DICTIONARY OF TERMS: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Information on use of this dictionary of terms: The definitions come from a variety of sources with the emphasis to indicate how the terms are used in the readings in the course. A code form is used to indicate sources. Generally this will be the abbreviations indicate in the source list below to include book/author/page in that order. Thus LR/PL/14 means that this information came from John Rawls book Political Liberalism at page 14. Quotes are frequently used in order to indicate the exact words of the author .However, since this page is for personal use and not publication, often quotation marks are left out in he interest of ease and quickness of typing. One can go to the source indicated and check the exact wording if used in any sort of term paper, published article, etc.. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy are very useful for finding definitions and usages of various philosophical terms. The Metaencyclopedia of Philosophy indicates various sources including the previous two; thus, it is best to go to the SEP or IEP first.
There are a variety of dictionaries with definitions of political terms. It often pays to check more than one and compare definitions for clearer understanding and also for bias or a particular perspective in the definition. Some dictionaries are:
POLITICAL DICTIONARIES ONLINE
DICTIONARIES ON PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS, IDEAS AND WRITERS
Noesis. This
is an Internet source located at http://www.philosophypages.com/dy
Metaencyclopedia
of Philosophy Online at http://www.ditext.com/encyc/frame.html
Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/
Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/
Glossary of
political economy terms: http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/glossind.html
Political
glossary:
http://www.bungi.com/cfip/glossary.htm
Vanderbilt
University Site for Links to Political Theory Sources:
http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/romans/polsci.html#polscitheo
Dictionary of
Mexican Political Terms: http://lonestar.texas.net/~wombat/politicalglossary.html
NOTE: MANY TERMS used in political science, and especially in political philosophy have numerous meanings given to them by writers and are part of the debate and reasoning process. For example "democracy" has many meanings such as "participatory democracy"," deliberative democracy", "pluralistic democracy." "Conservatism" also is broken down into "neoconservatism", "traditional conservatism", etc. "Liberalism" may be "libertarian liberalism", "natural rights liberalism", etc. THUS, I have often used many quotes from writers in order to situate the meanings within particular writings even though they may have a much broader application. The focus is on the writing used in my courses; however, some definitions from standard dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other sources have been used where it seemed useful.
NOTE: Comments in brackets found within the definitions are mine.
[AH]Albert, Hans. Treatise on Critical Reason. 1985
[BS]Susser, Bernard. Political Ideology in the Modern World. 1995
[CS]Schrag, Calvin. The Self After Postmodernity.1997.
[DC]Cooper, David. "Postmodernism and 'the end of philosophy'" in Irving Velody and James Good (Eds.). The Politics of Postmodernity. 1998.
[GBM]Madison, Gary B. .Working Through Derrida.1993.
[GT] Tinder, Glenn. Political Thinking: The Perennial Questions.6th ed. 1995.
[IEP]Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/
[JB]Bohman, J. "Critical theory" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[JR/LP]Rawls, John. Law of Peoples. 1999.
[JR/PL]Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. 1996.
[JR/SF]Freeman, Samuel (ed.). The
[JR/TJ]Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. 1971.
[KMM]Kant, Immanuel in Friedrich, Carl (Ed.). The Philosophy of Kant. 1949.
[LT]Thiel, Leslie. Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Political Theory.1997.
[MAC]MacIntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?1988.
[MetaP]Metaencyclopedia of Philosophy Online at http://www.ditext.com/encyc/frame.html
[MR]Raskin, M. Liberalism
[MS]Sandel, Michael J. .Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 2nd. ed. 1998.
[Noesis]Noesis. This is an Internet source located at http://www.philosophypages.com/dy
[NOZ]Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 1974.
[OED]
[RHC]Random
[RP]Plant, Raymond, "Antinomies of Modernist Political Thought: Reasoning, Context and Community" in Irving Velody and James Good (Eds.).The Politics of Postmodernity. 1998.
[RE]Ellis, Ralph. Just Results: Ethical Foundations for Policy Analysis. 1998.
[RG]George, Robert. In Defense of Natural Law. 1999.
[SB/DD]Benhabib, Seyla. Democracy and Difference. 1996.
[SB]Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self. 1992.
[SR] Rosen, Stanley. Hermeneutics as Politics.1987
[SEP]Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/
[WC]Connolly, William. The Ethos of Pluralism.1995.
[WK]Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction.1990.
[WWD]Webster's
[JC]Christman, John.Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction. 2002.
[JW]Wallach, John. “Contemporaary
Neo-Aristotelianims.” Political
Theory.vol 20. 1992.
CLICK ON ALPHABET TO SEARCH QUICKLY:
A
abstraction A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and
Names (Internet) The process of
forming a general concept
by omitting every distinguishing feature from our notions of some collection of
particular things; thus, substantively, the concept or idea that results from
this process. Introduced by Peter Abelard as
part of his solution to the problem of universals,
abstraction became crucial for other nominalistic
explanations, including Locke's
account of our use of general terms. Thus, for example, the idea of
"green" could in principle be derived by abstracting from one's
specific experiences of a summer lawn, the leaves of trees, and emeralds. Berkeley, on the
other hand, argued that abstract
ideas in this sense are impossible because every sensible idea has only
particular content. In the more recent work of Frege, Quine, and Saul Kripke, efforts
to understand the status of abstract ideas focus on the analysis of general terms
in language.
acquisition, justice in [NOZ/150] One of Nozick's key principles referring to the "original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things. This includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held, the process, or processes, by which unheld things may come to be held, the things that may come to be held by these processes, the extent of what comes to be held by a particular process, and so on. Nozick indicates that if the world were wholly just : "1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. "
agent/agency [MS/10-11] Sandel describes the liberal conception of the person as having specific traits if justice is to be primary: [Note the links between "person", "subject" and "agent". ]"We must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. In particular we must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, conditioned to be sure, but part of us always antecedent to any conditions [i.e., not determined by social conditions, etc.]. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the purposes we pursue. Deontological liberalism supposes that we can, indeed must, understand ourselves as independent in this sense." -- at p. 58: "We might understand human agency as the faculty by which the self comes by its ends." -- "If I am a being with ends, there are at least two ways I might 'come by' them: one is by choice, the other by discovery, by 'finding them out'. The first sense of 'coming by' we might call the voluntarist dimension of agency; the second sense the cognitive dimension."--At p. 152 Sandel indicates that Rawls' voluntaristic agency "depended on the faculty of will, for it is the will that allows the self to reach beyond itself, to transcend the bounds that are fixed in advance, to grasp the ends it would possess and hold them as it always must, external to itself." -- By contrast the cognitive agency is not voluntarist: "the self came by its ends not by choice but by reflection, as knowing (or inquiring) subject to object of (self-) understanding."---Benhabib emphasizes the role of agency in indicating the communitarians she labels as "participants" as seeing the problems of modernity "less in the loss of a sense of belonging, oneness and solidarity but more in the sense of a loss of political agency and efficacy [that is, the ability to act within politics and other social spheres, for example when one is unable to act in politics due to income, or the inability of mothers to participate due to the duties of motherhood and the failure to have better and more readily available day care]." ---- [RE/110] Ellis describes Gewirth's position that only that which is necessary to a person's free agency can be considered a legitimate rights claim -- "For example, in order to be a free agent, it is necessary to have the minimal requirements for survival, a modicum of human dignity, and a certain amount of freedom of movement. The emphasis on the notion that the value of free agency "trumps" all other considerations, and is thus a mandatory right, is similar to the Kantian argument that the moral autonomy of each person is an inviolable principle that must trump all consequentialist calculations...."
agonistic Benhabib [SB/93] uses this term in her discussion on the public space: "According to the 'agonistic' view, the public realm represents that space of appearance in which moral and political greatness, heroism and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space, in which one competes for recognition, precedence and acclaim; ultimately it is the space in which one seeks a guarantee against the futility and the passage of all things human: 'For the polis was for the Greeks, as the res publica was for the Romans, first of all their guarantee against the futility of individual life, the space protected against this futility and reserved for the relative permanence, if not immortality, of mortals.'"
Agon: Greek word. (MAC, 27) ---“Agon is a formal rule-governed contest, and the rules are designed to allow each contestant a fair opportunity to exhibit his excellence in activity of some particular kind. Under the conditions of the rule-governed contest the contender who excels will also be the contender who wins and receives the prizes and above all the kudos, the glory of winning because one is excellent.”
Agothos: Greek term. (MAC, 15) --- “To do what my role requires, to do it well, deploying the skills necessary to discharge what someone in that role owes to others, is to be agathos. – “good”
Akratic: Greek word. [MAC, 128] –re: Aristotle ---
passions not yet under a person’s rational control, because in one way or
another his knowledge of what is good is not brought to bear on them (Plato)
– not vicious since simply is a lack of knowledge to do right thing
– the enkratic person “does what the rational and virtuous person
does, but his motivations are not the same as those of the fully virtuous. It
is in spite of his passions, at least to some degree, that he does what he does
in judging and acting rightly, although his character is sufficiently formed to
issue in prohairesis, rational desire.”
Arche: Greek word. [MAC, 80] “a single, unified explanation of the
subject matter and the course of enquiry into that subject matter.
–“adequately specified as it can only be at the point at which
enquiry is substantially complete, it will be possible to deduce from it every
relevant truth concerning the subject matter of the enquiry; and to explain the
lower-order truths will precisely be to specify the deductive, causal, and
explanatory relationships which link them to the arche and which show that,
given the nature of the arche, they would not be other than they are.”
--- At 132: “Deliberation then first moves to a beginning, an arche, with
a view to the construction of an argument which concludes with an end product
to which Aristotle gives the name of prohairesis.
allocative justice see justice, allocative
ambition-sensitive [WK/75] This term is used by Dworkin and discussed at length by Kymlicka in reference to the idea that people's fate should depend on their ambitions in the broad sense of goals and projects about life. This is relevant to the discussion on equality and whether some people should have more than others in a society and if so why or if not, why not. The contrasting term is endowment-insensitive which refers to the idea that one should not receive unequal benefits in the society simply due to luck and having more natural endowment than others.
analytic philosophy A
Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names (Internet) Twentieth-century
methods of philosophizing, generally characterized by the careful effort to
uncover logical and philosophical suppositions concealed beneath the
superficial structure of statements in ordinary uses of language, pursuit of
clarity in the treatment of genuine philosophical issues, and a deep respect
for the achievements of natural science. In a variety of distinct forms, philosophical analysis
was practiced by Moore,
Russell, Wittgenstein, the logical positivists,
Ryle, Austin, Bergmann, and Quine. Greatly influential
in England and America, analytic philosophy is sometimes criticized for its
excessive professionalization of the discipline ---- analytic /
synthetic Distinction between judgments or propositions. A judgment is
analytic if the concept of its predicate is already contained in that of its
subject; if the concepts of its subject and predicate are independent, it is
synthetic. Alternatively, a proposition is analytic if it is true merely by
virtue of the meaning of its terms or tautologous; otherwise,
it is synthetic. For example: "Golden retrievers are dogs." is
analytic. "Dogs enjoy chasing squirrels." is synthetic. Empiricists generally
suppose that this distinction coincides with the a priori / a posteriori
and necessary /
contingent distinctions, while Kant held that synthetic a priori
judgments are possible. Quine
has argued that no strict distinction can be maintained, since the analyticity
of any proposition can be denied, with suitable revisions of the entire system
of language in which it is expressed. Recommended Reading: Analyticity:
Selected Readings, ed. by James F. Harris, Jr. and Richard H. Severens
(Quadrangle, 1970); Arthur Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth (Yale,
1958); and Willard V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine
Logico-Philosophical Essays (Harvard, 1980) ---- a
priori / a posteriori Distinction among judgments, propositions,
concepts, ideas, arguments, or kinds of knowledge. In each case, the a
priori is taken to be independent of sensory experience, which the a
posteriori presupposes. An a priori argument, then, is taken to reason
deductively from abstract general premises, while an a posteriori
argument relies upon specific information derived from sense perception. The necessary truth of an a
priori proposition can be determined by reason alone, but the contingent truth of an a
posteriori proposition can be discovered only by reference to some matter
of fact. Thus, for example: "3 + 4 = 7." is known a priori.
"Chicago is located on the shore of Lake Michigan." is known a
posteriori. Rationalists
typically emphasize the importance of a priori ideas and arguments in
establishing genuine knowledge on a firm foundation. Kant argued that synthetic a priori
judgments are preconditions for any experience and thus provide a basis for
mathematical and scientific knowledge. Empiricists, on the
other hand, usually hold that all a priori propositions are merely analytic, so that we
must rely on a posteriori propositions for significant information about
the world. Kripke
challenges even the identification of this distinction with that between the
necessary and the contingent. Recommended Reading: Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena
to Any Future Metaphysic (Hackett, 1977) }; New Essays on the A Priori,
ed. by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (Oxford, 2000); A Priori
Knowledge, ed. by Albert Casullo (Dartmouth, 1999); and Robert Greenberg, Kant's
Theory of a Priori Knowledge (Penn. State, 2001) --- W.V.O.
Quine The foremost American philosopher of the twentieth century is Willard Van Orman Quine of Harvard.
Respected for his mastery of the technical apparatus of symbolic logic, Quine employs logical
analysis together with semantics derived from Alfred Tarski to great effect. Quine's
work represents a synthesis of British analytic philosophy with the traditions of
American pragmatism, combining
careful attention to the logical structure of our language with an emphasis on
seeking convergent views of the world derived from individual experience.
Quine's influential paper "Two Dogmas of Empricism"
(1951) challenges the foundations of logical positivism by raising significant
doubts about its project of constructing reliable knowledge out of the data of human
experience. The traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, on
Quine's view, depends more nearly on a conventional decision than on any bright
line between distinct types of judgment. The content of our experiences counts
for or against the entire body of beliefs we hold, and our efforts to reconcile
them may require the modification or abandonment of any of those beliefs, no
matter what their status. No statement (or, perhaps, none but the pure tautologies of logic) is forever secure
from revision in the face of future evidence, and any statement can be retained
if suitable changes are made in the rest of the system. Moreover, Quine pointed
out that the attempt to ground knowledge on experience invariably founders on
the difficulty of establishing genuine synonymy of terms. Since there are indefinitely many possible translations for any
statement within a language, it is impossible to establish meaning objectively.
Our uses of language are nothing more than dispositions to verbal behavior, and
meaning is radically indeterminate. We are left with little basis for the
construction of a body of knowledge, then, and must often be content with
nothing more than careful analysis of the implications of our language.
antinomy [RHC] "a contradiction between two statements, both apparently obtained by correct reasoning."
aphorism [WWD] "a short pointed sentence containing a wise or clever observation or a general truth."
aporetic Aporetics referred to skeptics. According to M.E.Roughly in an Internet article: The aporia is, literally, an impasse, an impassable or irresolvable contradiction. The aporetic method, in a philosophic context, as defined in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, is: "the raising of puzzles without offering solutions-typical of the elenchus in the early Socratic dialogues of Plato. These consist in the testing of definitions and often end with an aporia, e.g. that piety is both what is and what is not loved by the gods. Compare the paradoxes of Zeno, e.g., that motion is both possible and impossible." To say that Joyce's writing is "aporetic" is to suggest that it is predicated essentially on that which cannot be decided or determined rather than on a referent (a subject, a concept, a source) which can be more or less successfully identified, reflected upon, illustrated, interpreted. If you like, it is "aporetic" instead of being "mimetic."
arete: Greek term. (MAC, 15) --- “excellence” or “virtue”
argument, secular see secular argument
association [JR/PL/42] associations have final ends and aims and well-ordered society does not
associational – see political, the
autonomous, rationally see rationally autonomous
autonomy, full [see Dagger's comment at civic virtue below which places autonomy and and civic virtue as complementary and not in opposition as Sandel does] --- [JR/PL/42] "full autonomy is realized by citizens when they act from principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons." This is a political and not an ethical value: "By that I mean that it is realized in public life by affirming the political principles of justice and enjoying the protections of the basic rights and liberties; it is also realized by participating in society's public affairs and sharing in its collective self-determination over them." – Ethical values of autonomy and individuality "apply to the whole of life , both social and individual, as expressed in the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill."-----full autonomy cf rational autonomy [JR/PL/306] Rawls distinguishes rational autonomy from full autonomy --"rational autonomy is acting solely from our capacity to be rational and from the determinate conception of the good we have at any given time. Full autonomy includes not only this capacity to be rational but also the capacity to advance our conception of the good in ways consistent with honoring the fair s of social cooperation; that is, the principle of justice."
autonomy, moral [JR/PL/iv] expressed in a certain mode of life and reflection that critically examines our deepest ends and ideals -- fails to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity required of reasonable political principles and cannot be part of a political justice -- many citizens of faith reject moral autonomy as part of their way of life
autonomy, political see political autonomy
autonomy, rational see rational autonomy
average utility--see utility, average
axiom: [RHC]"a universally accepted principle or rule"/ math and logic: "a proposition that is assumed without proof for the sake of studying the consequences that follow from it." -- e.g. "self evident truths"
background culture [JR/PL/14] "This is the culture of the social and not of the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many associations…."—This includes churches, universities, etc.
background justice [JR/JF/10] “A just basic structure secures what we may call background justice. ----see justice, pure background procedural
basic liberties [JR/PL/42]Rawls specifies equal basic liberties by a list as follows: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law. --- [JR/JF/104] note comment on absoluteness: “No basic liberty is absolute, since these liberties may conflict in particular cases and their claims must be adjusted to fit into one coherent scheme of liberties. The aim is to make these adjustments in such a way that at least the more significant liberties involved in the adequate development and full exercise of the moral powers in the two fundamental cases are normally compatible. It is the whole scheme of basic liberties which has priority, but it would not have priority unless each of the basic liberties were of fundamental importance and could not be compromised unless doing so were unavoidable.” --- basic liberty criterion [JR/JF/112-113] – in Theory criteria not provided – “The basic criterion is this: the basic liberties and their priority are to guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the adequate development and the full and informed exercise of their two moral powers in what we have referred to as the two fundamental cases ….” These two fundamental cases involves capacity for a sense of justice and its application to basic structure and policies thus need equal political liberties and freedom of thought for informed application of principles of justice--- second case is capacity for conception of the good and exercise of citizen’s powers for forming, revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life – e.g. freedom of conscience and freedom of association --- what distinguishes the two fundamental cases from other basic liberties is “their connection with the realization of the fundamental interests of citizens regarded as free and equal as well as reasonable and rational.” --- “the significance of a liberty depends on “whether it is more or less essentially involved in, or is a more or less necessary institutional means to protect, the full and informed exercise of the moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamental cases.” basic liberty, central range [JR/JF/111] – The priority of basic liberties “is not infringed when they are merely regulated, as they must be, in order to be combined into one scheme. So long as what we may call the ‘ central range of application’ of each basic liberty is secured, the two principles are fulfilled.”
basic structure [JR/JF/10] “the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time (Theory, par. 2:6)” – a just political structure secures background justice – regulates govt. structure but not internally institutions and associations with society, e.g. labor unions, firms, family
boundary, individual see moral space and how used by Nozick
bounded rationality [LT/199] Thiel relates Herbert Simon's notion that "the rational actor seldom if ever actually selects the most efficient means to achieve given ends. Instead , he selects those means found satisfactory given his cognitive limitations, the availability of information, and the constraints placed on his time and resources. The rational actor is engaged not in maximizing but in 'satisficing' values, that is to say, in achieving satisfactory rather than optimal results."
burdens of judgment [JR/PL/54] A concept in Rawls’ theory referring to the sources, or causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons -- person who "share a common human reason, similar powers of thought and judgment: they can draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balance competing considerations."
capitalism -- see and compare with democracy, property-owning [JR/JF/137] system of natural liberty (see Theory par. 12] secures only formal equality and rejects both the fair value of the equal political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. It aims for economic efficiency and growth constrained only by a rather low social minimum (Theory par. 17: 91f. on meritocracy).” --- welfare-state capitalism also rejects the fair value of political liberties and permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property so that the control of the economy and much of the political life rests in few hands although welfare provisions may be quite generous and guarantee a decent social minimum to cover basic needs -- a principle of reciprocity to regulate economic and social inequalities is not recognized
Cardinal virtues: [MAC, 197] “Prudence is both an exercise of reason and concerned with how reason should operate in practice, Justice is an application of reason to conduct and is concerned with how the will may be rationally directed toward right conduct. Temperateness is the restraining of passions contrary to reason, its subject matter is “the concupiscible appetite” which urges us to act contrary to reason, while courage is the holding fast of the passions to what reason requires, when fear of danger or hardship urges otherwise, and its subject matter is “the irascible appetite” which so urges….”
