well as the old New Year's. Sometimes a religious person who supervises the school visits it, but there is no direct control over the spiritual life of the pupils. Although teachers still try to influence the development of the children. So they could be expelled for smoking and television is disapproved.
The other kind of Christian schools are classical Orthodox gymnasia. They are oriented to more fervent believers. All subjects related to religion are obligatory curriculum. As are ancient languages, Greek and Latin, "The Life of the Earth" from Christian perspectives, ancient culture, and other humanities. Prayers are not only at the beginning of the day but also at the start of each class. They eat food prescribed for fasting and at the time of meals excerpts from the lives of saints are read. There is a church in the gymnasium where services are conducted and every Monday everybody goes to prayer service there. It is required to wear dark clothing in school without jewelry and bad conduct in class leads to prostrations as acts of penitence. In the "strict" gymnasia more attention is given to formal rituals and their execution. Special supervisors oversee the disciplinary and spiritual life of the class.
Now as to the organizational aspect of the business. Orthodox gymnasia, in contrast to many other private academic institutions, are inexpensive. Most often children from families of quite modest income study there. And there are small classes in the gymnasia, ten to fifteen pupils each. The resources come mostly from patrons parents who want to give their children such an education. A wealthy and responsible parent is a find for the director of the school.
But there are not many of those and thus it is not unusual for Orthodox schools to be in financial isolation. Another problems is how to find a good level of teachers of humanities disciplines (which predominate in the educational institutions). There is a number of purely pedagogical questions, the chief of which is what kind of results come from the strict puritanical education under conditions of modern life and whether the restrictions prescribed by tradition will evoke a reverse reaction.
Nevertheless it is obvious that private schools of "religious orientation" are a new, interesting version of education and perhaps they will manage to solve their own peculiar problems and overcome the difficulties of ordinary schools. (We will discuss schools of other confessions in future editions.) (tr. by PDS, posted 3 September 2000)
ORTHODOX GYMNASIA
by Kseniia Luchenko
Sobornost,
1 September 2000
The academic year begins today in secular schools and in Orthodox gymnasia. How do parents concerned about the question of where to send our child learn about Orthodox educational institutions? How do they make the right choice? Today the Internet will not be a useful support for them. Although it is almost certainly true that many parents of six and seven year olds have begun their search on the Internet, since statistics show that they are the most active users of the net.
There are not many Orthodox schools and gymnasia, but it is possible to learn about only a few of them on the Internet. Thus, in June graduates of twelve Orthodox schools and gymnasia of Moscow received certificates of completion. Only the classical gymnasium "Yasenevo" has its own site on the Internet. Here it is really possible to learn all the basic information about this school: address, license number, curriculum, statistics on admission of graduates to higher education; and also it is possible to view the photoalbum, and read an interview with the director, Fr Aleksei, and a member of the council of the gymnasium, chairman of the "Radonezh" society Evgeny Nikiforov. In a word, the information is sufficient to give an impression of the gymnasium and to decide whether it would suit your child. It is just a shame that pupils do not take part in the construction and work of the site; rather, in the gymnasium there is a computer class and the advanced students could make their own creative web page.
The site announced as ""Transfiguration"--the page of the Russian philological school 'Word,' " is more like the home page of its director, Oleg Shvedov. Regarding the school itself it is possible to learn here only two reasonable facts: its address and the fact that it exists on the support of publishing activity (a list of books issued is attached). Although the personality of the director is presented in all respects: on the first page is his photograph, and academic and publicistic articles are published making up the rubric "my opinion." Somehow the sermons of Viacheslav Reznikov and a story of Georgia have made their way onto the site. Recently there appeared a section "Russian National Cultural Center," but this is an entirely different story, since it has no direct relationship to secondary education.
As regards the rest of Russia, only the parents of Piatigorsk are in luck. The most interesting things on the site "Piatigorsk Orthodox Lyceum IKS" are illustrated stories about trips of the students to France, England, USA, and Japan. The site was created for clearly promotional purposes and therefore in the main there are located here stories about the successes of pupils and teachers as well as about Piatigorsk itself and how the lyceum will help to support Orthodox traditions.
There are several other possibilities for learning about Orthodox secondary educational institutions via the Internet. First, recently a site of the Department of Religious Education and Catechesis of the Russian Orthodox church was opened, on which, besides masses of other useful information, has been placed a list of all Orthodox gymnasia and lyceums of Moscow, with addresses, telephone numbers, and other official information. Second, on the site of the Round Table on Religious Education and Ministry one can become acquainted with short but complete descriptions of several Orthodox gymnasia of Moscow, Smolensk, and Novosibirsk, and find their contact telephone numbers. But one must remember that this site has not been updated since 1996 and the information might be hopelessly outdated. Second, there exists an electronic version of the weekly supplement to the newspaper "First of September," "Sunday School," where often are published interviews with directors and teachers of Orthodox gymnasia as well as discussions of problems of religious education and training. The site contains a archive of newspapers, starting in 1997 and ending with the latest issue.
One can place hope also on the recently opened site under the title
"Meeting. Department for parents,"
which is entirely devoted to an Orthodox view on education and training.
Here there is advice from priests, teachers, psychologists, and doctors.
In the new future sections of "Orthodox Child Care and Sunday Schools"
"Orthodox Gymnasia and Schools," as well as "Herald of Church Pedagogy"
are planned. But for now they are not active and parents can get necessary
information and advice from each other by participating in the forum that
is active on the site. (tr. by PDS, posted 3 September 2000).
Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow and all-Rus has called the Russian leadership
to return gradually to the church property that was seized by the bolsheviks.
"We do not demand that all icons, churches, and religious institutions
be returned immediately, but whereever there is such a possibility, property
confiscated in the revolutionary hysteria should be returned gradually,"
the patriarch said yesterday at a meeting with the ambassador of Germany
to Moscow, Ernst Jorg von Studniz, who delivered to the head of the Russian
church an icon of the Protection of the Mother of God that had been removed
from Russia during World War II. The Moscow patriarchate reported that
at present there are only two things in Moscow that the church owns, the
church of All-Saints on Kulishki and the Don monastery. The remaining items
have been transferred to it for indefinite use without charge. (tr. by
PDS, posted 3 September 2000)
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