capital, political – see political capital
categorical imperative [KMM/150] "I am never to act in any way other than so I could want my maxim also to become a general law." -- p. 163: "If the action is conceived as good in itself and consequently as necessarily being the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason then it is categorical.--p. 164: "Whereas the categorical imperative directly commands a certain conduct without being conditioned by any other attainable purpose....This imperative may be called the imperative of morality (Sittlichkeit)."---[Noesis] "Imperatives for Action: More accurate comprehension of morality, of course, requires the introduction of a more precise philosophical vocabulary. Although everything naturally acts in accordance with law, Kant supposed, only rational beings do so consciously, in obedience to the objective principles determined by practical reason. Of course, human agents also have subjective impulses, desires and inclinations that may contradict the dictates of reason. So we experience the claim of reason as an obligation, a command that we act in a particular way, or an imperative. Such imperatives may occur in either of two distinct forms, hypothetical or categorical. The Categorical Imperative Constrained only by the principle of universalizability, the practical reason of any rational being understands the categorical imperative to be: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." That is, each individual agent regards itself as determining, by its decision to act in a certain way, that everyone (including itself) will always act according to the same general rule in the future. This expression of the moral law, Kant maintained, provides a concrete, practical method for evaluating particular human actions of several distinct varieties. ----A hypothetical imperative conditionally demands performance of an action for the sake of some other end or purpose; it has the form "Do A in order to achieve X." The application of hypothetical imperatives to ethical decisions is mildly troublesome: in such cases it is clear that we are morally obliged to perform the action A only if we are sure both that X is a legitimate goal and that doing A will in fact produce this desirable result. For a perfectly rational being, all of this would be analytic, but given the general limitations of human knowledge, the joint conditions may rarely be satisfied. A categorical imperative, on the other hand, unconditionally demands performance of an action for its own sake; it has the form "Do A." An absolute moral demand of this sort gives rise to familiar difficulties: since it expresses moral obligation with the perfect necessity that would directly bind any will uncluttered by subjective inclinations, the categorical imperative must be known a priori; yet it cannot be an analytic judgment, since its content is not contained in the concept of a rational agent as such. The supreme principle of morality must be a synthetic a priori proposition. Leaving its justification for the third section of the Grounding (and the Second Critique), Kant proceeded to a discussion of the content and application of the categorical imperative. -----[RE/99-100] Ellis indicates that the categorical imperative also has a second formulation which is that "we treat others always as ends in themselves and never merely as means toward ends." And third is the formulation that we "should act so as to regard others as ends in themselves only insofar as they are considered in their capacity as autonomous moral agents -- not necessarily in their capacity as hedonistic subjects. The reasoning here is that it is the other's capacity to will according to a moral principle that we cannot consistently treat as if it did not have intrinsic values. As far as the person's capacity as hedonistic subject is concerned, it would not be logically self-contradictory to will that certain hedonistic interests be frustrated, even though we cannot will that our own hedonistic interests be frustrated. "So, in the final analysis what the categorical imperative prescribes is that we both act positively to facilitate others' autonomous moral agency (since we could not consistently will that our own be thwarted) and , in negative terms, that we refrain from depriving others of the conditions needed to be autonomous moral agents." ----- Consider, for example, the case of someone who contemplates relieving a financial crisis by borrowing money from someone else, promising to repay it in the future while in fact having no intention of doing so. (Notice that this is not the case of finding yourself incapable of keeping a promise originally made in good faith, which would require a different analysis.) The maxim of this action would be that it is permissible to borrow money under false pretenses if you really need it. But as Kant pointed out, making this maxim into a universal law would be clearly self-defeating. The entire practice of lending money on promise presupposes at least the honest intention to repay; if this condition were universally ignored, the (universally) false promises would never be effective as methods of borrowing. Since the universalized maxim is contradictory in and of itself, no one could will it to be law, and Kant concluded that we have a perfect duty (to which there can never be any exceptions whatsoever) not to act in this manner. "
central range of basic liberty – see basic liberty, central range
citizens [JR/PL/18]"Since we start with democratic thought, we also think of citizens as free and equal persons. The basic ideas is that in virtue of their two moral powers ( a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of society makes persons equal." [xlvi] citizens are viewed as having the intellectual and moral powers appropriate to that role such as " capacity for a sense of political justice given by a liberal conception and a capacity to form, follow , and revise their individual doctrines of the good and capable also of the political virtues necessary for them to cooperate in maintaining a just political society." --- [JR/LP] p. 135 “we say that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think is most reasonable to enact.” – democratic citizenship [p. 136] is a relation of citizens to basic structure of society and is a relation of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body – “Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal i a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer on another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms. The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position. ---p. 137”Thus when, on a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, all appropriate government officials act for and follow public reason, and when all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideally as if they were legislators following public reason, the legal enactment expressing the opinion of the majority is legitimate law. It may not be though the most reasonable, or the most appropriate, but each, but it is politically (morally) binding on hem or her as a citizen and is to be accepted as such. Each thinks that all have spoken and voted at least reasonably, and therefore all have followed public reason and honored their duty of civility.”
citizens, democratic [JR/JF/191] “We view democratic citizens not only as free and equal but as reasonable and rational, all having an equal share in the corporate political power of society, and all equally subject to the burdens of judgment.”
citizenship [JR/PL/xlv] Rawls distinguishes between moral philosophical perspective and that of political liberalism --in moral philosophy person viewed as capable of exercising moral rights and fulfilling moral duties but in political liberalism the person is seen "as a free and equal citizen, the political person of a modern democracy with the political rights and duties of citizenship and standing in a political relation with other citizens. The citizen is… a moral agent since a political conception of justice is a moral conception…. But the kinds of rights and duties and the values considered are more limited." "The fundamental political relation of citizenship has two special features: first it is a the relation of citizens within the basic structure of society, a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by death, and second, it is a relation of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body." --- [JR/JF/91-92] inquiry is free and public as well as informed and reasonable – use of judgment, inference, and evidence and also “the virtues of reasonableness and fair-mindedness as shown in the adherence to the criteria and procedures of commonsense knowledge and to the methods and conclusions of science when not controversial. These values reflect and ideal of citizenship: our willingness to settle the fundamental political maters in ways that others as free and equal can acknowledge are reasonable and rational.” --- This ideal gives rise to a duty of public civility (par. 33), one aspect of which direct us, when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are involved, to reason within the limits set by the principles of legitimacy.”--- [JR/JF/91-92] inquiry is free and public as well as informed and reasonable – use of judgment, inference, and evidence and also “the virtues of reasonableness and fair-mindedness as shown in the adherence to the criteria and procedures of commonsense knowledge and to the methods and conclusions of science when not controversial. These values reflect and ideal of citizenship: our willingness to settle the fundamental political maters in ways that others as free and equal can acknowledge are reasonable and rational.” --- This ideal gives rise to a duty of public civility (par. 33), one aspect of which direct us, when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are involved, to reason within the limits set by the principles of legitimacy.”
civic humanism [JR/PL/206] Rawls contrasts this with his conception of the good in a well-ordered society. He sees it as presenting fundamental opposition to justice as fairness as a good --- civic humanism: "For as a form of Aristotelianism, it is sometimes stated as the view that man is a social, even a political animal whose essential nature is most fully realized in a democratic society in which there is widespread and vigorous participation in political life." – Rawls doesn't oppose notion that persons might find political life as central to their conceptions of the comprehensive good but it is not necessary. --- [JR/JF/142] “civic humanism is (by definition) a form of Aristotelianism: it holds that we are social, even political, beings whose essential nature is most fully achieved in a democratic society win which there is widespread ad active participation in political life. This participation is encouraged not merely as possibly necessary for the protection of basic liberties but because it is the privileged locus of out (complete) good. This makes it a comprehensive philosophical doctrine and as such incompatible with justice as fairness as a political conception of justice.” .” – “We do not mistake civic humanism (as defined) for the truism that we must live in society to achieve our good.” [refers to Theory, par. 79 “for criticism of this utterly trivial interpretation of human society.”] – “Rather, civic humanism specifies the chief, if not the sole human good as our engaging in political life, often it eh form associated historically with the city-state, taking Athens and Florence as exemplars.” – classical republicanism, on the other hand, is the view that the safety of democratic liberties, including the liberties of nonpolitical life (the liberties of the moderns) requires the active participation of citizens who have the political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime…” – must be a concern for the public good and for political justice --- To be free and equal citizens we must be involved – classical republicanism does not involve a comprehensive doctrine thus is fully compatible with political liberalism as represented by Berlin and Constant -and with justice as fairness as a form of liberalism
civic religion [JR/PL/xl] for the ancients the problem was one of the good life -- for the moderns is the conception of justice –"For the ancients religion was civic religion and it was left for philosophy to work out a doctrine of the good. For the moderns religions was the salvation religions of Christianity and already included a doctrine of the good …."
civic virtue see also civic humanism above ---in classical republican thought civic virtue is the disposition to place the good of the community above one's personal good and contains 3 primary elements: fear of corruption, the hatred of dependence [Aristotelian conception of citizen who rules and is ruled], and the desire for liberty --- Dagger argues that autonomy and civic virtue are not at odds since when autonomy pulls too hard i an individualistic directing, the appeal to civic virtue reminds us that both the development and the exercise of autonomy require the assistance and cooperation of others; when appeals to civic virtue threaten to jeopardize individual rights, appeals to civic virtue threaten to jeopardize individual rights, the claims of autonomy remind us that the body politics ought be a cooperative enterprise composed of individuals who have a right to lead a self-governed life [Richard Dagger in "Sandelian Republic and the Self." The Review of Politics. 1999]
civility, duty of [JR/PL/217]--"to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made." --- [JR/JF/90] “duty of civility requires us in due course to make our case for the legislation and public policies we support in terms of public reasons, or the political values covered by the political conception of justice (or one of a suitable family of such).” – at fn 11 “Thus we suppose the parties accept the four general facts of political sociology in par. 11.3. ---- civility--[JR/LP] p. 135 “This ideal [of public reason] is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in terms of the political conception of justice they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens. Hence, whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act from and follow public reason is continually shown i their speech and conduct on a daily basis.” – How about citizens then? “we say that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think is most reasonable to enact.” ---p. 136 “citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech.””
classical episteme [SB/206]
whether empiricist or rationality, modern epistemologists agreed that the task
of knowledge, whatever its origins, was to build an adequate representation of
thinks. – mind had to mirror
nature --- re Charles Taylor : when we hold that X represents a correct
representation of X we establish a neat separation of ideas, thoughts,
descriptions and like on the one hand, and what these ideas, etc. are about on
the other. Modern epistemology operated with a threefold distinction: the order
of representation in our consciousness [ideas and sensations ] ; the signs
though which these “private” orders were made public, namely words
and that of which our representations were representations, and tot which they
referred. In this tradition meaning was defined as ”designation”;
the meaning of a word was what it designates, while the primary function of
language was denotative, namely to inform us about objectively existent state
of affairs. The classical episteme of representation presupposed a spectator
conception of the knowing self, a designative theory of meaning and a
denotative theory of language.
classical republicanism see republicanism, classical
cognitive dimension of agency see agent
cognitivtist: [RG, 19] "What sets...cognitivists...apart from noncognitivists is the claim that people can have, and be aware of, non-instrumental reasons for acting, and that their grasp of these reasons figures decisively in some actions. If cognitivists are correct, then sometimes people's desires are consequent and dependent upon their (practical) judgments of value. In these cases, reason, rather than desire, 'determines the target.'" --[CS/24] using Donald Polkinghorn: Cognition is neither decontextualized objectification and explanation of isolated empirical and linguistic data nor abstract structural schematization. Cognition unfolds as a pre-objective understanding of self and world within discursive practices.---there is a holism at work in the dynamics of narrative cognition, keeping at bay the elementarism of empiricistic and semiotic reductionism, but it is not the abstract holism of a narratology bent upon explanation via structures of textuality.
coherentist: [JR/SF357] Onora O’Neill refers to “completing the constitution of reason as one unified body of principles.” –thus Rawls sees the second Critique as confirming that reason is “self-authenticating as a whole” by offering “not only a constructivist conception of practical reason but a coherentist account of its authentication” -- Rawls argues that the supreme reason of practical reason, alias the moral law, alias the categorical imperative cannot be given any deduction, although it cannot be derived from theoretical reason, although it is not a regulative idea, it can be authenticated as the principle needed for completing the constitution of reason as one unified body of principles.
common asset [JR/JF/75] “In Theory it is said (par. 17: 101, 1st ed.) that the difference principle represents an agreement to regard the distribution of native endowments as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be . I it not said that this distribution is a common asset: to say that would presuppose a (normative) principle of ownership that is not available it he fundamental ideas from which we begin the exposition. Certainly the difference principles is not to be derived from such a principle as an independent premise.” --- “The text of Theory … is commenting on what is involved in the parties’ agreeing to the difference principle: namely, by agreeing to that principle, it is as if they agree to regard the distribution of endowments as a common asset.” [not Sandel and question as to if this can be done compare to community idea and sense of the whole as support for the use of individual assets for the good of all.] ---“…what is regarded as a common asset is the distribution of native endowments and not our native endowments per se. It is not as if society owned individuals’ endowments taken separately, looking at individuals one by one. To the contrary, the question of the ownership of our endowments does not arise; and should it arise, it is persons themselves who own their endowments; the psychological and physical integrity of persons is already guaranteed by the basic rights and liberties that fall under the first principle of justice….” --- “What is to be regarded as a common asset, then, is the distribution of native endowments, that is, the differences among persons.” --- the variety is what is the common asset and provides for different ways of bringing together the talents into a coordination for the good of all, e.g., various musicians for a musical composition --- “Variations of talent of the same kind (as in degrees of strength and endurance also allow for mutually beneficial complementaries, as economists have long known and formulated in the principle of comparative advantage.” [Aristotle and rise of society from such complementarity? – Marx and it’s not ownership that is the key but the social relationships re: property.] – “We use the phrase ‘common asset’ to express a certain attitude, or point of view, toward the natural fact of the distribution of endowments.” ----– Scheffler in [JR/SF/ 339-440] the idea that the distribution of natural talents should be regards as a common asset is not the idea of an aggregate good that takes precedence over the goods of the individual human beings. Instead, the thought is that a system that treats the distribution of talents as a collective asset under the terms of the difference principles is actually required if each person is to have a chance of leading a good life
common good [JR/LP] p. 77 – Rawls is often accused of not looking to a common good but he does here but with the requirement that a consultation in the society takes place that does not strive simply to maximize achievement of the common aim – rather, it tries to maximize this achievement consistent with honoring all the restrictions enshrined in the procedure of consultation itself
common sense political sociology –[JR/PL/lvii] Rawls refers to this in commenting on excessive inequalities which may develop in areas such as the financing of elections, distribution of income and basic health care
communication, transversal [CS/148] striving for convergence without coincidence, conjuncture without concordance, seeking to understand within the context of differences --- the idea is to understand the self against the background of divergent perspectives, giving due regard to the integrity of particularity and the play of diversity
communicative rationality [LT/195]This generally refers to ideas such as Juergen Habermas's idea that social and political change comes through open communication ----[JB]Theories of many different sorts locate interpretation as a practice, that is, in acts and processes of ongoing communication. Communication is seen from this perspective as the exercise of a distinctive form of practical rationality. A critical theory of communicative action offers its own distinctive definition of rationality, one that is epistemic, practical, and intersubjective. For Habermas, for example, rationality consists not so much in the possession of particular knowledge, but rather in “how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge” (Habermas 1984, 11). Any such account is “pragmatic” because it shares a number of distinctive features with other views that see interpreters as competent and knowledgeable agents. Most importantly, a pragmatic approach develops an account of practical knowledge in the “performative attitude,” that is, from the point of view of a competent speaker. A theory of rationality can be a reconstruction of the practical knowledge necessary for establishing social relationships. This reconstruction is essential to understanding the commitments of the reflective participant, including the critic.
communicative ethics --also referred to as discourse ethics --[SB/24] Benhabib’s description of the shift from Kantian thought procedure to communicative means for developing ethical maxims is as follows: only those norms and normative institutional arrangements are valid which individuals can or would freely consent to as a result of engage in certain argumentative practices --- thus need a community of communication which is the only plausible procedure in the light of which we can think of the Kantian principle of universalizability in ethics today --- don’t ask what an agent would will to be a universal maxim ask what norms or institutions would the members of an ideal or real communication community agree to as representing their common interests after engaging in a special kind of argumentation or conversation – the procedural model of an argumentative praxis replaces the silent thought-experiment enjoined by the Kantian universalizability test [SB/73] --[SB37]discourse ethics states that only those norms can claim to be valid that meet o(or could meet) with the approval of all concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. -- Benhabib's version of this is: "the fairness of moral norms and the integrity of moral values can only be established via a process of practical argumentation which allows its participants full equality in initiating and continuing debate and suggesting new subject matters for conversation. Thus understood, communicative ethics is a theory of moral justification. Justification in ethics should be considered a form of moral argumentation." –at p. 40: the sociological presupposition of communicative ethics is that the spheres of law and morality on the one hand, individual morality and other forms of collective ethical life on the other have been separated or differentiated from each other ---legality [abstract right], morality and ethical life are distinct spheres and practices. The individual as a member of all these spheres must integrate the claims of each upon her through her own resources. The reflective questioning of ways of life an concepts of the good is institutionalized with the full separation from each other of these three spheres under conditions of modernity. Such differentiation constitutes the first socio-historical presupposition of communicative ethics. –at p. 42: communicative ethics is not morally neutral in that it does privilege a secular, universalist, reflexive culture in which debate, articulation and contention about value questions as well as conceptions of justice and the good have become a way of life – compares it to conventional moral systems in which a possible justification of norms may be that they are good and fair because they reflect our way of life, which is superior to others – as a system of postconventional morality, by contrast, communicative ethics distinguishes among modes of argument leading to hypothetical validity. Thus no way of life is prima facie superior to another and the prima facie validity it confers upon certain normative practices cannot be taken for granted if one cannot demonstrate with reason to others who are not members of this way of life and even to skeptics among one’s way of life as to why these practices are more just and fair than another. Note that the advocate of conventional morality is not excluded from the conversation; but the kinds of grounds such a person will bring into the moral conversation will not be sufficiently universalizable form the standpoint of all involved. At [SB/86] "... in communicative ethics the 'good' as it might be agreed upon by participants in a practical discourse, is constrained by the 'right', i.e. by conditions of fair argumentation and fair debate. This is why communicative ethics remains a deontological theory but, as distinguished from Habermas's version of it, I prefer to defend a 'weak deontological' interpretation according to which questions of justice as well as of the good life, of norms as well as of values, can be subject to discursive debate and testing in an open-ended conversation which does not aim at consensus but at 'reaching and understanding.'"
community [JR/PL/42]"a society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine" -- [MS/149] Sandel describes an instrumental conception of community and a sentimental conception. The instrumental is where the community is external to the aims and interests of the individual who comprise it and serves the self-interests of the individuals. Social arrangements are regarded as necessary burdens and cooperation is only for the sake of pursuing private ends. In the sentimental conception community "reaches the feelings and sentiments of those engaged in a cooperative scheme." Sandel argues for a conception whereby the community is seen to penetrate the self more profoundly than even the sentimental view. This seems to indicate a communitarian view which Sandel labels the constitutive conception.-- At p. 172 Sandel: "in so far as our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitutive sense. And what marks such a community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain 'shared final ends' alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings within which the opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved. In so far as justice depends for its pre-eminence on the separateness or boundedness of persons in the cognitive sense, its priority would diminish as that opacity faded and this community deepened." ---[John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, 1989]"There is a difference between a society, in the sense of an association, and a community. Electrons, atoms and molecules are in association with one another. Nothing exists in isolation anywhere throughout nature. Natural associations are conditions for the existence of a community, but a community adds the function of communication in which emotions and ideas are shared as well as joint undertakings engaged in." --- [JR/JF/199-200] Rawls argues vs. notion that liberalism is simply individualism – “a political society is a community if we now mean by a community a society, including a political society, the members of which – in this case citizens – share certain final ends to which they give very high priority, so much so that in stating before themselves the kind of person they want to be the count their having these ends as essential.”
communitarianism [see republicanism below which is seen
as similar too but not quite the same]--- critical to communitarian
thought is the role of one's culture and traditi0n which give meaning and
guidance to one's life --- [MS/x] "One way of linking justice with
conceptions of the good holds that principles of justice derive their moral
force from values commonly espoused or widely shared in a particular community
or tradition. This way of linking justice and the good is communitarian in the
sense that the values of the community define what counts as just or
unjust." -- [MS/61] On Rawls' conception of the person, my ends are
benevolent or communitarian when they take as their object the good of another
, or of a group of others with whom I may be associated, and indeed there is
nothing in his view to rule out communitarian ends in this sense." -- Sandel
cautions at [MS/186] "The term 'communitarian' is misleading, however,
insofar as it implies that rights should rest on the values or preferences that
prevail in any given community at any given time. Few if any of those who have
challenged the priority of the right are communitarians in this
sense."-----[SB/11] Benhabib describes two basic strands of
communitarian thinking on the question of reconstituting a community under
conditions of modernity. "The first I describe as the 'integrationist'
and the second as the 'participationist." While the first
group [integrationist] of thinkers seek to reconstitute community via
recouping and reclaiming an integrative vision of fundamental values and
principles, the participationists envisage such a community as emerging
from common action, engagement and debate in the civic and public realms of
democratic societies. I reject the integrationist vision of community as being
incompatible with the values of autonomy, pluralism, reflexivity and tolerance
in modern societies." At [SB/77] "... it is characteristic of the
integrationist view that it emphasizes value revival, value reform, or value
regeneration and neglects institutional solutions." She emphasizes the
role of agency in indicating the communitarians she labels as
"participants" as seeing the problems of modernity "less in the
loss of a sense of belonging, oneness and solidarity but more in the sense of a
loss of political agency and efficacy [that is, the ability to act
within politics and other social spheres, for example when one is unable to act
in politics due to income, or the inability of mothers to participate due to
the duties of motherhood and the failure to have better and more readily
available day care]." "The participationist view then does not
see social differentiation as an aspect of modernity which needs to be
overcome. Rather the participationist advocates the reduction of contradictions
and irrationalities among the various spheres, and the encouragement of
non-exclusive principles of membership among the spheres.--- Benhabib
compares communitarians with other theories and, in fact says at [SB/70]
"As a political theory, 'communitarianism' must primarily be
identified...less in terms of the positive social and political philosophy it
offers than in light of the powerful critique of liberalism it has developed.
It is on account of their shared critique of liberalism that thinkers like
Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Michael Sandel
have been called communitarians." -- She sees a commonality between
contemporary critical social theory and communitarianism in some
fundamental principles and political views. "The rejection of ahistorical
and atomistic conceptions of self and society is common to both, as is the
critique of the loss of public spiritedness and participatory politics i
contemporary societies." -- Communitarianism insists "that
contemporary moral and political theory enrich its understanding of the self
and base its vision of justice upon a more vibrant view of political community'
in order to correct "the excessive formalism of justice-centered and
deontological theories." -- The epistemological critique focuses on the
"incoherence of the Enlightenment project of justifying morality and of
providing normative foundations for politics in the device of a voluntary
contract between free and autonomous agents." ----[RP/78-83] Plant indicates
several features of communitarians: "Political goods cannot be determined
by abstract reasoning, nor are they freely chosen by atomized moral agents, but
rather arise out of and are implicit in the ways of life of particular
communities." -- There is no necessity for "theoretical foundations
for a way of life and to conceive the political philosopher’s task in
this way is misconceived." -- We cannot "develop cogent views of the
good by abstract philosophical reasoning, nor are they the product of
individual preference or emotional attitude. Rather they are embodied in the
ways of life of particular communities. The philosopher cannot give them any
external rational foundation." -- "In a sense the community is the
basis of practical reason and political judgement, but these bases are not
universal in scope nor indubitable as the foundational assumptions of many
political theorists seem to imply." But they are not arbitrary views of
the good but restricted and local since "practical reason has to speak to the
situatedness of human life." ----[WC/142ff]– Connolly’s
description of Michael Walzer’s thought is illustrative of communitarian
thought – Walzer is that value universal reason. He indicates a suspicion of any cold drive to
universalization, whether it's from Kant, Rawls, Schumpeter or anyone
else. His communitarian perspective,
unfolds through the warm words of plurality, diversity, spheres, complex
equality, membership, belonging, shared understandings, and connected intellectuals,
contrasting these spherical shelters to an icy world of abstract reason,
external standards, simply quality, strangers, and disconnected intellectuals
would insert standards from nowhere. He
sees a democratic state through the optics of a plurality of spheres such as
the market, the family, education, religion, medical care, and citizenship,
each with internal understandings of justice in its sphere, that can be brought
to bear whenever and injustice is discovered within it for its internal
principles illicitly leaked into other spheres.
Shared understanding do for Walzer, what political rationality did for
Schumpeter may reinstate sufficient standards of judgment jeopardized by the
devaluation of abstract rationality; they provide the glue that holds its
sphere together; and they contain this diversity within the boundaries of the
territorial state. Belonging not only
protects you from a cold world, it provides you with bearings through which to be a moral agent inside the
warm world of the state -----[JC] Communitarianism characteristics Christman Liberalism sees collective deliberation
as a necessary means to establish and maintain legitimacy of the authority
structure of the state whereas communitarianism deliberation is not the source
of legitimacy of the values of the community, but a means of discovering these
values. Public discussion and deliberation is an activity that aims at
revealing the implicit shared meanings that (already) constitute the moral
frameworks of citizens. (1243 citing Daniel Bell) Engaging in such activity,
directly or through representatives, manifest the freedom of citizens as social
beings and it requires (according to some communitarians) a host of virtues and
skills that society must instill in its members through robust civic education
(142 citing Sandel) --- The fundamental point is that mechanisms of collective
choice are needed in order to find, interpret, and prioritize the values that
define the community. Those values comprise the “good” for the
community. The purpose of the community
is to identify the common good and consider ways to best promote it. In this light,
democracy embodies the ideals of classical civic republicanism of the ancient
world, where participation in the collective self-government of one’s
society in pursuit of the common good was a manifestation of virtue and
freedom. (142 citing Sandel – a contrasting view of republicanism with
Pettit) ---- note that the common good can mean
the aggregate desires of a population, i.e., the values they accept for
themselves at a time – this is a highly relativist and , at the
collective level, subjectivist understanding of the values underlying political
life. But communitarians need not be
subjectivist in this way; they can claim rather that the good for a
population is, objectively, what is best for them given various background
facts about their society and its history and the social nature of its people.
This is one way to understand Rousseau’s idea of the general will (cites
community [CS/87] Being with the other is a social event and constitutes a society but not a community – Community is more like the binding textuality of our discourse and the integrating purpose of our action. Community, reminiscent of the ancient Greek concept of the polis, take son a determination of value and is indicative of an ethic-moral dimension of human life. ---p. 88: There is no purely descriptive fact of being-with, no value-neutral intersubjective state of affairs. The “sociality” of being-with is always already oriented either toward a creative and life-affirming intersubjectively or toward a destructive and life-negating mode of being-with-others. It is thus that one is able to define community as principally a creative and self-affirming modality fo being-with-others in society, as contrasted with conformism and more conventionalism as a self-effacing modality of being-with. Community and conformity are alternative modalities of being with other selves.
compensation principle [NOZ/114] This is a critical idea in Nozick's theory regarding what is morally required behavior. The principle of compensation "requires those who act in self-protection in order to increase their own security to compensate those they prohibit from doing risky acts which might actually have turned out to be harmless for the disadvantages imposed upon them."-- Nozick refers to Locke in indicating the existence of "moral space around an individual" which limits the actions of others. If one crosses this boundary then the person must be adequately compensated. What is adequate compensation and when required is the subject of chapter 4.
complete life [JR/PL/12]Rawls gives this special meaning in that he wants to work with an abstraction of citizens who enter the society at birth and leave it as death without having to work in other possibilities
comprehensive doctrine [JR/PL/13] – See also conception, comprehensive. Comprehensive doctrine is a key concept in Rawls’ theory. A fully comprehensive doctrine "covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system. This includes "what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and is the limit to our life as a whole." [JR/PL/59] A reasonable comprehensive doctrine is an exercise of theoretical reason: "it covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner. It organizes and characterizes recognized values so that they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of the world."--In balancing values when they conflict practical reason is also involved -- "While a reasonable comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed and unchanging, it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine."
concept, conception -- see also abstraction --- [JR/PL/14] Rawls distinguishes between concept and conception with concept referring to "the meaning of a term" and conception including "as well the principles required to apply it."--Persons might agree on the meaning of the concept of justice but still be at odds over its application, thus having different conceptions.
conception, comprehensive [JR/PL/175] This is the same as a comprehensive doctrine : A comprehensive conception is "when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical conduct (in the limit our life as a whole). There is a tendency for religious and philosophical conceptions to be general and fully comprehensive." -- By definition for a conception to be even partly comprehensive "it must extend beyond the political and include the nonpolitical values and virtues." -- A fully comprehensive doctrine covers "all recognized values and virtues within one precisely articulated scheme of thought."
conception, general [JR/PL/175] "when [a conception] applies to a wide range of subjects (in the limit to all subjects)"
conception, moral [JR/PL/10] It is a moral conception in that "its content is given by certain ideals, principles and standard; and that these norms articulate certain values, in this case political values." ---- [JR/JF/194-195] “the focus of consensus, the political concept of justice, is itself a amoral conception. And, second, it is affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it includes conceptions of society and of citizens as persons, as well as principles of justice, and an account of the cooperative virtues through which those principles are embodied in human character and expressed in public life
conception-dependent desires [JR/PL/84] "the principles we desire to act from are seen as belonging to, and as helping to articulate, a certain rational or reasonable conception, or a political ideal."
conception, political [JR/JF/181-182] justice as fairness is not applied moral philosophy. “Its principles, standards, and values are not the result of applying an already elaborated and independent religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine, comprehensive in scope and general in range. Rather, it formulates a family of highly significant (moral) values that properly apply to the basic structure of society. These are the political values: they arise in virtue of certain special features of the political relationship, as distinct from other relationships.”
concrete other See generalized other cf concrete other
conditions of justice [JR/TJ/128] ""the circumstances of justice obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity. Unless these circumstances existed there would be not occasion for the virtue of justice, just as in the absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no occasion for physical courage."
conscience [CS/93-94] It is this third dimension, the dimension of the everyday and concretely experienced lifeworld, the dimension of ordinary discourse and practical dealings, antedating the derivation of facts and values, that we find a phenomenon that play a pivotal role fo r the ethical requirement. This is the phenomenon of conscience, which has been given widespread treatment in the history of religion, literature, and philosophy, but which for all that still remains an opaque and elective though indispensable condition for ethico-moral experience. – conscience is the catalyst of critique for addressing modes of ethical behavior – it is conscience that informs us about the misdeeds and misdirection in the way we conduct our lives and that tells us there is a better way to do things – but what is the source of conscience? – is simply from cultural history or is it a call to an authentic self-being, to a courage to be oneself amend the threats of conformism and conventionalism, and to motivation for redress of social ills in public life? –conscience is, according to Heidigger, a freeing from conventions and an authentic mode of creative intersubjective self-actualization but still leaves question of the authority and moral sanction of conscience – Schrag points to Joseph Butler’s insight that conscience is a mode of moral understanding; a manner of knowing one’s way about in moral predicaments; a practical wisdom of what the situation requires, given the potentialities and constraints of our human nature ---ties into ethics and awareness of the other and what Schrag calls the ethical moment: In heeding the call of conscience one is always directed to the voice and the fact of the other, and this other is always a resident in an exterior space – the radical exteriority of the other as other need to be acknowledged, attested, and assented to --- and it is in this acknowledging, attesting, and assenting that the genealogy of ethics finds its course. This constitutes the ethical moment, in which one understands oneself as a self-in-community, implicated in an acknowledgment of an other who is not of one’s making, and to whose voice and action one is called upon to respond in a “fitting manner”. ---ethics seen as a praxis rather than an inventory of theoretically grounded principles – the ethical has to do with ethos in the originative sense of ac cultural dwelling, a more or manner of historical existence, a way of being into the world that exhibits a responsibility both to oneself and to others – it is this that defines the bearing of the self as ethical subject, which subjectively is always that of an intersubjectively --- this ethical subject need to be distinguished from the classical metaphysical theory of the self as a soul substance and from modern formal and empirical theories of the self a moral agent – these portray the self as an entity of sorts—the displacement of this framework enable one to view the self as ethical not because it has managed to collect and accumulate abstractive attributes, properties, and predicates, but instead because it exists ethically – and to exist ethically is to respond to the prior discourse and acting of other selves within the constraints of a communal world
Conscientia: Latin word. [MAC, 185] “The application of fundamental principles to a particular situation requires an additional set of capacities, both that involved in deducing from the universal and general fundamental principles more specific principles, with more immediate application to specific types of situation, and that involved in deriving from both of these principles the particular practical judgments about what is to be done here and now or in some particular set of circumstances which may some day be, but is not yet, here and now. T o these capacities the name ‘conscientia’ is applied.”
consequentialism [IEP] "It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences of our actions. According to consequentialist normative theories, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an action's consequences: Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable.
Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are also called teleological theories, from the Greek word telos, or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality.
Consequentialist theories first became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences of an action. Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular, competing consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:
Ethical Egoism: an action is morally
right if the consequences of that action
are more favorable than unfavorable only
to the agent performing the action.
Ethical Altruism: an action is morally
right if the consequences of that action
are more favorable than unfavorable to
everyone except the agent.
Utilitarianism: an action is morally
right if the consequences of that action
are more favorable than unfavorable to
everyone. "
[RE/174] Ellis argues that the distinction between a rights-based approach and a consequentialism one is not as rigid as is sometimes supposed since the consequentialist approach in , in principle, one in which legal rights must be justified by consequentialist concerns, but fairness or distributive justice may be counted as one of the legitimate consequences to be promoted. That is, in a consequentialist approach, one has the 'right' not to be saddled with a distributive unjust burden for the sake of aggregate benefits.
consensus, rational This term has special meaning for Habermas as indicated by Held [DHCT/344]: "rational consensus is the ultimate criterion of the truth of a statement or the correctness of norms. The criterion is 'not the fact that some consensus has been reached; but rather that at all times and all places, if only we enter a discourse, a consensus can be arrived at under conditions which show the consensus to be grounded'." This requires the ideal speech situation. [see ideal speech situation]
conservatism Susser provides several summaries of different types of conservatism, with some constants throughout and some variants. Burkean conservatism (18th):[BS/38]
1. Politics is a practical,
experience-based activity. Abstract theories are irrelevant as a guide to
political action.
2. Human society is far too complex
and delicate to be encompassed by rational schemes. Such schemes will
inevitably be revealed as inappropriate to the real world of practice.
3. Institutions are not the creation
of conscious will or rational contracts. They develop in a slow and painstaking
process of historical trial and error. Hence, long-standing practices must be
presumed to contain a full measure of wisdom.
4. Because the thinking of
individuals is always based on limited experience, it is to be approached with suspicion.
By contrast, the species as a whole is wise.
5. Because rational doctrines lack
the suppleness that comes with experience, they tend toward extremism and
rigidity. When they come into conflict, violence is likely to ensue.
6. The proper guides to political
action are prescription and prejudice. They provide the criteria by which to
.judge competing claims to rights, duties, and privileges.
[BS/31]Traditional conservative themes:
1. Precedent: Custom and precedent--often
spoken of as prescription--determine the validity of claims to rights and
privileges and provide the criteria by which to judge the legitimacy of social
practices generally.
2. Absolute Truth: Truth is one,
eternal, and universal and therefore properly governs human social and
political life.
3. Human Limitations: Human beings
are flawed, imperfectable creatures. Sordid desires and selfish interests
regularly overcome principle and reason. Individual and communal conflicts are,
therefore, inevitable. Human designs for reform (to say nothing of revolution)
cannot fundamentally alter the basically defective nature of social life.
4. Hierarchy: Because human
abilities are unequally distributed, some individuals are meant to lead just as
others are meant to follow. Hierarchy, the subordination of some individuals
and groups to others, is therefore an integral and irremediable part of the
human condition.
[BS/44] Leo Strauss (20th) Conservatism:
1. Political traditions
cannot be the basis of our political judgement because they are widely
discrepant in their characters. Moreover, much of what is traditional has been
preserved because of accident or conspiracy.
2. Political traditions as well as
our other political beliefs require justification in the light of reasoned
principles. Such principles derive from universal and absolute standards
accessible to philosophical understanding.
3. Philosophical reason is radically
different from common sense or scientific reason. It is comprehensive and
eternal in character and is only available to the truly wise. The pursuit of
unconditional truths is the object of genuine political thinking.
4. Relativism--the belief that ideas
can have no truth independent of the context in which they function is the
great enemy of genuine political thought and the most prevalent pathology of
the modern mind.
5. Relativism is entirely
appropriate to modern mass civilization because it flatters the philistines and
the vulgar. Because it disqualifies standards, relativism denies that the
common are interior to the noble and virtuous.
6. Relativist tolerance derives not
from respect for rival ideas but from the absence of any standard by which to
judge them. In the end, if a reasoned case cannot be made for tolerance (or
relativism or tradition) it must collapse in self-contradiction.
[BS/49] Conservatism Based on
Human Frailty and Imperfection:
1. Human beings are fundamentally
flawed and limited.
2. The source of social imperfection
lies in human imperfection.
3. Political life is powerless to
perfect these flaws because they inhere in human nature.
4. Political life can do no more
than prevent human beings from acting on their naturally selfish and predatory
intentions.
5. Attempts at fundamental political
reform and social revolution will invariably fail because they can only deal
with the symptoms rather than the sources of human problems.
6. Equalizing property or political
rights does not overcome human rivalries, exploitation, or selfishness. These
vices will merely resurface in new (and not necessarily more desirable) forms.
7. By encouraging baseless hopes
that human existence can be fundamentally overhauled, progressives threaten the
social order and are responsible for a great deal of human suffering.
[BS/53] Ortega's Conservatism
(20th):
1. "Mass
man" has displaced the natural cultural elites in the West. "Mass
man" is defined by a specific psychopathology: life demands nothing of
himself, he is content to be exactly what he is, just like everybody.
2. Masses have always existed;
what is different at present is their demand for political power. They
insist that their shoddy tastes, values and standards be imposed universally.
3. The masses do not understand that
a culture, to be preserved, requires care and cultivation. They are interested
only in their rights; they lack appreciation of duties and responsibilities.
The masses have no respect for any authority above them or for any limits upon
their will. Like the young, they live for the moment and feel themselves
invincible.
4. Equality for the masses is a
leveling device by which to pull everyone down to their pathetic level.
Similarly, liberal democracy is a means to pursue their pleasures without being
haunted by the sense of inferiority.
5. The technocrats---those who are
trained in some narrow specialization rather than broadly cultured--represent
the "mass man" in this most dangerous form. Accustomed to authority
and deference, these 'learned ignoramuses'' are unable to perceive their own
lack of understanding. They insist on their opinions with dogmatic certainty.
6. Modern mass movements like
Fascism and Bolshevism represent the mentality of the "mass man' exactly.
They lack a sense of history, believe there are no limits to what they can do,
impose their crude cultural tastes on all, and speak a political language that
is shallow sloganeering.
7. Only by allowing the natural
hierarchy of human social organization to reassert itself can catastrophe be
averted. Deference to the cultural elite on the part of the masses is the only
way civilization can be preserved.
considered convictions [JR/JF/29] “judgments given under conditions in which out capacity for judgment is most likely to have been full exercised and not affected by distorting influences (Theory, par.9).” [how autonomous are these convictions? does it matter?]
constitutional consensus cf overlapping consensus [JR/PL/viii] Rawls differentiates between the two on the basis of the formalism of the former that guarantees certain constitutional principles and the latter ties into the basic comprehensive doctrines and actualization of the liberties in line with the necessary equality for the liberty. He indicates that "the guaranteed liberties alone are an impoverished form of liberalism and, in fact, libertarianism since no combination of liberty and equality is developed. Libertarianism "lacks the criterion of reciprocity and allows excessive social economic inequalities as judged by that criterion." – thus for Rawls stability is not established for the right reasons
constitutional essentials [JR/JF/47-49] Rawls distinguishes between those elements essential to the acquisition and control of political power and those applications of the political liberties in a fair manner thus first principle has priority (constitutional essentials) over second principle which sets guidelines for legislative action on adhering to the constitutional essentials – thus the essential of equal freedom of speech requires background circumstances that place persons in positions whereby they can exercise this right, hence a “fair” equality of opportunity to the essential of freedom of speech which is derived from the necessity to act as free and equal persons in exercising moral powers of determination of the good and pursuing one’s sense of justice.
constitutional regime [JR/JF/145] “A constitutional regime is one in which laws and statues must be consistent with certain fundamental rights and liberties, for example, those covered by the first principle of justice. There is in effect a constitution (not necessarily written) with a bill of rights specifying those freedom and interpreted by the courts as constitutional limits on legislation --- [note also Carl Friedrich's definition that emphasizes “effective, regularized restraints on government” --- This is one of the best definitions available touching on political power. It doesn’t reflect on economic power and what effective, regular restraints might be available there.] – in contrast a procedural democracy is one in which there are no constitutional limits on legislation and whatever a majority (or other plurality) enacts is law, provided the appropriate procedures, the set of rules that identify law, are followed.” ---constitutional democratic government--[JR/LP] p 24 – the govt. is effectively under the people’s political and electoral control and answers t and protects their fundamental interests as specified i a written or unwritten constitution and in its interpretation – not directed by the interests of large concentrations of private economic an corporate owner veiled from public knowledge and almost entirely free form accountability
constitutive conception of community See community
constructivism, Kantian cf Rawlsian [MS/176] Sandel quoting Rawls: "The parties to the original position do not agree on what the moral facts are, as if there were already such facts. It is not that, being situated impartially, they have a clear and undistorted view of a prior and independent moral order. Rather (for constructivism), there is no such order, and therefore no such facts apart from the procedure as a whole [emphasis added by Sandel]" Onora O’ Neill in [JR/SF] pp. 347-348:”The metaphor of construction has had a wide use in twentieth-century theoretical and philosophical writing. On as minimal understanding, it is no more than the thought than [sic] certain entities are complex, that is, composed out of other more elementary entities. This thought may seem quite neutral about the sorts of things that are elementary and the sort of things that may be composed out of them. In this very general sense, logical atomism, the procedure of the Tractatus, and Carnap’s Aufbau programme, in which complex statements are constructed from elementary statements of experience, are all forms of constructivism. So, too, are may antirealist views of science, theory, and society, which speak, for example, of the social construction of reality (of meaning, of science) of the construction of social identity or the construction of modern France out of more elementary components such as beliefs, attitudes, or interactions. However, this minimalist understanding of constructivism as ontologically neutral misleads. By and large, the term constructive is used by proponents of antirealist views. Realist positions argue that certain facts or properties are features of the world, so need not be based on, or constructed out of, other elements. Of course, realists, too, may think that there are simple and complex facts and properties, but they will not generally be inclined to think of the latter as construction because this would suggest that they are constructed by some agent or agency, a thought which realists rejects. However, there is plenty of confusion in the use of the terms constructive, contstructivism, constructionist, and their cognates in particular because some antirealist writing on science and society speaks of facts as constructed, thus appropriating one of the central terms of realist thought for their own purposes. Ethical constructivists share the antirealism of many other constructivist claims and positions. Unlike moral realists, they doubt or deny that there are distinctively moral facts or properties, whether natural or natural, which can be discovered or intuited and will provide foundations for ethics. John Rawls put the point succinctly in 1989 …[when] he denied that ethical ‘first principles, as statements about good reasons, are regarded as true or false in virtue of a moral order of values that is prior to and independent of our conceptions of person and society and of the public and social role of moral doctrines.’ If there were an independent moral order of values, and it could be known, moral realism could be established and constructive approaches to theirs would be redundant. Antirealism comes in many forms in ethical and political theory, and much of it is not constructivist. Constructivisms are distinctive among antirealist ethical positions, not only in claiming that ethical principles or claims may be seen as the constructions of human agents but in two further respects. They also claim that constructive ethical reasoning can be practical – it can establish practical prescriptions or recommendations which can be used to guide action —and that it can justify those prescriptions or recommendations; objectivity in ethics is not illusory. Ethical constructivists reject not only those nonrealistic positions which give up on the entire project of justification (e.g. emotivism) but also those which deploy severely restricted conceptions of justification which are too weak to support strong claims about objectivity in ethics (e.g., relativism, communitarianism, social constructionism applied to ethical beliefs). Constructivist approaches to ethics are therefore distinctive and ambitious. They hold that, although realist underpinnings are unobtainable, (some) objective, action-guiding ethical prescriptions can be justified. The challenge is to see whether and how this combination of ambitions can be sustained.” – at pp. 354-355: “The procedure(s) envisaged – stated in the various CI [categorical imperative] formulations – are contrasted with the procedures adopted by proponents of heteronomy in ethics who either support perfectionism by invoking the (illusory) impendent values of moral realism or advocate positions such as subjectivism, utilitarianism, or preference-based forms of contractarianism by invoking the (unvindicated) value of satisfying preferences. O’Neill argues that Kant more radical and Rawls more limited in constructionism since Kant has it apply to individuals in a universal manner no matter where located and Rawls restricts to an audience of citizens in a bounded, democratic society thus a public reason thus Rawls more limited to an account of justice and Kant can move beyond to a broader view of ethics --- O’Neil asserts that is a major question whether the categorical imperative procedure itself is constructed or is this a type of intuitionism brought in – Rawls says Kant cannot offer a constructive justification for his conception of practical reason and Rawls turns to “our moral experience” and Kant’s conception of free and equal persons as rational and reasonable --- these ideas are elicited from our moral experience – ethical reasoning builds on a basis of these elicited concepts; practical reason itself is not justified by any constructive procedure.----coherentist: [JR/SF357] Onora O’Neill refers to “completing the constitution of reason as one unified body of principles.” –thus Rawls sees the second Critique as confirming that reason is “self-authenticating as a whole” by offering “not only a constructivist conception of practical reason but a coherentist account of its authentication” -- Rawls argues: although the supreme reason of practical reason, alias the moral law, alias the categorical imperative, cannot be given any deduction, although it cannot be derived from theoretical reason, although it is not a regulative idea, it can be authenticated as the principle needed for completing the constitution of reason as one unified body of principles.
contract theory – --see also pluralism, reasonable -- the social contract notion is perhaps the prevailing notion of legitimacy for contemporary democracies today – It starts mainly in the 17th century [although refered to in Plato’s Republic] as societies move into more pluralistic arrangements with different religious groups [The Protestant Reformation in the 16th playing a key role in this development] and different economic groups different economic groups – the social contract theorists – Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau – along with Kant in the 19th century and Rawls [along with many others] in the 20th developed different versions of the notion but always with the basic notion of legitimacy stemming from some sort of social agreement – real or hypothetical [usually more hypothetical than r3al at its basis but reflected in the real constitutions and positivist approach to justice and law today ]. – Benhabib draws a short contrast between old and new in the following: --- at [SB/154] she describes the Aristotelian-Christian world-view [ancient and medieval moral systems] has having a definition of man-as-he-ought-to-be, and the articulation of a set of rules or precepts that can lead man as he is into what he ought to be. In such moral systems, the rules which govern just relations among the human community are embedded in a more encompassing concept of the good life. This good life, the telos of man, is defined ontologically with reference to man’s place in the cosmos – the ancient and medieval teleological conception of nature was destroyed through the attack of medieval nominalism and modern science, the emergence of capitalist exchange relations and the subsequent division the social structure into the economy, the polity, civil associations and the domestic-intimate sphere thus radically altering moral theory – morality is thus emancipated from cosmology and from an all-encompassing world view that normatively limits man’s relation to nature – justice alone becomes the center of moral theory when bourgeois individuals in a disenchanted universe face the task fo creating the legitimate basis of the social order for themselves – what ought to be is not defined as what all would have rationally to agree to in order to ensure civil peace and prosperity [Hobbes, Locke], or the ought is derived from the rational form of the moral law alone [Rousseau, Kant] As long as the social bases of cooperation and the rights claims of individuals are respected, the autonomous bourgeois subject can define the good life as his mind and conscience dictate
conventional and postconventional moral system See moral system, conventional and postconventional
cooperative virtues of political life [JR/JF/116-117] “the virtues of reasonableness s and a sense of fairness, and of a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway. --a disposition to honor the duty of public civility. It directs us to appeal to political values in cases involving the constitutional essentials, and also in other cases insofar as they order on those essentials and become politically divisive.” --- e.g. abortion
counterfactual [Noesis] "A conditional statement whose
antecedent is known (or, at least, believed) to be
contrary to fact. Thus, for example, "If
George W. Bush had been born in
crisis, social [DHCT/285] Habermas’s concept of social crisis is a change in the system itself is taking place, a change in the identity of the system – such changes are seen as threats to the social identity of an individual – [Held] "identity change involves alterations of structures essential to the stability and maintenance of a particular social configuration, for example the wage-capital structure in capitalism."
criterion of reciprocity [JR/PL/xlvi] "Our exercise of
political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we
offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as
a justification of those actions." -- This applies to the constitution
itself and also to the particular statutes and laws
[SB/189-190] Benhabib quotes Habermas’s comment on Kohlberg:
"Thus, the perspective complementing that of equal treatment of individuals
is not benevolence but solidarity. this principle is rooted in the realization
that each person must take responsibility for the other because as consociates
all must have an interest in the integrity of their shared life context
critical knowledge [SB/205] Benhabib uses in opposition to functional knowledge: " The corresponding epistemic vision is 'critical' as opposed to 'functional' knowledge. Critical knowledge is in the service of the subject; its goal is not the legitimate of power but the enabling of empowerment. It seeks not to enhance the efficiency of the apparatus but to further the self-formation of humanity; not to reduce complexity but to create a world in which a reconciled humanity recognizes itself."
critical theory [DHCT/25] a central tenant is "that the process of liberation entails a process of self-emancipation and self-creation."--[DHCR/31] "rejected idea that all social phenomena were in essence a mere 'reflex' of the economic" although the economic was very important in understanding social phenomena -- emphasis was strongly placed on "historically oriented empirically oriented research, carried out in the context of Marx's insights into political economy." [thus grasping this emphasis of Marx without accepting the more orthodox Marxian position of economic determinism whereby economics determined all. They argued that not even Marx was so deterministic in his thinking.] --At p. 33 referring to Horkheimer and necessity for interdisciplinary study and the exploration of "'the interconnection between the economic life of society, the psychic development of the individual and transformations in the realm of culture...including not only the so-called spiritual contents of science, art and religion, but also law, ethics, fashion, public opinion, sport, amusement, life style etc.'." -- At p. 48 Horkeimer rejects the "primitive purity" and "autocratic structure" of the Soviet party and state. At p. 51 referring to Marcuse, another main actor in critical theory: "His work is...famous for his defence of a socialism that is radically democratic and libertarian." "Marcuse has defended throughout his life the call for direct democracy in the polity, work-place and in the cultural sphere." ""A radically democratic society requires independent critical thinking."---At pp. 66-67 refers to the stance against the instrumental reason predominant under capitalism: "the 'rise' of formal, means-end rationality undermines the status of critical, substantive rationality - the rationality of values, ends and possible attitudes towards life. Critical reason and autonomous thinking are being eroded as a result of both the 'bracketing of human beings within commodity production' and 'the fall of a technological veil."---At p. 183, referring to Horkheimer "Critical theory aims to assess 'the breach between ideas and reality'. The method of procedure is immanent criticism. Immanent criticism confronts 'the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual principles, in order to criticize the relation between the two and thus transcend them.'"-----At pp. 214-215: Critical theory is concerned with bringing to light the "actuality" of what is "real" in society in order to come up with ways in which individuals may find more empowerment to attain a better life. Adorno illustrates this with his concept of negative dialectics or non-identity thinking. Identity thinking sees the particular dissolved into the universal since all particular objects are subsumed under the universal. . Rational identity holds to a set of ideal properties of an object, thus "an object only does justice to is concept if it meets the specifications of its ideal characteristics." Negative dialectic or non-identity thinking seeks the falseness of the claims of identity thinking by assessing "the relation between concept and object, between the set of properties implied by the concept and the object's actuality." "Non-identity thinking employs language, through the construction of 'constellations' of concepts, as a connotative or indicative device. " "It examines contradictions between the object's idea of itself and its actual existence. Thus the immanent method, through its capacity to produce a 'heightened perception of the thing itself', cannot escape a certain 'transcendent' quality. The transcendent element of this approach does not...lead to a once and for all grasp of the totality."---- –regarding the immanent method and society [DHCT/217] Adorno, as described by Held, "argued, the individuality of the particular can be uncovered – through categories which are intrinsic to it rather than through notions which are imposed from without." – the universal is revealed within the particular [i.e., is immanent in the particular]– "critical theory seeks to understand, analyzes and enact in its very structure the subjective ground of society: society is not simply an object; it is a subject-object. It is both the subject of knowledge and the object." – [DHCT/217]quoting Adorno: "Society is subjective because it refers back to the human beings who create it, and its organizational principles too refer back to subjective consciousness and its most general form of abstraction – logic, something essentially subjective. Society is objective because, on account of its underlying structure, it cannot perceive its own subjectivity, because it doe not possess a total subject and through its organization it thwarts the installation of such a subject."---- [DHCT/256] referring to Habermas "ideology is, as Trent Schryoer put it, ‘those belief systems which can maintain their legitimacy despite the fact that they could not be validated if subjected to rational discourse.’ The process of emancipation [a major theme of critical theory], then, entails the transcendence of such systems of distorted communication. this process, in turn, requires engaging in critical reflection and criticism. It is only through reflection that domination, in its many forms, can be unmasked.” Held: "On Habermas’s account, the critical theory of society makes this [The very structure of speech is held to involve the anticipation of a form of life in which truly, freedom and justice are possible" its starting point. Critical theory is therefore, grounded in a normative standard that is not arbitrary, but ‘inherent in the very structure of social action and language’.----Habermas's idea of the ideal speech situation is a key concept in his notion of critical theory. [DHCT/343] Held describes it: "The condition for a grounded consensus is a situation in which there is mutual understanding between participants, equal chances to select and employ speech acts, recognition of the legitimacy of each to participate in the dialogue as 'an autonomous and equal partner' and where the resulting consensus is due simply 'to the force of the better argument'." --- Held sums up much of the work of critical theory: [DHCT/261: "their interest in theory and critiques was directly related to an ambition to analyze new forms of domination, undermine ideology, enhance awareness of the material conditions of life circumstances, and to aid the creation of radical political movements." -- at p.362 Held refers to their analysis of the components of culture, of identity formation because history is made "by the 'situated conduct of partially knowing subjects'." --"Critical theory does not downplay structure, but seeks to examine the interplay between structure and social practices, the mediation of the objective and subjective in and through particular social phenomena." -- at p. 363: "The Frankfurt school and Habermas sought to extend and adapt the insights of Marx's work in order to reveal the complex factors which hinder people coming to consciousness of themselves as capable of different action." ----- [JB] "Critical Theory has a narrow and a broad meaning in philosophy and in the history of the social sciences. “Critical Theory” in the narrow sense designates several generations of German philosophers and social theorists in the Western European Marxist tradition known as the Frankfurt School. According to these theorists, a “critical” theory may be distinguished from a “traditional” theory according to a specific practical purpose: a theory is critical to the extent that it seeks human emancipation, “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer 1982, 244). Because such theories aim to explain and transform all the circumstances that enslave human beings, many “critical theories” in the broader sense have been developed. They have emerged in connection with the many social movements that identify varied dimensions of the domination of human beings in modern societies. In both the broad and the narrow senses, however, a critical theory provides the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms".
cultural relativism This perspective is one of seeing cultures
as having their own particular characteristics so that ideas of the good may
vary among cultures. Rather than universal cultural truths there are truths and
values relative to the respective cultures. Benhabib at [SB/62} refers
to radical cultural relativism " which views other cultures as isolated
islands of cultural autonomy" and then goes on to assert this is
"poor sociology and history." The relativity of cultural values has
been at the heart of many debates over natural law, with its thrust towards a
law of nature applicable to all [see, for example Carneades arguments presented
by
current time-slice principles of justice [NOZ/153] Historical distribution refers to "whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about. In contrast, current time-slice principles of justice hold that the justice of a distribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) as judged by some structural principles) of just distribution." -- p, 155 "historical principles of justice hold that past circumstances or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things."
decent government, see government, decent
decent hierarchical societies [JR/LP] pp. 64-65 society has non-aggressive aims and recognizes that it must gain its legitimate ends through diplomacy and trade and other ways of peace – respects the political and social order of other societies even if it assumes its underlying doctrine to be comprehensive with influence on the structure of government --- a decent hierarchical people’s system of law, in accordance with its common good idea of justice secures for all members of the peoples what have come to be called human rights: right to life [subsistence and security], to liberty [freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought] – to property [personal property] – to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice [ that is, that similar cases be treated similarly] – human rights, as thus understood, cannon be rejected as peculiarly liberal or special to the Western tradition. They are not politically parochial. --- moral duties and obligations exist since people views as decent and rational, as well as responsible and able to play a part in social life, they recognize these duties and obligations as fitting with their common god idea of justice and do not see their duties and obligations as mere commands imposed by force – they have the capacity for moral leaning and know the difference between right and wrong as understood in their society – doesn’t need to accept idea of persons as citizens first with equal basic rights as equal citizens but views persons as responsible and cooperating members of their respective groups ------ there must be a sincere and not unreasonable belief o the part of judges and other officials who administer the legal system that the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice – society’s injunctions must be justified by law and not simply force and upheld by judges
decent people see people,
decent
decent society see society
deconstruction see also structuralism, poststructuralism[LT/81-82] Deconstruction refers to the idea that "meaning is determined by the relation of words to other words. It is a structured play of signs. Deconstruction focuses on this unstable relativity of language. Deconstruction utilizes the rhetorical features of a text to undermine or cast suspicion on its manifest content or argument, particularly if the text asserts or legitimates stable categories of experience or structures of social existence. Deconstruction demonstrates the self-contradictory linguistic tendencies within any attempt to conceptualize neatly these categories or structures. It also demonstrates that certain rhetorical forms, such a binary oppositions between subject and object, appearance and reality, mind and body, male and female, self and other, speech and writing insidiously establish hierarchies of values. "Deconstructionists are concerned not only or even primarily with the capacity of language to represent reality. It is concerned with the capacity of language to construct reality. Likewise poststrucuralist theory is not only ore even primarily concerned with the capacity of power to constrain action and desire. It is concerned with the capacity of power to construct identity, and be so doing, induce action and desire. Post structuralists investigate the generative effects of power. Hence many poststructuralists, such as ... Michel Foucault (1926-84) focuses less on the linguistic forms and rhetorical contradictions found in texts than on concrete institutions and other historical legacies of power. By focusing on the contextual relativity of these institutions and legacies, poststructuralists seek to undermine the grip various forms of power have on us today." ---[MetaP] Derrida and Deconstruction: An Introduction by Bill Ramey
Deconstruction is notoriously difficult to define. No brief definition is
likely to please those associated with deconstruction, and indeed they
have complained often about the misrepresentation of deconstruction.
Deconstruction is not, they tell us, a methodology, a school of
thought, a philosophy of language, or a system of thought; and despite its
trendy acceptance by American literary critics,
contemporary deconstruction originates with the French philosopher Jacques
Derrida. Derrida has been accused of being everything from an
intellectual terrorist to a philosophical court jester. But it is precisely
these kinds of categories that Derrida resists, i.e., sharp distinctions
between being playful and being serious, being
logical and being whimsical, and so on. As Nietzsche wrote, no one is as
serious as a child at play. At any rate, whether Derrida's discourse is playful
and liberating or childish and purposely obscure is a matter for critical
debate. Neither deconstruction nor structuralism work from the
assumption that the task of language is to match up what we say and write
with what exists in the world, i.e., neither accepts the referential theory
of language. Rather both take their cue from the views of linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure. Christopher Norris, one of the best expositors of
deconstruction, writes:
[T]he linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure ... argued that our knowledge of the
world is
inextricably shaped and conditioned by the language that serves to
represent it.
Saussure's insistence on the 'arbitrary' nature of the sign led to
his undoing of the
natural link that common sense assumes to exist between
word and thing....
Far from providing a 'window' on reality ... language
brings along with
it a whole intricate network of established significations....
Reality is carved
up in various ways according to the manifold patterns of
sameness and
difference which various languages provide. This basic
relativity of
thought and meaning ... is the starting-point of structuralist
theory. (4-5)
. . . .
If there is a
single theme which draws together the otherwise disparate field of
'structuralist' thought, it is the principle ... that language is a
differential network of meaning. There is no self-evident or one-to-one link
between 'signifier' and 'signified', the word as (spoken or written)
vehicle and the concept it serves to evoke. Both are caught up in a play of
distinctive features where differences of sound and sense are the only
markers of meaning. Thus, at the simplest phonetic level, bat and cat are
distinguished (and meaning is generated) by the switching of the initial
consonants. The key difference between deconstruction and structuralism is that
the latter posits the stability of signs and language systems; and although it
rejects attempts to justify systems of thought on referential grounds, i.e.,
attempts to find unshakable foundations for our beliefs by matching them up to
the real world, it still holds out for the possibility that one can take a
scientific approach to criticism and literature, an approach leading to a
stable theory of language and culture. To put it differently,
structuralism dispensed with the correspondence theory of truth and language in
favor of the coherence theory of truth. Deconstruction, on the other hand,
rejects the stability of the sign and accordingly rejects both theories
of truth. Deconstruction and Philosophy--- One of the better
ways to understand deconstruction is to look at its philosophical roots.
Many consider Derrida's 1966 speech at
functions: (1) "to orient, balance, and
organize the structure," (2) "to make sure that the organizing
principle of the structure would limit ... freeplay of the structure," and
(3) to forbid further signification, i.e., further substitution and
transformation of a structure's contents and terms (517). Put simply, the
center is the endstop of a structure, that which closes it off and masks
its structurality, i.e., masks its man-made nature. Derrida critiques
this centering process by drawing a contradiction from it. The center is
supposed to both within and outside the structure; the center defines the
structure but is not part of it (or else the structurality of structure
comes to the foreground). Hence, concludes Derrida, "[t]he center is
not the center." This is an attempt to turn Western philosophy's
logic back onto itself, to expose its stress points, to decenter it--to
literally
deconstruct its structures. Derrida goes on to claim
that: the whole history of the concept of structure ...
must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for
center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in
a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or
names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the
history of these metaphors and metonymies. -----
Deconstruction and Literature Derrida's version of [the]
Kantian argument makes writing ... the precondition of
all possible knowledge.... His claim is a priori in the
radically Kantian sense: that we cannot think the possibility of
culture, history, or knowledge in general without also
thinking the prior necessity of writing. In Of Grammatology,
Derrida goes so far as to say that "There is nothing outside of the
text" . His argument is that in back of all our attempts to understand
what a text means and refers to is not the thing-in-itself, but still
more writing--more "supplements, substitutive
significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential
references." Here we come back to Derrida's view of the history of
philosophy as a "history of ... metaphors and metonymies." For
Derrida, the same is true of literature and literary
criticism, and hence we can grasp the import of deconstruction for literature.
... an interpretation should be a careful reading
that accounts for all aspects of a text, whether recognized by the writer
or not: ... the reading must always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived
by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not
command of the patterns of language that he uses. This relationship is not a
certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness or of
force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produce.
deliberative conception of mutual respect Sandel [MS/217] urges a concept to replace notion of public debate void of arguments from one's perspectives of the good. Rather than simply having mutual respect of opinions of others " we respect our fellow citizen's moral and religious convictions by engaging, or attending to, them -- sometimes by challenging and contesting them, sometimes by listening and learning from them -- especially when those convictions bear on important political questions."
democracy --- [JR/LP] p. 139 deliberative democracy --3 essential elements: the idea of public reason, although not all such ideas are the same (“Deliberative democracy limits the reasons citizens may give i supporting their political opinions to reasons consistent with their seeing other citizens as equals.”)–second is a framework of constitutional democratic institutions that specifies the setting for deliberative legislative bodies – third is the knowledge and desire on the part of citizens generally to follow public reason and to realize its ideal i their political conduct --- public financing essential since is necessary to set democracy free from the curse of money – also need widespread education in the basic aspects of constitutional democratic government -- at p. 140“In constant pursuit of money to finance campaigns, the political system is simply unable to function. Its deliberative powers are paralyzed.” [SB/DD5-6] Benhabib refers to several versions of democracy as presented by Habermas: the republican model is where politics is viewed as the articulation of a "common good". "The good of politics is not the administration of the interests of civil society as much as it is the creation of solidarity among citizens." The liberal model is where politics is "the coordination of divergent interests among private persons." "The democratic process has the function of transmitting to the political apparatus the interests of an autonomous civil society." Habermas than indicates the discourse theory: "The political system is considered neither the peak nor the center, nor even the formative model of society...."--" Quoting Habermas : "Within and outside the parliamentary complex, these subjectless forms of communication constitute arenas i which more or less rational opinion- and will-formation can take place." His insistence is , quoting Habermas, "on the original meaning of democracy in terms of the institutionalization of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens." -- Agonistic democracy is Benhabib's label for the type of democracy described in the quote from Bonnie Honig: "To take difference -- and not just identity -- seriously in democratic society is to affirm the inescapability of conflict and the ineradicability of resistance to the political and moral projects of ordering subjects, institutions, and values....It is to give up on the dream of a place called home, a place free of power, conflict, and struggle, a place -- an identity, a form of life , a group vision -- unmarked or unriven by difference and untouched by the power brought to bear upon it by the identities that strive to ground themselves in its place." ---- see democracy, property-owning below -----Connolly and democracy in pluralistic sense with all “truths” and policies subject to question and dissent: democracy [WC/101] Connolly refers to democracy as representative democracy in which political agents doubt, dissent, protest, organize, resist, disrupt fixed priorities as a as well as mandate and obey general laws. "While Democratic idealists often celebrate the citizen as the consummate agent through which a legitimacy, freedom, and a common will realized, and while Democratic realists often reduces citizen to a self-interest calculator voting in periodic elections, this [his view] conception prizes a citizen partly because it dissipates in defining the laws of the state and partly because its corollary role as critic of previous patterns of state authority supports and energizes its critical political capacities in numerous arenas. Democratic citizenship is idealized here because citizenship itself as the site of a constitute ambiguity: it is at once the means through which general programs are crystallized and enacted through governing assemblages and a medium through which previous settlements sedimented into institutional practice are interrogated and unsettled. These two contending dimensions of politics can be embodied in the same political subject: the citizen as participant in the representational politics of the state and as activist and social movements that interrogate previous patterns of settlement in the state and other social institutions. Maintenance of productive tension between these interdependent dimensions of citizenship constitutes the perfection of democratic politics." -----[WC/154] ". Democracy is, among other things, an affirmative cultural/political response to the problematization of final markers that helps to define the late - modern condition. It contests authoritarian and totalitarian modes of responses and conditions because they draw upon contemporary instruments of surveillance, repression, and social mobilization to reinstate coercively old markers that have become destabilized. It treats the contestation of final markers as a contribution to freedom, self -formation, and self -governance among constituencies no longer required to believe that how they have been constituted historically is what nature requires them to be. And it cultivates agonistic respect among multiple constituencies who respond differentially the mysteries of being while acknowledging each other to be worthy of respect partly because they are implicated in this common condition. A democratic ethos balances the desirability of governance through democratic means with a corollary politics of democratic disturbance through which any particular pattern of previous settlements might be tossed up for grabs again. The ethos of democracy, understood in these terms, has territorial/institutional conditions of existence, but it also embodies the crucial cultural disposition: at least a significant minority of those implicated in it understand that the porous understandings they share rest upon contestable foundations, that there are numerous differences among them grounded in a matrix of uncertainty, and that a laudatory way to respond to these uncertain commonalities and shared uncertainties is to cultivate respect for a politics of democratic governance and contestation that limits ways in which contested changes are to be initiated and disturbed traditions to be retained. The ethos of democracy both fosters a recurrent problematization of final markers (for they constantly tend to reinstate themselves) and foments a culture of agonistic respect among those who affirm this "alienated" world. The key to a cultural of democratization is that it embodies a productive ambiguity at its very center, always resisting attempts to allow one side or the other to achieve final victory: its role as a mode of governance is balanced and countered by its logic as a cultural medium of the periodic denaturalization of settled identities and conventions. In a world for the paradox of politics is perpetually susceptible to forgetfulness, there is a perpetual case to be made for the renewal of democratic energies of the naturalization. For if the second dimension of democracy ever collapsed under the weight of the first, state mechanisms of electoral accountability would become conduits for fascist unity."---- [WC/152] "today the territorial/security state forms in the space of democratic liberation and imprisonment. Yet deliberates because it organizes democracy democratic compatibility through electoral institutions. It imprisons because it confines and conceals democratic energies flying over and through its dikes. The confinement of democracy to the territorial state – to a (paradoxical) sovereign place where (ambiguous) understandings (dis)organize the common life-consolidates and exacerbates pressures to exclusive nationality. Every protean nation demands a state, and every state strives to become a nation-often in the name of territorial democracy.”----- --- realist democracy: [WC/140141] Connolly referred computers view of democracy. This is called the realist theory of democracy. It reduces democracy to a method for electing officials -- is criticized for its demolition of the common good, and its devaluation of direct participation as a means to educate citizens to the common good -- the general will cannot express the will of the people. Rather it is the effect of strategic and rhetorical devices. This is all realistic and since it is simultaneously impossible to discover a general will as the classic theorists of democracy imagined. It is impossible in modern life to retain a legitimate state for long without subjecting potential leaders to competitive elections. Still, this demolition of the general will as the magic source of democratic legitimacy does not reduce Schumpeter’s premier method for electing officials. The electoral method must still be legitimate. Schumpeter legitimated it by calling it a rational mode of governance, by condemning conceptions of democracy that involve popular activism and education as irrational, and by supporting the sober, cool, detached a governance of leaders accountable to citizens only on election day. Mere assertion, often repeated, counts more than rational argument, and so does the direct attack upon the subconscious. And Schumpeter invokes a universal code of rationality to vindicate a realist democratic method. The method contains a variety of rules such as the imperative of periodic elections, the necessity of slogans and electoral competition, the installation of governors from the vicissitudes of public opinion between elections so that they can promote the long-term interests, split between foreign and domestic policy that insulates foreign-policy initiatives even further from the electorate, the cultivation of an independent civil service, the education of citizens into the wisdom of patience and reticence between elections, and so on. Political rationality replaces the general will. Rationality, bosses, experts, words as bullets, maturity, efficiency, periodic elections, the insulation of elites, and the national interest, are key terms positive to his interpretation of democracy. Sentimentality, the general will, evasion of reality, or irrational aspects of government. -----[WC/77ff] Connolly indicates McPherson's four models of democracy: protective democracy, as indicated by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill sought regular elections to advance market interest and to protect against the tyranny of the statement in this setting. It sought to regulate and restrain interests already established in civil society, rather than to become a morally transforming force. The excepted class inequality and inclined toward a series of exclusions from effective citizenship and restrictions in the rights of those granted citizenship. Second is developmental democracy, represented by John Stuart Mill and P. H. Greene. The key problem was to elevate working-class men and rational beings because they can no longer be governed are treated like children. Democratic participation becomes the central route to the development of responsible citizens and fulfilled lives. McPherson indicates that Mill was confounded by the deep incompatibility between the claims of equal human development and the existing class inequalities of power. The third type is equilibrium democracy also known as pluralist democracy. Schumpeter is a major representative here. It appreciates the value of participation and celebrates the functional importance of apathy. It argues against popular pressures and demands that exceed the capacity of the state respond to them. The fourth model is that of participatory democracy. Connolly indicates that McPherson favors this, but does not have great confidence that he can be installed. McPherson indicates that we cannot achieve more democratic participation without a prior change in social inequality, and in consciousness, but we cannot achieve the changes in social inequality and consciousness without a prior increase in democratic participation. He thus reluctantly endorses representative institutions, holding out some hope that they may wither under the weight of participatory practices in the future. McPherson distinguishes between extractive power and developmental power. Eextractive power involves the ability to command benefits for oneself from the labor or actions of others, usually by controlling resources they need. Developmental power is the ability to realize and exercise human capacity. The human capacities include the capacity for rational understanding, for moral judgment in action, for aesthetic creation or contemplation, and the emotional activities of friendship and love, and, sometimes, for religious experience. McPherson indicates that economic equality is an essential condition of democracy, which then makes it possible for all to realize the capacities in harmony with everyone else and for the entire democratic ethos to exude a consensual, harmony. That eliminates constructive contention, Connolly agrees with McPherson, except he finds danger in the pursuit of unity, coherence, and harmony. He sees these unalert to the indispensable, ventilating effects of political disturbance and the enactment of new identities, even in the most developed or realized democracy.--Connolly's emphasis is that a democratic politics is one in which tension is maintained between ruling and governance, on one hand and disturbing the naturalization of the results of action in concert on the other
democracy, procedural – see constitutional regime and contrast
democracy, property-owning [JR/JF/138] constitutional framework for democratic politics – guarantees the basic liberties with the fair value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and regulates economic an social inequalities by a principle of mutuality, if not the difference principle ---“ background institutions of property-owning democracy work to disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, and thus to prevent a small part of society from controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well. By contrast, welfare-state capitalism permits a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of production.” – “Property-owning democracy avoids this, not by the redistribution of income to those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital (this is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a background of fair equality of opportunity.” -- “in welfare-state capitalism the aim is that none should fall below a decent minimum standard of life, in which their basic needs are men, and all should receive certain protections against accident and misfortune ….” – “In property-owing democracy, o the other had, the aim is to realize it eh basic institutions the idea of a society as a fair system of cooperating between citizens regarded as free and equal. To do this, those institutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to e full cooperating members of society on a footing or equality. Among these means is human as well as real capital, that is, knowledge and an understanding of institutions, educated abilities, and trained skills.”
democratic capitalism [Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, 1991, p.14] Novak describes it as comprising a market economy dependent on markets and incentives; a polity respectful. of the rights of individuals to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and a system of cultural institutions moved by ideals of liberty and justice for all (pluralist and, in the largest sense liberal).
deontological liberalism [MS/1] "As an ethic that asserts the priority of the right over the good, and is typically defined in opposition to utilitarian conceptions, the liberalism I have in mind might best be described as 'deontological liberalism'." [MS/10-11] Sandel describes the liberal conception of the person as having specific traits if justice is to be primary: [Note the links between "person", "subject" and "agent". ]"We must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. In particular we must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, conditioned to be sure, but part of us always antecedent to any conditions [i.e., not determined by social conditions, etc.]. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the purposes we pursue. Deontological liberalism supposes that we can, indeed must, understand ourselves as independent in this sense."
deontology [OED] "The science of duty; that branch of knowledge which deals with moral obligations; ethics." Citing 1826 Bentham West. Rev. VI 448 OED indicates that ethics has received the more expressive name of deontology. [MS/3] Sandel indicates what is meant by comparing with two other terms often used in philosophy" "The contrast might also be drawn in terms of two different senses of deontology. In its moral sense, deontology opposes consequentialism; it describes a first-order ethic containing certain categorical duties and prohibitions which take unqualified precedence over other moral and practical concerns. In its foundational sense, deontology opposes teleology; it describes a form of justification in which first principles are derived in a way that does not presuppose any final human purposes or ends, nor any determinate conception of the human good." --Sandel at MS/92 indicates the distinction between the ancients who assumed that man is by nature a being who discovers his ends rather than as the deontologists conceive him as a being who chooses his ends.--At p.6 Sandel indicates Kant's deontological view:" On the deontological view, what matters above all is not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them. And this capacity , being prior to any particular end it may affirm, resides in the subject [ subject meaning in the person here]." Sandel at MS/9 includes in this form of thinking Rawls, Dworkin and Fried since they argue for rights that are not dependent on a particular vision of the good. In effect: "Society is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good." -- Further at p. 10 referring to and quoting Fried "By comparison with the good, the concepts of right and wrong 'have an independent and overriding status because they establish our basic position as freely choosing entities.' More important than any choice, the value of personhood 'is the presupposition and substrate of the very concept of choice'."-- At pp. 54-55 referring to Rawl's notions of self, Sandel summarizes: "To be a deontological self, I must be a subject whose identity is given independently of the things I have, independently, that is , of my interests and ends, and my relations with others." ---- Benhabib [SB/72] describes Habermas' thought as follows: "It is not that deontology describes a kind of moral theory juxtaposed to a teleological one; for Habermas, deontological judgments about justice and rights claims define the moral domain insofar as we can say anything cognitively meaningful about these phenomena." Benhabib's preference is a "weak" deontological theory: At [SB/86] "... in communicative ethics the 'good' as it might be agreed upon by participants in a practical discourse, is constrained by the 'right', i.e. by conditions of fair argumentation and fair debate. This is why communicative ethics remains a deontological theory but, as distinguished from Habermas's version of it, I prefer to defend a 'weak deontological' interpretation according to which questions of justice as well as of the good life, of norms as well as of values, can be subject to discursive debate and testing in an open-ended conversation which does not aim at consensus but at 'reaching and understanding.'" –at SB/76 She refers to deontology in moral theory and in political theory// in moral theory it implies that conceptions of justice should precede those of the good life, both in the sense of limiting what can be legitimately defended as the good life and in the sense that conceptions of justice can be justified independently of particular conceptions of the good life --- in the political realm, deontology means that the basic principles of just order should be morally neutral, but in the sense of allowing many different conceptions of the good life to be freely pursued and cherished b citizens, and also in the sense that the basic liberties of citizens ought never to be curtailed for the sake of some specific conception of ht social good or welfare. --- she argues the communitarians reject deontology in the realm of moral theory and that they argue that conception of justice necessarily imply certain conception of the good life – the communitarians been criticized more from the political side by those who argue for the more absolute position of individual liberties in pursuing what the consider the good life and not what the community decides ---[IEP]"Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care for our children, and to not commit murder. Deontological theories base morality on specific, foundational principles of obligation. These theories are called deontological theories, from the Greek word deon, or duty, given the foundational nature of our duty or obligation. They are also sometimes called nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory, irrespective of the consequences of that might follow from our actions. For example, it is wrong to abandon care for our children even if it results in some great benefit.
There are four leading types of deontological theories.
(1) The first is duty theory championed by Hugo Grotius and
Samuel Pufendorf. By the 17th century, virtue theorists listed nearly
one hundred virtuous character traits that a good person should acquire.
Grotius and Pufendorf viewed these as lists of obligations to which we are all
duty-bound through laws of nature. They classified these duties under three
headings:
duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to others. Duties to God include
honoring him, serving him, and praying to him. Duties to oneself include
preserving one's life, pursuing happiness, and developing one's talents. Duties
to others fall into three groups. First, there are family duties which involve
honoring our parents, and caring for spouses and children.
Second, there are social duties which involve not harming others, keeping
promises, and benevolence. Third, there are political duties that involve
obedience to the laws, and public spirit. Based on these duties it would be
wrong, for example, for us to skip worship services, to commit suicide, or
steal from others. The morality of all actions, then, is determined in
reference to these duties. For almost 200 years, duty theory dominated
normative ethical theories.
(2) A second deontological theory is rights theory. According
to rights theorists, these are rights that all people naturally have, and the
rest of us are obligated to acknowledge. 17th century British philosopher John
Locke argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's
life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights,
given to us by God. Following Locke's lead, US Declaration of Independence
authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three foundational rights: life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others maintained that we
deduce other more specific rights from these, including the rights of property,
movement, speech, and religious expression. There are four features
traditionally associated with moral rights. First, rights are natural insofar
as they are not invented or created by governments. Second, they are universal
insofar as they do not change from country to country. Third, they are equal in
the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of gender,
race, or handicap. Fourth, they are inalienable which means that I ca not hand
over my rights to another person, such as by selling myself into slavery.
(3) A third deontological theory is that of the categorical imperative as developed by the18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Influenced by Grotius and Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing one's talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls the "categorical imperative." Kant gives at least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never merely as a means to an end. That is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor's lawn furniture since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually. Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single principle of duty.
(4) A fourth deontological theory is a recent revision of duty theory by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes prima facie duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are "part of the fundamental nature of the universe." However, Ross's list of duties is much shorter which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:
Fidelity: the duty to keep promises
Reparation: the duty to compensate others
when we harm them
Gratitude: the duty to thank those who
help us
Justice: the duty to recognize merit
Beneficence: the duty to improve the
conditions of others
Self-improvement: the duty to improve our
virtue and intelligence
Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure
others
Although some of these duties are the same as those of traditional duty
theory, such as beneficence and self-improvement, Ross does not include duties
to God, self-preservation, or political duties. This list is not complete, Ross
argues, but he believes that at least some of these are self-evidently true.
Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose
between two conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow my
neighbor's gun and promise to return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit
of rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks for the gun so that he can take
vengeance on someone. On the one hand, the duty of fidelity obligates me to
return the gun; on the other hand, the duty of nonmaleficence
obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus not return the gun. According to
Ross, I will intuitively know which of these duties is my actual duty, and
which is my apparent or prima facie duty. In this case, my duty of
nonmaleficence emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the gun."
deserve, see holistic
difference principle [JR/TJ/83] Rawls' difference principle is one of the most important concepts to come out of his writing and one of the most debated. It is "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Part (b) is called the "fair equality of opportunity" by Rawls.
dignity [KMM/183] "But that which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value or price, but has an intrinsic value; it has dignity."
dike: Greek term: (MAC) --- justice – but MacIntyre indicates at pp. 13-14 earlier Homeric conceptions whereby it was used to characterizes actions in accordance with the fundamental order structuring both nature and society – in Homeric literature “a particular dike is straight if it accords with what themis requires.” --- “Themis is what is ordained, what is laid down as the ordering of things and people.” –At p.22: “”But what is peculiarly important is that the connection between the forms of decision-making and the order of dike, which Lloyd-Jones emphasizes, is clearly perceived. Central to every culture is a shared schema of greater or lesser complexity by means of which each agent is able to render the actions of others intelligible so that he or she knows how to respond to them.” – this involves one in “practical reasoning” since it involves the constraints of dike? and arete?. Thus MacIntyre asserts: “This subsequent history [to Homeric concepts] will then be a history of the relationship of practical reasoning and of justice to the virtues and more generally to conceptions of human good.”
diminishing marginal utility -- see marginal utility, diminishing
discourse [JR/LP] p. 155 along with the discourse that is a form of public reasoning are the following three types of discourse: declarative is not a form of public reasoning but a declaration of our own comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious – used to show that we endorse a reasonable public political conceptions of justice with its principles and ideals from our particular comprehensive doctrines – this strengthens the ties of civic friendship --- conjecture: in this we argue fro what we believe or conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines, religious or secular and try to show them that, despite what them might think they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide a basis for public reasons. The ideal pf public reasons is thereby strengthened. However, it is important that the conjecture be sincere and not manipulative --- witnessing is another form of discourse in which a group may disagree with existing policy, legislation but still accept the legitimate law – e.g., Quakers and pacifism or Catholics and abortion – differs from civil disobedience in that it does not appeal to principles and values of a liberal political conception of justice but feel they must bear witness to the beliefs of their faith --- civil disobedience and conscientious refusal comes when society seen as nearly just, but not fully just society -----[CS/22] The event of discourse as a saying of something by someone to someone is threatened from both “below” and “above” – from below in terms of a tendency toward an ontology of elementarism fixated on the isolable, constitutive elements of speech acts and linguistic units (phonemes, morphemes, lexemes), and from above in the sense of a predilection toward an abstract holism of narratological structures that leaves the event of discourse behind. ---- [JB] "This theory of ideology as distorted communication opens up the possibility of a different relation of theoretical and practical knowledge than Habermas has suggested so far. His approach uses formal pragmatics philosophically to reflect upon norms and practices that are already explicit in justifications in various sorts of argumentation or second-order communication. Such reflection has genuine practical significance in yielding explicit rules governing discursive communication (such as rules of argumentation), which in turn can be used for the purpose of designing and reforming deliberative and discursive institutions (Habermas 1996, 230). It is easily overlooked that such rules are only part of the story; they make explicit and institutionalize norms that are already operative in correct language use. Such implicit norms of well-formed and communicatively successful utterances are not identical with the explicit rules of argumentation. "----[JB] "With such an expansion of Kantian practical reason, democracy is now grounded in the intersubjective structure of communication exhibited in the special form of reflective and reciprocal communication and public testing of claims to validity that Habermas calls “discourse.” As communication about communication, discourse emerges in problematic situations in which new solutions must be sought in order to continue social cooperation. Democratic institutions have the proper reflexive structure and are thus discursive in this sense. In them, citizens deliberate as free and equal persons, for whom the legitimacy of the decision is related to the achievement of a “rational consensus.” That is, a consensus is rational to the extent that it is based on a norm that could under ideal conditions be justified to all those who are affected by a decision. Early on Habermas called the full list of these counterfactual conditions “the ideal speech situation,” although later it is clear that it is meant to provide a principled basis by which to assess the quality of agreements reached discursively."
discourse ethics – see communicative ethics -- [SB37]discourse ethics states that only those norms can claim to be valid that meet o(or could meet) with the approval of all concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.
discursive public space See public space.
distributive justice see justice, distributive
duty of civility --see civility, duty of
ecological rationality [LT/208] Thiel uses John Dryzek to exemplify this: "'The pursuit of all ...values is predicated upon the avoidance of ecological catastrophe. Hence the preservation and promotion of the integrity of the ecological and material underpinning of society -- ecological rationality -- should take priority over competing forms of reason in collective choices with an impact upon that integrity.'"
economic rationality [LT199] "The goals of the economically rational person need not be egoistic, venal, or even financial oriented. The economic actor simply pursues the greatest amount of value with the least expenditure of effort and resources. The economic actor, as Anthony Downes writes, is interested in 'maximizing output for a given input, or minimizing input for a given output'." -- Such reasoning may be used to maximize votes by politicians while voters seek to maximize benefits. -- "Rather than assume that individuals are selfish, theorists of economic rationality assume that individuals behave in ways that are 'wholly determined by the endeavor to relate means to ends as efficiently as possible.' Not selfishness but efficiency is the key characteristic. Assuming that individuals are selfish, however, certainly simplifies the application of economic rationality as a tool of the social science inquiry. If actors are assumed to pursue the maximization of personal wealth (or personal power), one's theory gains a level of parsimony not otherwise achievable. Yet this assumption is not strictly necessary."
elenchus Aporetics referred to skeptics. According to M.E.Roughly in an Internet article: The aporia is, literally, an impasse, an impassable or irresolvable contradiction. The aporetic method, in a philosophic context, as defined in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, is: "the raising of puzzles without offering solutions-typical of the elenchus in the early Socratic dialogues of Plato. These consist in the testing of definitions and often end with an aporia, e.g. that piety is both what is and what is not loved by the gods. Compare the paradoxes of Zeno, e.g., that motion is both possible and impossible." To say that Joyce's writing is "aporetic" is to suggest that it is predicated essentially on that which cannot be decided or determined rather than on a referent (a subject, a concept, a source) which can be more or less successfully identified, reflected upon, illustrated, interpreted. If you like, it is "aporetic" instead of being "mimetic."
emancipation [DHCT/256] referring to Habermas "ideology is, as Trent Schryoer put it, ‘those belief systems which can maintain their legitimacy despite the fact that they could not be validated if subjected to rational discourse.’ The process of emancipation [a major theme of critical theory], then, entails the transcendence of such systems of distorted communication. this process, in turn, requires engaging in critical reflection and criticism. It is only through reflection that domination, in its many forms, can be unmasked."
embodied (or embedded) person See [SB] This refers to the conception of the person as one who embodies various attributes; thus instead of perceiving of the person as an abstract, generalized "person", the person is conceived as a being with feelings, interests, values and other attributes . The "embedded" aspect refers to the embedding of the various socializing influences around the person and the embedding of various attributes of the specific person as compared to a generalized concept. Benhabib uses these terms extensively along with the "generalized other", and the "concrete other." The generalized other is the abstract, unified, generic concept of the other as compared to the concrete other which refers to the specific attributes of particular persons and seeks to build discourse, truth seeking, moral decisions, etc. around this concept of the concrete other rather than the generalized other.
end-result principles or end-state principles of distributive justice [NOZ/155] --broadens view of current time-slice principle to include some historical dimension in understanding the structure of distribution but emphasis is on the present structure and what has been the end-result of the distributions and not on the entitlements due to historical principles of justice whereby "the past circumstances or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things.".
enlarged thinking [SB] Benhabib quotes Hannah Arendt regarding the art of "enlarged thinking": "The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is not like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement. And this enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend its individual limitations, cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it need the presence of others ‘in whose place’ it must think, whose perspective it must take into consideration, and without whom it never as the opportunity to operate at all." -- Benhabib continues: "The goal of such conversation is not consensus or unanimity ... but the 'anticipated communications with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement".--At [SB/54]: "Put differently, judgment involves a certain 'interpretive' and narrative' skill which, in turn, entail the capacity for exercising an 'enlarged mentality.' This enlarged mentality can be described precisely as exercising the reversibility of perspectives which discourse ethics enjoins. The link between a universality model of moral conversation and the exercise of moral judgment is the capacity for the reversing of moral perspectives, or what Kant and Arendt name the 'enlarged mentality.'" --- And at p. 140: "Enlarged thought, which morally obligates us to think from the standpoint of everyone else, politically requires the creation of institutions and practices whereby the voice and the perspective of others, often unknown to us, can become expressed in their own right."
empiricism Generally refers to knowledge gained "by the direct and immediate evidence of the senses" [SB/206] ----[WC/6] empiricism treats human beings as subjects or agents of knowledge; it treats things as independent objects susceptible representation; it treats language as primarily a medium of representation, or, at least, a medium in which the designated dimension of concepts can be disconnected rigorously from the context of rhetoric/action/evaluation in which they originate
endowment-insensitive [WK/75] This term is used by Dworkin and discussed at length by Kymlicka in reference to the idea that people's fate should not depend on their natural endowments. . This is relevant to the discussion on equality and whether some people should have more than others in a society and if so why or if not, why not. The contrasting term is ambition-sensitive which refers to the idea that one should receive unequal benefits in the society due to their bored sense of goals and projects about life.
enkratic: Greek word. [MAC, 128] –re: Aristotle --- the enkratic person “does what the rational and virtuous person does, but his motivations are not the same as those of the fully virtuous. It is in spite of his passions, at least to some degree, that he does what he does in judging and acting rightly, although his character is sufficiently formed to issue in prohairesis, rational desire.”
entitlement theory of Nozick [NOZ/151] "1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. " He adds to this also the idea that rectifications of injustice must take place where "the existence of past injustices (previous violations of the first two principles of justice in holdings)" has taken place.
epagoge: Greek word. [MAC, 91] “This method of moving from a set of particulars to universal, to the concept of the form which those particulars to different degrees exemplify, Aristotle called epagoge?. – standard translation is “induction.” It “involves inference but is more than inference; it is rather that scientific method through which the particular varyingly impure or distorted exemplifications of a single form can be understood in terms of that form….” – it is part of the dialectic of Aristotle, “that process in which a particular thesis or theory justifies itself over against its rivals through its superior ability in withstanding the most cogent objections form different points of view, that a conclusion about what the arch? is arrived at. Nous , that is to say, is the exercise of a capacity for understanding what the conclusion is of a nondemonstrative mode of argument or enquiry.” ---At 118: refers to performing epagoge? on those experiences in which we have made right phronetic judgments. “We cannot judge and act rightly unless we aim at what is in fact good; we cannot aim at what is good except on the basis of experience of right judgment and action. But the appearances of paradox and circularity are deceptive. In developing both out conception of the good and the habit of right judgment and action – and neither can be adequately developed without the other – we gradually learn to correct each in the light of the other, moving dialectically between them.”
episteme: --epistemology Greek word.[MAC, 92] re: Aristotle: scientific
knowledge, which involves universals cf. phronesis, practical
intelligence, which is concerned with particulars as well. --- classical
episteme [SB/206] whether
empiricist or rationality, modern epistemologists agreed that the task of
knowledge, whatever its origins, was to build an adequate representation of
thinks. – mind had to mirror
nature --- re Charles Taylor : when we hold that X represents a correct representation
of X we establish a neat separation of ideas, thoughts, descriptions and like
on the one hand, and what these ideas, etc. are about on the other. Modern
epistemology operated with a threefold distinction: the order of representation
in our consciousness [ideas and sensations ] ; the signs though which these
“private” orders were made public, namely words and that of which
our representations were representations, and tot which they referred. In this
tradition meaning was defined as ”designation”; the meaning of a
word was what it designates, while the primary function of language was
denotative, namely to inform us about objectively existent state of affairs.
The classical episteme of representation presupposed a spectator conception of
the knowing self, a designative theory of meaning and a denotative theory of
language.
equal [JR/JF/18] re all are free and equal: “possess to a sufficient degree the requisite powers of moral personality and the other capacities that enable them to be normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life.”
equal citizens [JR/PL/xlvi] "citizens are equal in virtue of possessing, the requisite minimum degree, the two moral powers and the other capacities that enable us to be normal and fully cooperating members of society. All who meet this condition have the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and the same protections of the principles of justice."
equal liberties [JR/JF/149] the worth of political liberties must be similar to all citizens whatever their economic or social position or else are merely form without fair value -- the aim “is to enable legislators and political parties to be independent of large concentrations of private economic and social power in a private-property democracy, and of government control and bureaucratic power in a liberal socialist regime” – “This is to further the conditions of deliberative democracy and to set the stage for the exercise of public reason, an aim which … justice as fairness shares with civic republicanism.”
equality Equality has several critical dimensions in its definitions. One is the equality of result compared to the equality of opportunity. Equality of result refers to people receiving the same or a particular benefit, such as health care or a guaranteed income, and the latter refers to the opportunity for all to receive but some may not. This need not mean a "leveling" of all regarding income and other aspects of life , but assuring certain basic levels of education, health, income, etc.. Equality of opportunity is generally referred to as either formal opportunity or substantive equality of opportunity. For example all have the right and possibility to go to a state university and become educated, to have the same rules applied equally in a court of law, etc., thus formal equality of opportunity. However, the substantive equality of opportunity question arises if different family incomes affect whether one can take advantage of the opportunity to go to a university or obtain a lawyer of equal quality in handling issues of law. [JR/TJ/83] Rawls' difference principle is one of the most important concepts to come out of his writing and one of the most debated. It is "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Part (b) is called the "fair equality of opportunity" by Rawls.
equality of opportunity – see fair value/fair equality of opportunity
essentialism [RP/83] "the view that there must be a common element to all uses of a term and the view that there is a strict set of necessary and sufficient conditions governing the use of a term."
ethical cognitivism cf ethical rationalism and ethical decisionism [SB/49-50] "By 'ethical cognitivism' I understand the view that ethical judgments and principles have a cognitively articulable kernel and that they are neither mere statements of preference nor mere statements of tasted. they imply validity claims of the sort, ' X is right' (where X refers to a principle of action or a moral judgment) means that 'I can justify to you with good grounds why one ought to respect, uphold, agree with S.' In this sense, ethical cognitivism is opposed to ethical decisionism that reduces such principles and judgments to an 'I will' which cannot be further questioned. Ethical cognitivism is also opposed to ethical emotivism that conflates statements like 'Child molesting is wrong' with claims like 'I like Haagen-Dazs ice-cream.'" --" By 'ethical rationalism,' by contrast, I mean a theoretical position which views moral judgments as the core of moral theory, and which neglects that the moral self is not a moral geometrician but an embodied, finite, suffering and emotive being. We are not being rational but we acquire rationality through contingent process of socialization and identity formation." -- "This 'rationalist' bias of universalist theories in the Kantian tradition has a least two consequences. By ignoring or rather by abstracting away from the embedded, contingent and finite aspects of human beings, these theories are blind to the variety and richness as well as significant of emotional and character development." [This. of course, is the perspective of Benhabib. Rawls, undoubtedly, would view his theory in a more positive light, but the argument presented here indicates the sharpness of lines that one might draw, and Benhabib does in defining the terms.]
ethical decisionalism See ethical cognitivism
ethical rationalism See ethical cognitivism
ethics see also conscience and Schrag’s ideas above.
ethics, altruistic cf egoistic --- Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action. Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent.
ethics, communicative See communicative ethics
ethics, egoistic cf altruistic --- Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action. Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent.
ethics --- general --- See also related ideas such as intrinsic goods (intrinsic values), extrinsic values, relativism, discourse ethics [communicative ethics] and value pluralism. ---See IEP (link is located above) for lengthy but clear discussion of approaches to ethics. The following are discussed in more detail. [IEP] "The field of ethics, also called moral philosophy, involves systematizing, defending, and commending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves. ?" ---[IEP] "The term "meta" means after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a removed, or bird's eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined area of moral philosophy. Three issues, though, are prominent: (1) metaphysical issues concerning whether morality exists independently of humans; (2) psychological issues concerning what motivates us to be moral; and (3) linguistic issues concerning the meaning of key ethical terms. ". –[SB/40] Alasdair MacIntyre has plausibly argued that often the distinction between meta-ethics and substantive ethics is spurious to the degree that a philosophical meta-ethics, including a theory of moral justification, has substantive moral implications. – quoting MacIntyre: “If your metatheory of procedural justification…conceived as a dialogue taking place under the constraints of practical discourse, defines the ‘moral point of view’ in light of a minimal commitment to discursive justification, are you not thereby precluding all conceptions of the good in which discoursive justification plays no role from even being considered as forms of the good?”--- Normative ethics involves a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. Should I borrow my roommate's car without first asking him? Should I steal food to support my starving family? Ideally, these moral questions could be immediately answered by consulting the moral guidelines provided by normative theories. Finally, applied ethics involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war. By using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these controversial issues. The lines of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics are often blurry. For example, the issue of abortion is an applied ethical topic since it involves a specific type of controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to life, which are litmus tests for determining the morality of that procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues such as, "where do rights come from?" and "what kind of beings have rights [IEP] "Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a single principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, such as moral rights to life, liberty, and happiness. The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. Unfortunately, philosophers do not agree about what precisely that criterion is. Over the centuries, hundreds of theories have been offered, each claiming to be the ultimate guide. Proponents of these theories also devote much time to rejecting rival theories. For example, most normative ethicists reject the Golden Rule in the above form. If I am a masochist then, according to the Golden Rule, it is morally permissible for me to inflict pain on other people. But inflicting pain on others is clearly wrong, hence the Golden Rule fails as the ultimate criterion of morality. In spite of the quantity of normative theories available for consideration, many theories involve common strategies that we can classify. "---[IEP] Applied ethics is the branch of ethics that consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, and euthanasia. Medical ethics focuses on a range of issues that arise in clinical health care settings. Health care workers are in an unusual position of continually dealing with life and death situations. It is not surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and diverse than other areas of applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise about the morality of surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of fetuses, the status of unused frozen embryos, and abortion. Other issues arise about patient rights and physician's responsibilities, such as the confidentiality of the patient's records and the physician's responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The AIDS crisis has raised the specific issues of the mandatory screening of all patients for AIDS, and whether physicians can refuse to treat AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical experimentation on humans, the morality of involuntary commitment, and the rights of the mentally retarded. Finally, end of life issues arise about the morality of suicide, the justifiability of suicide intervention, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia." ----[WC/xxiii] "My sense is that defenders of both traditions reduce the possibilities of ethics to the options of contractual morality, command morality, or teleological morality. The modernists find these options to suffice; the posties find all three perspectives to harbor too many violences and exclusions.”
ethnicity: See discussion on nationalism below for discussion on national groups and ethnic groups.
ethos [RP/89] "Loyalty to institutions, belief in their value, is not grounded in anything other than the fact that, as Rorty argues, they overlap with lots of other members of the group with which we identify for purposes of moral or political deliberations and the fact that these beliefs, values and loyalties are distinctive of the group and it through these that it builds up its self-image and its sense of worth."
evident intention [JR/JF/196] “When others with evident intention do their part in just or fair institutions citizens tend to develop trust and confidence in them.” [refers to Rousseau’s’ use of this idea in Emile, se also Theory, par70, fn. 9]
existentialism [HA/75] "This development reached an extreme stage with that polarization in philosophical thought went to philosophical movements arose, each of which seemed almost totally uninterested in the other: existentialism and positivism. Whereas existentialism stresses decision with its free and can determine nature, emphasizes its a rationality, and declares scientific knowledge essentially on interesting precisely because of its objectivity, positivism places the emphasis upon knowledge and objectivity, stressing its fallibility and rational character, of this missing decision and commitment to the realm of subjectivity and arbitrariness is philosophically uninteresting. One seeks to eradicate objective knowledge because it allegedly failed to make contact with existence; the other seeks to avoid subjective decision because it appears to lie outside the sphere of rationality. However little they may have to say to one another, it is nevertheless clear that both movements start to some extent from common presuppositions. Both opt for review in which rationality and existence part company, but one emphasizes the rational analysis of facts, while the other glorifies irrational existential decisions. " -- "inevitably, the situation fundamentally changed when the shared presuppositions with itself question, which happened primarily as a result of the discovery, made more or less simultaneously in many places, but ultimately decisions lie "behind" all knowledge." --this incursion of decision into the sphere of knowledge to be seen as representing a considerable danger to the objectivity of knowledge. We choose our problems, evaluate solutions to them and decide to prefer one of the available solutions to the others-a procedure that is certainly not lacking in components of an unambiguously in August of character.--"our discussion so far clearly show that the dichotomy between rational knowledge and a rational decision suggested by the polarization of philosophical thinking into positivism and existentialism is inadequate, because of the reason that behind every piece of knowledge-conscious or unconscious-stand decisions. It is therefore impossible to base a thesis of the irrationality of decisions upon their unfoundability without this thesis necessarily being extensible to the whole realm of knowledge. Furthermore, it is it has now become clear that the distinction between rationality and irrationality, since it is a methodical distinction, must have reference to praxis, and most can consequently find its proper place within the sphere of evaluation and decision. It relates to the sphere of cognition insofar as the latter is dominated not by passive contemplation and revelation, but by intellectual activity and shaping, which include selection, evaluation, and decisions; and over above that it, it plays a role in all those fears in which problems have to be solved, and therefore among which construction criticism have their place.//it is indisputable that the social sciences cannot help but make valuations the object of their statements. But such statements can have a cognitive informative character. They can describe, explain, and predict the valuations of the individuals and groups analyzed, without themselves possessing any evaluative content.
exploitation [WK/171] "taking unfair advantage of someone." -- "Every theory of justice, therefore, has its own theory of exploitation, since every theory has an account of the ways it is permissible and impermissible to benefit from others." -- Exploitation have varied meanings significantly affecting one's theory. [WK/182] Marxist technical theory of exploitation "refers to the specific phenomenon of the capitalist extracting more value from the worker's labor (in the form of produced goods) than is paid back to the worker in return for that labour (in the form of wages). This is the "surplus value" theory. -- "This technical definition of exploitation is sometimes said to be of scientific rather than moral interests." -- "Most Marxists, however, have taken the extraction of surplus values as evidence of an injustice -- indeed, as the paradigm of injustice." -- The moral value comes from the idea that unfair advantage has been taken of someone. [WK/177] another approach is that of John Roemer who "defines Marxist exploitation, not in terms of surplus transfer, but in terms of unequal access to the means of production. Whether one is exploited or not, in his view, depends on whether one would be better off in a hypothetical situation of distributive equality, namely, where one withdrew with one's labour and per capita share of external resources."
extrinsic values (instrumental goods): see "intrinsic good"
fact: [MAC, 357] “What is and was not harmless, but highly misleading, was to conceive of a realm of facts independent of judgment or of any other form of linguistic expression. So that judgments or statements or sentences could be paired off with facts, truth or falsity being the alleged relationship between such paired items. This kind of correspondence theory of truth arrived on the philosophical science only comparatively recently and has been as conclusively refuted as any theory can be….” -----[CS/92] facts are not brute givens: This theory, which is basically a construct of an abstract empiricism, should be jettisoned, and attention should be shifted to what it is that goes on in the actual practice of scientific and philosophical inquiry. What we find in such inquiry is that facts do not fall from heaven as insular and discrete entities but are rather constituted as facts with a variety of disciplinary matrices. A fact, whether physical or social, becomes a fact when it is taken as being relevant for the inquiry at hand. This taking something as something flags the interpretive moment in our inquiry into facts. There are no facts without interpretation and interpretation is always the work of a community of interpreters --- re values: values become values only when they are taken as being valuable within the contrite context of everyday life. Like fact, values are constituted and defined against the backdrop of communalized interpretive practices.
fair terms of cooperation [JR/PL/300ff] "terms upon which as equal persons we are willing to cooperate in good faith with all members of society over a complete life. " – also "to cooperate on a basis of mutual respect." "articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutuality: all who cooperate must benefit, or share in common burdens, in some appropriate fashion judged by a suitable benchmark of comparison. This element in social cooperation I call ‘the reasonable.’ The other element corresponds to ‘the rational’: it refers to each participant's rational advantage; what, as individual, the participants are trying to advance." Whereas the notion of fair terms of cooperation is shared, participants' conceptions of their own rational advantage in general differ. the unity of social cooperation rests on persons agreeing to its notion of fair terms." [p. 16] social cooperation refers to cooperation guided by accepted rules -- fair terms of cooperation "are terms that each participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity: all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the rules and procedures, are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison. " -- since Rawls is concerned with political conception the fair terms are expressed in principles specifying basic rights and duties within its main institutions -- these "regulate the arrangements of background justice over time, so that the benefits produced by everyone's efforts are fairly distributed and shared from one generation to the next."
fair value [JR/PL/327] this means "that the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or economic position, must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of political decisions. This notion of fair opportunity parallels that of fair equality of opportunity in the second principle of justice." –It is not the task in original position to establish the arrangements needed for fair value of the equal political liberties "Nevertheless, we must recognize that the problem of guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties is of equal if not greater importance than making sure that markets are workable competitive. For unless the fair value of these liberties is approximately preserved, just background institutions are unlikely to be either established or maintained." –-[p. 328] – might be accomplished by public support of elections ind. of private money influence
fallibilism [HA/xv] empty instead of foundationalism, which is been connected with the classical solution of the problem of rationality since the time of Plato and Aristotle, Albert defends a consistent fallibilism, as Karl Popper did for a long time. However, there is no need to give up the idea of truth and the possibility of approaching truth by the method of science. Neither skepticism nor any kind of relativism should have a claim on us. Those who abandoned the fusion of truth and certainty that is usual in classical thinking have no reason to surrender to skeptical or relativistic views, as they are fashionable today even in analytic philosophy. By no means do we need to choose between a consistent empiricism with relativistic and skeptical consequences on the one hand and a transcendentalist dogmatism on the other
fascism [BS/174ff] Susser indicates the
difficulty in defining fascism: "A hundred different meanings crowd into
this remarkably elastic word." -- But Susser provides a number of useful
commentaries on what has been involved in Fascist regimes. These have
included Nazi German, Mussolini's
feminism [GT/38-39]: refers to psychological studies that indicate that female perceptions of reality differ significantly from male perception – “Females of all ages are apt to be attuned to the possibilities inherent in particular situations, regardless of what those situations have in common with other situations, whereas males are inclined to appeal to general rules. Faced with a moral problem, females typically are responsible to the unique and concrete character of the problem, while males search for a universal standard in accordance with which the problem can be resolved. Females display empathy, males logic; females try to elicit harmony, males to do justice. [It’s tricky to nail down objective, psychological dimensions that are gender related as are referred to by Glenn Tinder, but notably many feminist political philosophers stress the caring aspects of a theoretical orientation and how the rationalism of the classical political philosophy has often left this out. Also the argument presented by Seyla Benhabib in Situating the Self argues for discourse that takes into account the particular aspects of each person in arriving at judgments on justice rather than simply operating by rules and abstract conceptions of persons. ]
foundationalist approach to political theory [RP/85]"the sense that a good deal of ...theorizing has had to do with devising frameworks for ranking the importance of human interest according to some metaphysical scale of values." -- universal theory of the self or idea of human nature -- a determination of the fundamental interests and purposes of human beings
free citizens [JR/PL/72] citizens are free in three respects: "having the moral power to form, revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good; second, as being self-authenticating sources of valid claims; and third, as being capable of taking responsibility for their ends."
freedom [JR/PL/222] "what we affirm on the basis of free and informed reason and reflection is affirmed freely; … insofar as our conduct expresses what we affirm freely, our conduct is free to the extent it can be. Freedom at the deepest level calls upon the freedom of reason, both theoretical and practical, as expressed in what we say and do. Limits on freedom are at bottom limits on our reason: on its development and education, its knowledge and information, and on the scope of the actions in which it can be expressed, and therefore our freedom depends on the nature of the surrounding institutional and social context." ----Habermas stresses emancipation through self-reflection [see emancipation ] that reveals the forces of society and distorted understanding and also the necessity for material freedom [DHCT/326]---- Negative freedom is the emphasis on the government not interfering in the actions of persons. It is the freedom to do as one wishes without external constraints. Positive freedom refers to mastery of obstacles to self-realization. This leads to notions of government action in order that individuals might have the basic goods necessary for development of the self. Policy issues often involve uses of the term freedom with some arguing that government ought to allow individuals to do more as they please without government interference and others arguing that "equal opportunity" is not real unless everyone has at least basic levels of nutrition, health, education and other basic needs in order to exercise their ability to make choices, or, in other word, to exercise their freedom.---Kymlicka [KM/138-139] offers several definitions of freedom: "The 'Lockean' camp defines freedom in terms of the exercise of our rights. Whether or not a restriction decreases our freedom depends on whether or not we had a right to do the restricted thing." Kymlicka calls this the "moralized definition of liberty." -- In contrast is the "Spencerian camp". They define liberty "in a non-moralized way --- as the presence of options or choices, for example --- without assuming that we have a right to exercise those options." -- and then "assign rights so as to maximize each individual's freedom, compatible with a like freedom for all." "...whether people have a right to appropriate previously unowned natural resources depends no whether that right increases or decreases each person's freedom." -----[Jacob Segal, Freedom and Normalization: Poststructuralism and the Liberalism of Michael Oakeshott. APSR Aug. 2003]: Oakeshott see freedom as an intrinsic value, i.e., it is important in and of itself, and not as an instrumental value that leads to something else. Compared with Hayek whose classical liberalism sees freedom as a means to better choices in society and thus more success in accomplishing societal goals. This instrumentalism leads to normalization whereby people are expected to internalize particular norms of behavior, thus end up in the same position as that criticized by the poststructuralists who see modern life as one dictated by social norms, albeit it internalized and appearing to be the acts of individuals [e.g., Foucault's criticism] For Oakeshott, as for the poststructuralists, this is not freedom. He argues not for want-satisfaction [classical liberalism] but for the self-sufficient experience of the expenditure of energy which has a value in itself apart from any outcome including "happiness." Hayek sees laissez-faire as a means by which the state maximizes its productivity. Oakeshott believes that the classical economists subordinate autonomy to want-satisfaction, this Foucaultian analysis holds that the intrinsic worth of the individual is not central to the liberal order. Liberal freedom becomes a technical requirement of governing the natural processes of social life . The free self is the useful self constructed as the "normal man."Segal refers to Connolly's analysis of Oakeshott regarding Oakeshott's ideas that liberal individual means that life is their own telos not a means to other forms of life. This absence of meaning does not lead to the despair of nihilism but the joy of an overflowing experience. -- For Oakeshott virtue is not self-denial but the affirmation of personal character without regard to what happens in the world. Morality is the self-sufficient moment of practical activity with action enjoyed for its own sake -- this is freedom and marks Oakeshott's brand of liberalism ---Stanley Rosen: [SR/12] referring especially to Kant: “freedom is an ambiguous first principle. Like any first principle, it cannot be deduced form some higher ground. It also suffers from the serous disadvantage that anything at all can be deduced from it. From the outset, it is evident that the defense of freedom is necessarily rhetorical.”
free-standing conception-[JR/PL/12] free-standing nature of the conception: "This means that it can be presented without saying, or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by."
full autonomy -- see autonomy, full [JR/PL/77]
full theory of the good -- see good, conception of
game theory: [Steven J. Brams, "Games, Strategies and Rational Actor Theory" in Susser, Bernard. Approaches to the Study of Politics.1992] Brams raises the problem of understanding rationality itself. "The rationality of means is fairly easy to specify: a means is rational if it pursues a given objective efficiently, that is, with the greatest chance of achieving it at the lowest possible price. This is all quite straightforward -- which is probably the reason that most political scientists who deal with rational political action focus exclusively on the rationality of means [ as compared to the rationality of ends and ethical speculation as to what the human objectives ought to be]."-- Given the complexity of ends it is difficult to separate instrumental ends from the discussions over ends themselves, e.g. the drunkard who drinks into oblivious in order to avoid the pain of being sober. This is rational to escape pain but is the end one to be sought? This sort of concern, Brams argues leads to "game theory": "The only choice that confronts competitors is which of the many means at their disposal is best suited to the pursuit of victory. It is precisely the pristine clarity that the game possesses, the calculability and logic of its moves, and the simplicity of its objectives that inspired political scientists to envisage political contests in game-theoretical terms. What, they asked, could be gained by viewing political, competition for power and position as a kind of game or contest in which the politician-players seek to use the most rational means to further their ends? Although there is the occasional playfulness politics is hardly a game. And yet it is surely a contest replete with rules, constraints, attacks, defenses, victors, and vanquished. We each act to maximize our own benefit in a world of limited resources, a world in which only very rarely can we all be winners. Our actions, insofar as they are balanced and rational, take into account the actions and possible reactions of others. We attempt to receive the greatest possible benefit at the smallest possible cost. we defend ourselves when attacked and assume that others will do so as well. Our political strategy is planned with the clear understanding that our rivals, in deliberating their moves and countermoves, are seriously considering our tactics as well as our potential reaction to their maneuvers." - game theory "does have its rigorous and quantitative mathematical side ... but it is nevertheless deductive rather than empirical in character. It deals in abstract reasoning, not with what decision makers do in practice. For the most part, it models choice situations rather than doing "'filed work.' It concerns itself with the rationality of decisions rather than with the actual motives that generate them."
gender [SB/191-192] "By 'gender' I mean the differential construction of human beings into male and female types. Gender is a relational category. It is one that seeks to explain the construction of a certain kind of difference among human beings. Feminist theorists, whether psychoanalytical, postmodern, liberal or critical, are united around the assumption that the constitution of gender differences is a social and historical process, and that gender is not a natural fact. Furthermore, and although there is some disagreement on this issue, I would agree with the recent work of Londa Schiebinger, Judith Butler and Jane Fax that the opposition of sex and gender itself must be questioned. It is not as if sexual difference were merely an anatomical fact. The construction and interpretation of anatomical difference is itself a social and historical process. That the male and the female of the species are different is a fact, but this fact itself is always also socially constructed. Sexual identity is an aspect of gender identity. sex and gender are not related to each other as nature to culture. sexuality itself is a culturally constructed difference."
general interest [SB/9] Benhabib distinguishes her emphasis from that of Habermas who stresses uncovering or discovering of some general interest to which all could consent. Benhabib states" "I propose to view the concept of 'general interest' in ethics and politics more as a regulative ideal and less as the subject matter of substantive consensus." ---- [DHCT/331] re: Habermas: "The rationality of discourse resides in ‘the fact that the reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common interest ascertained without deception’, By stipulating that the consensus arrived at must e constraint free (if one is possible on a given issue), there is a guarantee that the consensus expresses the desires of all – the common interest. Such a consensus requires that interests be both generalizable and shared communicatively."
generalized other cf concrete other [SB10] Benhabib refers to the conception of the person as one who embodies various attributes; thus instead of perceiving of the person as an abstract, generalized "person", the person is conceived as a being with feelings, interests, values and other attributes . The "embedded" aspect refers to the embedding of the various socializing influences around the person and the embedding of various attributes of the specific person as compared to a generalized concept. Benhabib uses these terms extensively along with the "generalized other", and the "concrete other." The generalized other is the abstract, unified, generic concept of the other as compared to the concrete other which refers to the specific attributes of particular persons and seeks to build discourse, truth seeking, moral decisions, etc. around this concept of the concrete other rather than the generalized other. [SB/10]Specifically: "According to the standpoint of the 'generalized other' [Kant, Rawls in her analysis], each individual is a moral person endowed with the same moral rights as ourselves; this moral person is also a reasoning and acting being, capable of a sense of justice, of formulating a vision of the good, and of engaging in activity to pursue the latter. The standpoint of the 'concrete other,' by contrast, enjoins us to view every moral person as a unique individual, with a certain life history, disposition and endowment, as well as needs and limitations." -- The generalized other is reflected in the liberal tradition of a democratic polity through recognition of civil, legal and political rights , all of which are to great persons equally within the framework of the law. The concrete other is involved in those ethical relations "in which we are always immersed in the lifeworld."--"To stand in such an ethical relationship means that we as concrete individuals know what is expected of us in virtue of the kind of social bonds which tie us to the other." ---Benhabib points out George Mead’s different definition of “generalized other”: “The organized community or social group which gives the individual his unity of self may be called the ’ generalized other.’ The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community.
good, conception of -- See also primary goods --[JR/PL/302] "The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue such a conception, that is, a conception of what we regard for us as worthwhile human life. A conception of the good normally consists of a determinate scheme of final ends and aims, and of desires that certain persons and associations, as objects of attachments and loyalties should flourish. also included in such a conception is a view of our relation to the world --- religious, philosophical, or moral --- by reference to which these ends and attachments are understood." – at p. 18 Rawls refers to the conception of the good and "what is valuable in human life"-- "… conceptions of the good are not fixed but form and develop as they mature, and may change more or less radically over the course of life. "--[JR/TJ/396] "And in fact I shall distinguish between two theories of the good. The reason for doing this is that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good in contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on hand. But to establish these principles it is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties' motives in the original position. Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice. Once this theory is worked out and the primary goods accounted for, we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what I shall call the full theory of the good." [MS/25] Sandel describes Rawls "thin theory of the good" as "thin in the sense that it incorporates minimal and widely shared assumptions about the kinds of things likely to be useful to all particular conceptions of the good, and therefore likely to be shared by persons whatever their more specific desires. The thin theory of the good is distinguished from the full theory of the good in that the thin theory can provide no basis for judging or choosing between various particular values or ends." ----- [JR/JF/140] re: the right and the good: “the right and the good are complementary; any conception of justice, including a political conception, needs both, and the priority of right does not deny this. That the right and the good are complementary is illustrated by this reflection: just institutions and the political virtues would serve no purpose – would have no point – unless those institutions and virtues not only permitted but also sustained conceptions of the good (associated with comprehensive doctrines) that citizens can affirm as worth of their full allegiance. A conception of political justice must contain within itself sufficient space, as it were, for ways of life that can gain devoted support. If it cannot do this, that conception will lack support and be unstable. In a phrase, the just draws the limit, the good shows the point.” – 6 ideas of the good in justice as fairness: (1) goodness as rationality – assumes that human existence and the fulfillment of basic human needs and purposes are good, and that rationalistic is a basic principle of political and social organization (2) primary goods specifying citizens’ needs( as opposed to preferences, desires, and final ends0 in accordance with the political conception of their status as free and equal persons (3) permissible (complete) conceptions of the good (each associated with a comprehensive doctrine) – priority of right means “that only those conceptions of the good are permissible the pursuit of which is compatible with the principles of justice – in the case of justice as fairness, with the two principles we have discussed.” (4) political virtues which specify the ideal of a good citizen of a democratic regime – (5) the political good of a society well ordered by the two principles of justice – (^) the idea of the good of such a society as a social union of social unions
goods, primary see primary goods
Greek Glossary: This comes from George Klosko's book, The Development
of Plato's Political Theory
Note
that throughout this Web page a number of Greek terms crop up without the
proper accents, etc. due to the limitations of editing tool (and of the editor)
to insert such symbols. Here you see the correct spellings complete with the
proper grammatical marks.
government, decent ---
[JR/LP] p. 75 standards of a decent people, i.e., liberal society, provided
that its rulers so not allow themselves to be corrupted, either by favoring the
rich or by enjoying the exercise of power for itself
guardianship of assets [MS/96] Sandel uses this notion to describe the position that one does not have absolute, unqualified, exclusive rights with respect to one's endowments [Nozick's view] but indicates "a more ultimate owner or subject of possession of which the individual person is the agent. -- The endowments [Sandel] bear as an individual are" owned by some other subject, on whose behalf, or in whose name, or by whose grace I cultivate and exercise them. This is a notion of possession reminiscent of the early Christian notion of property, in which man had what he had as the guardian of assets belonging truly to God, and it is a notion that fits with various communitarian notions of property as well."
hedonism, psychological [RE] "Human beings, by a law of human nature, cannot conceive of anything as being desirable in itself except happiness; therefore, it would be meaningless to require of us that we act by any principle except the maximization of happiness. ... The only thing that can be desirable...is happiness, which is essentially a form of pleasure -- in other words, a positive, gratifying or enjoyable quality of experiencing. Thus psychological hedonism, according to Mill, is the proof of the principle of utility."
hermeneutics [Noesis]
"according to which the meaning of any text is a function of the
historical situations of both the author and the interpreter. Since each
reading is grounded in its own context, no one reading offers a definition or
final interpretation of the text; the virtual dialogue continues
indefinitely." [LT/17] "Hermeneutics were people employed by the
early Christian church to interpret the religious service and scripture to worshippers
who spoke a different language." -- "In the nineteenth century,
hermeneutics developed as a method of interpreting biblical texts and later
other legal and literary documents. The German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey
(1833-1911) further expanded hermeneutics to encompass the interpretation of
human experience in general, the historical text of human life." --
"Dilthey wrote that 'understanding of other people and their expressions
is developed on the basis of experience and self-understanding and the constant
interaction between them.'" hermeneutic dialogue
[SB/62] "In such a dialogue one brings one's own presuppositions to the
conversation, adjusts them in the light of the answer of the other,
reformulates yet another set of questions, and so on." ---Benhabib
[SB/25]used Gadamer as an example of neo-Aristotelianism, describing his
approach as that of reasoning from a hermeneutic theory. He
"was the first to turn to Aristotle's model of phronesis as a form of
contextually embedded and situationally sensitive judgment of
particulars." "From Aristotle's critique of Plato, Gadamer extricated
the model of a situationally sensitive practical reason, always functioning
against the background of the shared ethical understanding of a community. "
"From Hegel's critique of Kant, Gadamer borrowed the insight that all
formalism presupposes a context that it abstracts from and that there is not
formal ethics which does not have some material presuppositions concerning the
self and social institutions. Just as there can be no understanding which is
not situated in some historical context, so there can be no 'moral standpoint'
which would not be dependent upon a shared ethos, be it that of the modern
state." – [DHCT/310] referring to Dilthey: "the central
realization of contemporary hermeneutics: that ‘there is no neutral
standpoint outside of history upon which the cultural scientist could base
himself’." referring to Gadamer" "Interpretations, people
like Gadamer have forcefully argued, cannot escape the language, the
preconceptions embedded in it, the background life-contexts, of their
authors." – At p. 311 re: Gadamer: "Gadamer argues that
‘language speaks its own being’; it is ‘a universal
ontological structure’. The truth of objects ‘comes-to-be’ in
the activity of language. The ‘being that can be understood is
language’. Language is the possibility-condition of truth." –
At p.315 refers to Habermas and depth hermeneutics as needed "in
order to grasp the history of tradition in such a way as to reveal sources of
domination and distortion in communication." – at p. 320: the unity
of linguistic analysis with the psychological investigation of causal
connections is needed , according to Habermas: "The methods and procedures
which Freud used are called by Habermas ‘depth hermeneutics.’" ---
historical entitlement theory [NOZ/153] Historical distribution refers to "whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about. In contrast, current time-slice principles of justice hold that the justice of a distribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) as judged by some structural principles) of just distribution."
historical materialism [DHCT/190] "Marx's historical materialism entails a rejection of objectivism and subjectivism. For him social reality is neither something wholly 'outside the subject' [objectivism] nor is it simply a creation of human thought [subjectivism]. Rather, reality is conceived as formed and constructed through practice and labor. Through practice and labour the human species synthesizes and alters the material world and thereby transforms nature qua known as well as itself. The objects of human perception are themselves the products of the self-generative and self-formative activity of the species. What we understand by nature or the human species changes over time as both are actively transformed. The process of knowing cannot be separated from historical being."--"But as Marx often suggested history is not made as actors might consciously and immediately wise. Circumstances exist, generated prior to any given instance of history in the main, which condition the social act and limit the extent to which any co-ordinated action may be fully explained as the pursuit of rational ends."
historical process view [JR/JF/54] “focuses on the transactions of individuals and associations as these are constrained by the principles and provisos applying directly to the arties in particular transactions.” – social process view “justice as fairness focuses first on the basic structure and on the regulations required to maintain background justice over time for all persons equally, whatever their generation or social position. Since a public conception of justice needs clear, simple, and intelligible rules, we rely on an institutional division of labor between principles required to preserve background justice and principles that apply directly to particular transactions between individuals and associations. Once this division of labor is set up, individuals and associations are then left free to advance their (permissible) ends within the framework of the basic structure
history, re: general idea including the end of notion ---The notion of the end
of history has been presented in different contexts. The mot well-known today
is that from
holistic see justice, holistic
homological [WWD] homology is "the science of law and lawmaking" -- "the branch of science, as of psychology, that investigates and formulates the principles governing its phenomena." -- homologous is "corresponding in structure, position, character, etc." [cf heterologous: "consisting of different elements; not corresponding."]
human nature [JR/LP] 7 In this context, to say that human nature is good is to say that citizens who grow up under reasonable and just institutions – institutions that satisfy any of a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice – will affirm those institutons and act to make sure their social world endures ---Stanley Rosen: human nature [SR/146] If there is no human nature that remains constant within historical change, and so defines the perspectives of individual readers as perspectives upon a common humanity, then reading is impossible. Whether one’s primary orientation is ontological or philological, interpretation depends upon the initial accessibility of the sense of the text as independent of clarification an deepening by the subsequent application of theories, methods, and canons
humanism [GT/39] “the belief that human powers are adequate for achieving all reasonable human ends; religion has little, if any, role to play.”
hypostatize [WWD] "to make into, or consider as, a distinct substance or a reality; attribute substantial or personal existence to it.-- hypostasis: "the underlying principle or nature."
hypothetical imperative [KMM/162] "If the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical."
idea [JR/PL/14] Rawls uses the term "idea" to include what is meant by concepts and conceptions
ideal [JR/JF/13] Rawls uses “ideal” to set up a clear case of perfect relationships in order to establish the principles at play and their ordered arrangement with priorities thus indicating what they are and how they should work relative to each other in a logical sense – his arguments refer time and again to “common sense” and “facts” to help establish the ideas upon which the ideals are built. His argument is not to start with pure concepts based solely on reason but to start from what is the idealized given and then work from there. Thus he starts from the idea of persons as free and equal because it is accepted as such in liberal societies and then builds out to what is ideally or most logically the relationships among other ideas such as basic liberties and distribution of goods in the society. --- ideal theory [JR/JF/13] “…we are concerned for the most part with the nature and content of justice for a well-ordered society. Discussion of this case is referred to in justice as fairness as ideal, or strict compliance, theory. Strict compliance means that (nearly) everyone strictly complies with, and so abides by, the principles of justice. We ask in effect what a perfectly just, or nearly just, constitutional regime might e like and whether it may come about and be made stable under the circumstances of justice (Theory, par. 22), and so under realistic, though reasonably favorable, conditions.” In this way, justice as fairness is realistically utopian: it probes the limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world (given its laws and tendencies) a democratic regime can attain complete realization of its appropriate political values – democratic perfection, if you like.”
ideal speech situation This refers to perhaps Habermas's most basic concept. [DHCT/343] Held describes it: "The condition for a grounded consensus is a situation in which there is mutual understanding between participants, equal chances to select and employ speech acts, recognition of the legitimacy of each to participate in the dialogue as 'an autonomous and equal partner' and where the resulting consensus is due simply 'to the force of the better argument'."
idealism [IEP]The term "German Idealism"
refers to a phase of intellectual life that had its origin in the Enlightenment
as modified by German conditions. English and French representatives of the
Enlightenment, giving precedence to sensation, had become empiricists and
skeptics. They viewed the world as a great machine, adopted hedonism as their
ethics, and interpreted history from a subjective-critical point of view. The
situation in
ideology The basic dictionary definition refers to the study of ideas and their nature and source [See WWD] However, ideology has taken on several technical meanings depending on the context. Leslie Thiel provides a basic definition [LT/217]: "For our purposes, we might define ideology as a set of coherent beliefs and values about history, nature, psychology, and society that conceptually and practically orders and organizes collective life. Importantly, ideologies are not simply any set of beliefs and values. The term ideology pertains only to those beliefs and values systematically connected to each other within some coherent scheme that reinforces and is reinforced by relations of power within society." Thiel quotes Michael Freedom's comment with regard to ideology and power: "Ideology is always about power because it involves the determination of meaning and the legitimization of one set of meanings from among a competing field. In that sense, to talk of political ideologies is tautological, as the power aspect in all ideology is precisely its political element. And inasmuch as all ideology as a deliberate or unconscious impact on public agendas, it is political." [DHCT/186] The critical theorists use a Marxian emphasis on ideology as system of ideas used to control political behavior.--"Ideologies are not, however, merely illusions. They are embodied and manifested in social relations." "Ideologies can express 'modes of existence'." "... ideologies are often also packages of symbols, ideas, images and theories through which people experience their relation to each other and the world. The degree to which ideologies mystify social relations or adequately reflect distorted social relations (but thereby mystify the possibility of non-distorted social relations) is a question for inquiry in particular cases and contexts.'" ----[DHCT/256] referring to Habermas "ideology is, as Trent Schryoer put it, ‘those belief systems which can maintain their legitimacy despite the fact that they could not be validated if subjected to rational discourse.’ The process of emancipation, then, entails the transcendence of such systems of distorted communication. this process, in turn, requires engaging in critical reflection and criticism. It is only through reflection that domination, in its many forms, can be unmasked."
immanent [WWD] inherent living, operating within --immanentism in philosophically refers to theory that objects of knowledge are within the mind -- theology refers to immanentism and theory that God pervades the universe
immanent criticism [DHCT/183]Immanent criticism confronts 'the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual principles, in order to criticize the relation between the two and thus transcend them.'"
immanent method [DHCT/217] Adorno, as described by Held, "argued, the individuality of the particular can be uncovered – through categories which are intrinsic to it rather than through notions which are imposed from without." – the universal is revealed within the particular – "critical theory seeks to understand, analyzes and enact in its very structure the subjective ground of society: society is not simply an object; it is a subject-object. It is both the subject of knowledge and the object." – [DHCT/217]quoting Adorno: "Society is subjective because it refers back to the human beings who create it, and its organizational principles too refer back to subjective consciousness and its most general form of abstraction – logic, something essentially subjective. Society is objective because, o account of its underlying structure, it cannot perceive its own subjectivity, because it doe not possess a total subject and through its organization it thwarts the installation of such a subject."
impartial spectator Samuel Sheffler in [JR/SF] has an excellent analysis of Rawl’s distinctions among utilitarians and his debate with them – [at p. 429 in JR/SF] Rawls argues that the commitment to unrestricted aggregation can be seen as the result of extending to society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man – this leads to concept of the ideally rational and impartial spectator as the standard of what is just – since this impartial spectator identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own, his function is to organized the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire. In this way, many persons are fused into one. In summary, Rawls argues, the classical utilitarian view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflating all persons into one though the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator. – in this sense utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons [p. 430]
incommensurability thesis: [RG, 92] Basic goods can be incommensurable with one another, i.e., intrinsic values such as human life and knowledge could be incommensurable since "basic values, inasmuch as they provide ultimate reasons for action, are irreducible to one another or to some common underlying factor." --At pp. 96-97: second order reasons such as moral norms such as the rule to do unto others as you would have them do unto you or to not harm others helps resolve choice situations without weighing one basic good as more important than another. --- At p. 100: consequentialism presupposes a commensurability by reason. George refers to various natural law theorists who oppose this and advocate incommensurability as well, but instead of arbitrary choice, as critics point to, they argue for second order moral rules to make choices.
inequality Rawls . [JR/JF/55] “any modern society, even a well-ordered one, must rely on some inequalities to be well designed and effectively organized….” “Justice as fairness focuses on inequalities in citizens’ life prospects – their prospects over a complete life (as specified by an appropriate idea of primary goods)….” prospects affected by social class of origin, native endowments, and good or ill fortune (illness, accident, regional economic decline, etc.)
instrumental conception of community See community
intentio: Latin for intent. [MAC, 184] MacIntyre discusses re: Aquinas “actions themselves are morally indifferent and are to be called or bad in virtue of whether or not the agent’s intention does or does not conform to divine law.” -- “the natural disposition exhibited in our most basic apprehension of those precepts, which we do not comprehend as a result of enquiry if only because a knowledge of their truth is already presupposed in all practical activity. It is perhaps to be classified as a particular potentiality of reason.”
interactive universalism [SB] Benhabib describes the elements of a postmetaphysical, interactive universalism as: the universal pragmatic reformulation of the basis of the validity of truth claims in terms of a discourse theory of justification; the vision of an embodied and embedded human self whose identity is constituted narratively, and the reformulation of the moral point of view as the contingent achievement of an interactive form of rationality rather than as the timeless standpoint of a legislative reason." At p. 153: "interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and difference among human, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid." -- See also substitutionalist universalism for contrast.
intersubjective conception of the self [MS/79] Sandel uses this term to describe the idea that the "relevant conception of the self may embrace more than a single empirically individuated human being." Thus the possession of attributes in an individual is a shared possession involving other.
intrinsic goods( intrinsic values) [RG, 103] "As end-in-themselves, intrinsic goods provide reasons for action whose intelligibility as reasons does not depend on more fundamental reason...to which they are means." This distinguishes them from instrumental goods which are means to other ends.--- In stressing that these are basic human goods George argues they are not "platonic forms" detached from persons. "Rather, they are intrinsic aspects of the well-being and fulfillment of flesh and blood human beings in their manifold dimensions (that is to say, as animate beings, as rational beings and as agents through deliberations and choice). Basic human goods provide reasons for action precisely insofar as they are constitutive aspects of human flourishing." --- re: Rawls' primary good: [JR/PL/307] "things which are generally necessary as social conditions and all-purpose means to enable persons to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good and to develop and exercise their two moral powers." --- They are "located in social requirements and the normal circumstances of human life in a democratic society. " [p. 76] Primary goods "include such things as the basic rights and liberties covered by the first principle of justice, freedom of movement, and free choice of occupation protected by fair equality of opportunity of the first part of the second principle, and income and wealth and the social bases of self-respect." -- see also "goods." --- see also the discussion of Oakeshott's ideas on freedom under" freedom" where he is indicated as seeing freedom as an intrinsic value and not an instrumental value. ----[WC/xxiii] teleological theories include “a metaphysics of intrinsic purpose[italics mine] within which teleological virtues have been defined and cultivated historically.”
intuitionism [Noesis] from online dictionary: intuitionism Reliance on unmediated awareness as a criterion of truth. In logic and mathematics, intuitionism denies the independent reality of mathematical objects and the principle of excluded middle. In moral philosophy, intuitionism is the metaethical theory that moral judgments are made by reference to a direct, non-inferential awareness of moral value. Ethical intuitionists usually hold that we recognize our duties in the specific features of particular moral decisions. [WK, 51] Kymlicka indicates Rawl's description of intuitionist theories as : "first, they consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular types of cases and second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighting these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right. Or if there are priority rules, these are thought to be more or less trivial and of no substantial assistance in reaching a judgement.(From Rawls, Theory, 1971, p. 34). Kymlicka then at p. 51, indicates that it is when these principles intuitively derived conflict that we look to political theory for guidance. ---Stanley Rosen’s comments: [SR/x] Pippin in preface – “This crucial appeal to intuition or a pre-discursive origin (or to the lived, human experience of the human), in many ways the core of Rosen’s philosophical position, is often linked in his work…to a kind of transcendental argument about the experiential bases for assessing and evaluating: that it is a condition of intelligibility itself that such an intuitional orientation serve as such a touchstone. The general argument is that analyses or interpretation or conceptual structures cannot be validated by analyses or interpretation or structures, but only by some intuition of what is not, and what is prior to, such interpretations; by ordinary human experience.” --- “Moreover, the position does not deny that ordinary experience is itself historical, is manifest in particular ways at particular times, but these manifestations are called mere ‘costumes’ and are said always to envelop a core human nature, always available in some non-historical and quite ordinary form. When we simply ask ourselves whether some form of life is worth living and how it ranks with respect to others or other possible forms, we are evincing this ordinary and intuitive assumption of a criterion, our ability to deliberate about such a question and distinguish satisfactory from unsatisfactory responses.” --- “Even the attempt itself [to explain] implies a commitment to the value of attempting to explain.][SR/95] intuition is the residual ‘platonism’ of the lumen naturale –but intuition, even when associated with mathematics, is essentially private and silent. It cannot justify itself or distinguish itself from faith [lumens naturale refers to the following as indicated by TOMONOBU IMAMICHI in an Internet article : As every person knows the name other than "prote philosophia" for the nameless Aristotelian manuscripts which later came to be named as "ta meta ta Physika" was theologike of which the perfect form was episteme theologike which is different from theologia as mythological history. Aristotelian theologike is translated in the latin Christian tradition into theologia naturalis, because it was performed through lumen naturale as natural reason and not through revelation. Perhaps the Thomist can dare today to say that the demonstration of the existence of God is really possible through traditional metaphysics even in view of modern research in the natural sciences. But who would dare assert its possibility in view of the technological construction and destruction in nature? In my opinion, as Vico says, theologia civil is as theologia historica must take the place of the old theologia naturalis. We can comment in two ways on this problem as well.]
invisible hand explanation [NOZ/18] Explanations that "show how some overall pattern or design, which one would have thought had to be produced by an individual's or group's successful attempt to realize the pattern, instead was produced and maintained by a process that in no way had the overall pattern or design 'in mind.'" -- "An invisible-hand explanation explains what looks to be the product of someone's intentional design, as not being brought about by anyone's intentions."
irony: Leslie Thiel in Thinking Politics provides a good explanation of irony along with its relevance to postmodern and Socratic thought: The postmodernist adopts Perspectivism judging that no surefire means of attaining "objective" knowledge is freed of all interpretive intrusions but cannot dismiss the possibility that there may be some ultimate "truth" out there, thus the irony since the ironist lacks all certainty including the certainty that there is no truth whatsoever. He then goes to Socrates as the first ironist : "In the original Greek usage of the term, an ironist was a fellow who leads others astray through rhetorical deception or sarcastic praise." --- Socrates, says Thiel, is ironic because he denies his own possession of knowledge and at the same time pokes holes in those who claim to have knowledge. "The only thing that Socrates knows is that he knows nothing. Thus he demonstrates he knows at least one thing which is that he knows nothing. "To be an ironist is to know that one knows nothing for sure. It is to know that truth is not something one can ever grasp, only something one can approach." Socrates is never sure what he means because he is aware that the stable definitions of the words and concepts required for self-expression will disintegrate when given over to dialectic examination -- thus the value of the dialectic. --- Even the cave may mean that the shadows are really the words being used, which are the only media for trying to express the truth --- perhaps the words are merely heuristic devices, goads to further thought -- "In a dialogue, which consist of numerous voices, the reader is never completely certain who, if anyone, speaks for the author or for truth. Dialogue is well-suited to irony."
judgment [SB/53] "Judgment involves the capacity to represent to oneself the multiplicity of viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning which constitute a situation. This representational capacity is crucial for the kind of sensitivity to particulars which most agree is central for good and perspicacious judgment. " -- "Put differently, judgment involves a certain 'interpretive' and narrative' skill which, in turn, entail the capacity for exercising an 'enlarged mentality.' This enlarged mentality can be described precisely as exercising the reversibility of perspectives which discourse ethics enjoins. The link between a universality model of moral conversation and the exercise of moral judgment is the capacity for the reversing of moral perspectives, or what Kant and Arendt name the 'enlarged mentality.'" ---a pragmatic, daily action type of definition is found in Barber's book: Benjamin Barber, The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times. 1988: [p. 203] [p.199] "Indeed, common civic activity constitutes what we mean by political judgment. The journey from private opinion to political judgment does not follow a road from prejudice to true knowledge; it proceeds form solitude to sociability. To travel this road, the citizen must put her private views to a test that is anything but epistemological: she must debate them with her fellow citizens, run them through the courts, offer them as program for a political party, try them out in the press, reformulate them as a legislative initiative, experiment with them i local, state, and federal forums, and , in every other way possible, subject them to the civic scrutiny and public activity of the community to which she belongs.: ---"...political judgment is something produced by politics rather than by cognition; its concomitant is citizenship rather than individual consciousness. " ---[p.209]"The citizen wishes in any case only to act rightly, not to know for certain; only to choose reasonable, not to reason scientifically; only to overcome conflict and secure transient peace, not to discover eternity; only to cooperate with others, to achieve moral oneness; only to formulate common causes, not to obliterate all differences." -- "...political judgment is not the application of abstract, independent standards to political actuality; it is the forging of common actuality i the absence of abstract, independent standards. It entails dynamic, ongoing, common deliberation and action, and it is feasible only when individuals are transformed by social iterations into citizens." ---[Barber eschews the philosophical abstractions of Rawls, Kant and others yet judgment involves also having some basis for making one's decisions and deciding what are the good and bad aspects of potential policy alternatives although the politics of the matter may restrict one's choices. Coming to some sense of rightness, wrongness, principles of justice, etc. does not forego a humbleness of understanding that one is always operating in terrain with a degree of uncertainty and that the ideal and the possible may not mesh and even that one's notions of the ideal may change, yet the choices available in politics and in the deliberations involve also thinking with one's notions of the ideal, of abstract principles of justice.]
just saving principle [JR/JF/159-160] “The principle of just saving holds between generations, while the difference principle holds within generations. Real saving is required only for reasons of justice: that is, to make possible the conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over tie.” ---“We must not imagine a (hypothetical and nonhistorical) direct agreement between all generations, so we say the parties are to agree to a savings principle subject to the condition that they must want all previous generations to have followed. They are to ask themselves how much (what fraction of the social product) they are prepared to save at each level of wealth as society advances, should all previous generations have followed the same schedule.” --- “Since no generation knows its place among the generations ,,, all later generations, including the present one, are to follow [the principle the would want preceding generations o have followed, no matter how far back in time.]” – This presentation of the savings principle upgrades the comment in Theory according to Rawls where it was assumed that the parties care for their descendents and nothing really constrains them to make any savings at all. Thus the restatement and revision in Justice as Fairness.
justice, allocative T
justice, distributive [JR/JF/50] “The problem of distributive justice in justice
as fairness is always this: how are the institutions of the basic structure to
be regulated as one unified scheme of institutions so that a fair, efficient,
and productive system of social cooperation can be maintained over time, from
one generation to the next? Contrast this with the very different problem of
how a given bundle of commodities is to be distributed, or allocated, among
various individual whose particular needs, desire, and preferences are know to
us and who have not cooperated in any way to produce those commodities. This
second problem is that of allocative
justice (Theory, par.
justice, pure background procedural [JR/JF/54 “Taking the basic structure as the primary subject enable us to regard distributive justice as a case of pure background procedural justice: when everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of cooperation, the particular distribution that results is acceptable as just whatever that distribution turns out to be….” – principles of justice specify the form of background justice apart from all historical conditions thus what counts is the workings of social institutions and not a benchmark of a state of nature [thus differs from Locke, Nozick]
justice, distributive This is the subject of much
writing in political philosophy. Rawls' key aspect of his theory is his
two principles of justice: [JR/PL/291](a) Each person has an equal right to a
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which is compatible with a
similar scheme of liberties for all (b) Social and economic inequalities
are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to positions and
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and
second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society. -- Nozick summarizes his concept with the notions of justice in
acquisition, justice in transfer and entitlement: Nozick indicates that
if the world were wholly just : "1. A person who acquires a holding in
accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that
holding. 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of
justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to
the holding. 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated)
applications of 1 and 2. " Thus, he says: "The complete principle of
distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone
is entitled to the holding they possess under the distribution. A distribution
is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means. The
legitimate means of moving from one distribution to another are specified by
the principle of justice in transfer." ----[JR/JF/50] “The problem of distributive justice in justice
as fairness is always this: how are the institutions of the basic structure to
be regulated as one unified scheme of institutions so that a fair, efficient,
and productive system of social cooperation can be maintained over time, from
one generation to the next? Contrast this with the very different problem of
how a given bundle of commodities is to be distributed, or allocated, among
various individual whose particular needs, desire, and preferences are know to
us and who have not cooperated in any way to produce those commodities. This
second problem is that of allocative
justice (Theory, par.
justice in acquisition see acquisition, justice in
justice in transfer see transfer, justice in
justice, holistic view Scheffler in [JR/SF/445] Rawls and utilitarianism take a holistic view f distributive justice: both insist that the justice of any particular assignment of entitlements always depends – directly or indirectly – on the justice of the large distribution of benefits and burdens i society. – holism about distributive justice draws support from two convictions. The firs is that the life prospects of individuals are so densely and variously interrelated, especially through their shared participation in social institutons and practices, that virtually any allocation of resources of one person has morally relevant implications for other people. Holistics conclude that it is impossible to assess the justice of an assignment of benefits to any single individual without taking into account the larger distributive context of that assignment. In conditions of moderate scarcity, we cannot tell whether a particular person should receive a given benefit without knowing how such an allocation would fit into the broader distribution of benefits and burdens within the society. Nor, to those who find holism compelling, does the project of identifying a putatively natural, presocial baseline distribution of advantage, and assessing the justice of all subsequent distributions solely by reference to the legitimacy of each move away from the baseline. Social institutons structure people’s lives in fundamental ways from birth through death.; there is no presocial moment in the life of the individual. --- nonholistic view would be to argue that an individual deserves something without inquiring into the larger distributional context, but by referring to a prior standard of desert. The basis for a valid desert claim, on this view, must always be some characteristic of, or fact about , the deserving person. In this sense, desert as traditionally understood is individualistic rather than holistic. --- at p. 447: Rawls responds to the issue with the argument that the sense of desert presupposes the existence of the creative scheme; it is irrelevant to the question of how in the first place the scheme is to e designed – Rawls suggests, Scheffler indicates, that his view is consistent with the traditional understanding of desert. He says, for example, that there is not conflict between his view of justice and the traditional Aristotelian view. It is true that Aristotle’s definition clearly presupposes…an account of what properly belongs to the person and what is due to him but Rawls argues such entitlements are very often derived form social institutions and the legitimate expectations to which hey fie rise and since there is not reason to think that Aristotle would disagree with this the upshot is that there is not conflict with the traditional notions. Similarly, he thinks he can say that, in the traditional phrase, a just scheme gives each person his due: that is, it allots to each what he is entitled to as defined by the scheme itself.
justice, moral doctrine cf political doctrine of justice see moral doctrine of justice
justice, political conception see political conception of justice
justice, sense of [JR/PL/18] "A sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation. Given the nature of the political conception as specifying a public basis of justification, a sense of justice also expresses a willingness, if not the desire, to act in relation to others on terms that they also can publicly endorse…."
justice, the two principles of [JR/PL/291] This is perhaps the best known and most critical idea in Rawls’ theory of justice (a) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
justice, two principles of see two principles of justice
justification, publicly based [JR/JF/91, fn. 13] “a justification … based solely on political values covered by the political conception of justice … [thus] we strive for publicly based justifications for questions regarding the constitutional essentials and basic quests of distributive justice but not in general for all the questions to e settled by the legislature within a constitutional framework.”
labor [DHCT/235]Marx has, according to Marcuse, a definition of labor, with which Marcuse agreed, critical to his theory:" labour is ‘the becoming-for-itself of man within externalization…--the ‘self-creating or self-objectifying act of man’. In [Marcuse’s] view, labour is the condition of human existence independent of all social forms, the foundation of every activity." – quoting Marcuse: "In his labour man supersedes the mere objectivity of objects and makes them into ‘the means of life’. He impresses upon them the form of his being, and makes them into ‘his work and his reality’…. The objective piece of finished work is the reality of man; man is as he has realized himself in the object of his labour. …It is precisely in labour that specifically human universality is realized." – Held, explaining Marcuse: "It is not the single, isolated individual who is active in this process. All labour is within the sphere of community; it is social, always ‘with and for and against others’."
laissez-faire capitalism – see capitalism
language: See nominalism.
law: Law is generally considered to be the set of rules established by political authority backed by sanctions (penalties) for failure to follow the rules. This is true for all criminal law and much of civil law where penalties are assessed for wrongful behavior. However, law may also contain rules for ordering processes in society which distribute resources (e.g., laws governing social security administration and who gets what), regulating societal behaviors such as non-discrimination (which can carry financial penalties through legal suits) or the procedures for approving new drugs. Law is often seen in a negative light of what one cannot do and is punished if doing it but it is also a means for coordinating societal activities for he common good. George provides a definition of this common good: [RG, 107]: "Where the laws are just (and expedient) authorities serve their communities well; where they are unjust (or inexpedient) authorities serve their communities badly. The moral purpose of a system of laws is to make it possible for individuals and sub-communities to realize for themselves important human goods that would not be realizable (or would not be fully realizable ) in the absence of the laws. Hence, according to Aquinas,' the end of the law is the common good.'"
law of peoples [JR/LP] p 3 a particular conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice – in jus gentium sense of what the laws of all peoples have in common
least advantages [JR/JF/57ff] need to look at primary goods which are “various social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good. Here we look as the social requirements and the normal circumstances of human life in a democratic society. Primary goods are things needed and required by persons seen in the light of the political conception of persons , as citizens who are fully cooperating members of society, and not merely as human beings apart from any normative conception. These goods are things citizens need as free and equal persons living a complete life; they are not things it is simply rational to want or desire, or to prefer or even crave. We use the political conception, and not a comprehensive moral doctrine, in specifying those needs and requirements.” --- “While the list of primary goods resets in I part o the general facts and requirements of social life, it does so only together with a political conception of the person as free and equal, endowed with the moral powers, and capable of being a fully cooperating member of society. This normative conception is necessary to identify the appropriate list of primary goods.” :--- basic rights and liberties: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and the rest – freedom of movement and free choice of occupations against a background of diverse opportunities --- powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility --- income and wealth generally needed to achieve a wide range of ends --- social bases of self-respect, understood as those aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence ---- least advantaged never identified re: income, wealth, gender, race but are not identifiable apart from, or independently of, their income and wealth – “Even supposing, for example, that it turns out, as commonsense political sociology might suggest, that the least advantaged, identified by income and wealth, include many individuals born into the least-favored social class or origin and many of the least (naturally) endowed and many who experience more bad luck and misfortune (par. 16,) nevertheless those attributes do not define the least advantaged.”
legitimacy, liberal principle of [JR/PL/137&217]] "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason." ---- [JR/JF/41] “political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason.” – “This is the liberal principle of legitimacy….” –“In matters of constitutional essential, as well as on questions of basic justice, we try to appeal only to principles and values each citizen can endorse.” [Rousseau and general will? Kant and categorical imperative? Plato and people must approve of the Republic?]----[JR/LP] p. 137 “Hence the idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity says: Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reason we would offer for our political actions – were we to state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonable think that other citizens might also reasonable accept those reasons.
legitimate expectation This plays a role in replacing idea of moral desert in setting rules for public life see moral desert
liberal conception of justice [JR/PL/6] Rawls sees the two principles [ [JR/PL/291] (a) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.] as exemplifying this liberal conception since it has the three main features of "first, a specification of certain basic rights, liberties and opportunities (of a kind familiar to constitutional democratic regimes); second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties, and opportunities, especially with respect to claims of the general good and of perfectionist values; and third, measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties and opportunities." – Rawls notes that these elements can be understood in different ways, so that there are many variants of liberalism.--Sandel indicates several types in describing libertarian liberals and natural liberty and those liberals who stress equal opportunity and would go further than the libertarians in correcting disadvantages in the social system. Rawls goes beyond both types with his two principles of justice and the more advantaged gaining only if to the advantage of the least advantaged. Sandel [MS/68] "The system of natural liberty defines as just whatever distribution results from an efficient market economy in which a formal (i.e. legal ) equality of opportunity prevails, such that positions are open to those with the relevant talents." --in comparison to natural liberty [MS/68] "liberal equality seeks to remedy the injustice of natural liberty by going beyond formal equality of opportunity and correcting, where possible, for social and cultural disadvantages. The aim is a kind of 'fair meritocracy', in which social and cultural inequality are mitigated by equal educational opportunities, certain redistributive policies, and other social reforms."
liberal model of public space See public space.
liberal peoples see peoples, liberal
liberalism This term has many more meanings
than commonly supposed given its everyday usage. Thus one often refers to
"classical liberalism" as compared to present-day ideological
orientations which label some persons as "liberals." Political
liberal thought usually refers to the kind of rights found in the U.S. Bill of
Rights (speech, exercise of religion, free press, etc.) and democratic
procedures such as open and free regular elections. Classical economic
liberalism has a focus point of keeping the state as uninvolved in the economy
as possible. Neoliberals today press this point in economics. Contemporary
liberals accept a stronger role of the government than do contemporary
conservatives. see below Susser's outline of "welfare liberalism." In
social issues contemporary liberals tend to fall back on the
classical emphasis on the protection of individual rights and contemporary
conservatives tend to be more willing to use the government to enforce
conceptions of public morality (gay rights, abortion, and censorship
(pornography, etc.) issues illustrate this---
comprehensive cf political liberalism is indicated by Rawls [JR/JF/153] essentially this is
the idea of a liberalism concerned with constitutional essentials and not
intended to favor any particular comprehensive view ----[JR/LP] p. 141 --Rawls referring to different
liberalisms [referred to as a family of reasonable political conceptions]
– “The limiting feature of these forms is the criterion of
reciprocity, viewed as applied between free and equal citizens, themselves seen
as reasonable and rational.” – three
main features of all liberalisms: first a list of certain basic rights,
liberties, and opportunities – second and assignment of special priority
to those rights, liberties, and opportunities, especially with respect to the
claims of the general good and perfectionist values and third measures ensuring
for citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms
– in all society seen as a fair system of cooperation over time –
political liberalism does not try to fix public reason once and for all in the
form of one favored political conception of justice – both
Habermas’s discourse conception of legitimacy and Catholic views of the
common good [deriving from Aristotle and St. Thomas]and solidarity come within
the various conceptions of justice – Benhabib argued for the discourse
model as the only one compatible with the general social trends of our
societies and with the emancipatory aspirations of new social movements like
the women’s movement but I find it hard to distinguish her view from that
of a form of political liberalism and public reasons, since it turn out that
she means by the public sphere what Habermas does, namely what Political Liberalism calls the
background culture of civil society in which the ideal of public reason does
not apply – also she doesn’t seek to show that certain principles
of right and justice belonging to the content of public reason could not be
interpreted to deal with the problems raised by the women’s movements, I
doubt this can be done.--- [SB] Benhabib
indicates as a part of the liberal tradition 'the universal
commitment to the consideration of every human individual as a being worthy of
universal moral respect." . ----However some critical differences exist
as to how one approaches the democratic concepts, notions of justice, equality,
basic rights, etc.. Not only are there differences reflected in various
political policies at the level of political practice, but there are sharp
differences in terms of such basic philosophical ideas such as what is the
nature of "the person" and the nature and role of "society"
and "community" and the limits or possibilities of "reason."
Thus note carefully the various distinctions being drawn in what
follows.-- -- utilitarian liberalism from the thinking of writers
such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mills focuses on social utility and the
greatest good for the greatest number of members in a society. Basic liberties
such as the freedom of speech were defended strongly with Mill's classic idea
that anything should be allowed unless it worked harm to another -- Sandel
asserts this was the dominant view until the rights-based liberalism
of Rawls, Dworkin and others (see liberal conception of justice).
The rights-based liberals disagree among themselves producing the libertarian
liberals (see libertarian) such as Nozick and Hayek on
one hand and egalitarian liberals (see equality for
different types of egalitarians) like Rawls on the other. [MS/184] Sandel
distinguishes the libertarian liberals as those who "argue
the government should respect basic civil and political liberties, and also the
right to the fruits of our labor as conferred by the market economy; redistributive
policies that tax the rich to help the poor thus violate our rights." Sandel
at [MS/184] indicates that the egalitarian liberals argue that we cannot
meaningfully exercise our civil and political liberties without the provision
of basic social and economic needs; government should therefore assure each
person, as a matter of right, a decent level of such goods as education,
income, housing, health care, and the like."--- Sandel also
describes deontological liberalism [MS/1] "As an
ethic that asserts the priority of the right over the good, and is typically
defined in opposition to utilitarian conceptions, the liberalism I have in mind
might best be described as 'deontological liberalism'." [MS/10-11] Sandel
describes the liberal conception of the person as having specific traits if
justice is to be primary: [Note the links between "person",
"subject" and "agent". ]"We must be creatures of a
certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. In particular we
must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, conditioned to be
sure, but part of us always antecedent to any conditions [i.e., not determined
by social conditions, etc.]. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects
as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the
purposes we pursue. Deontological liberalism supposes that we can,
indeed must, understand ourselves as independent in this sense."-----Benhabib [BS/16] describes
postmodernism as interested in a superliberalism which is
more pluralistic, more tolerant, more open to the right of difference and
otherness than the rather staid and sober versions presented by John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel." She also indicates the critical view of
the person in liberalism: "The conceptual framework via which liberals
state their views of the person follow a dualistic logic. ON the one hand,
there is the world of 'causative' influences like language, culture and
community which shape a person; these are so to speak the givens of phenomenal
agency in this world.---on the other hand, there are the 'rational ground'
through which individuals assume an attitude of choice and reflection toward
the given characteristics of their lives, bodies and communities -- the
position of noumenal agency." [In Noesis one finds the definition
of noumena as things as they are in themselves. Referring to Kant: "Kant's
distinction between things as they appear to us and things as they are in
themselves {
----Susser summarizes some of the brands of liberalism:
[BS/62] Locke's Liberalism (17th) -- classical liberalism with political and economic sides:
1. A view of humans as rational,
self-interested creatures who naturally possess the rights to life, liberty,
and property.
2. Although humans normally respect
the rights of others, without an arbitrating authority clashes between
individuals can endanger the peace.
3. The state is established to
safeguard our natural entitlements. By arbitrating conflicts, it allows us to
enjoy our rights in peace.
4. Not being the source of human
rights, the state may not violate them. These rights, most notably the right to
property, are absolute.
5. Rights are always individual
rights. No communal rights exist. Hence, the community many not violate
individual rights for the sake of some ostensible common good.
[BS/64] Adam Smith's Liberalism (18th) -- economic liberalism :
1. Individuals pursuing their own
interest are led, by a kind of invisible hand, to add to the public wealth.
2. The free market, relying on
price, demand, and supply, coordinates the activities of countless individuals
far better than any deliberately designed system could.
3. Individual self-interest is the
most reliable motive toward the production of wealth for all. Hence, public
interference in the workings of the free market is to be strenuously avoided.
[BS/70] John Stuart Mill (mid-19th) - Revision of Classical Liberalism-- These ideas translated into the welfare liberalism of the 20th century with social safety nets and a wide variety of social programs [health care, social security, unemployment insurance, welfare programs aimed at those in poverty, progressive income tax, child labor laws, minimum wage laws, trade unions, free public education, etc.-- see welfare liberalism discussed below under Rawls]:
1. Absolute property rights and minimal government often do not advance the
cause of liberty. An unrestrained free market creates poverty and monopolies,
both of which are enemies of personal autonomy.
2. By understanding liberty in terms of property rights, classical liberals had
unjustifiably made one's public standing conditional on one's economic
holdings. No less than property rights, the civil and political rights of
participatory democracy are critical for the development of free individuals.
3. Hence, the liberal ideal must be expanded to include creating the material
and spiritual conditions for the development of informed, intelligent, and
morally responsible individuals.
4. The radical individualism of classical liberalism should be moderated to
allow for considerations of the common good and the public welfare, i.e., to
accommodate the potentially positive role that government call play in
safeguarding liberty.
[BS/82] Friedrich Hayek (mid-20th) [Hayek's brand of liberalism is a large component of what is referred to as neoliberalism today.]
1. Human institutions arise out
of tile unplanned interaction of individual human interests. Without firsthand
knowledge of each other and without any necessary agreement about values, the
spontaneous, self-seeking activities of separate individuals create order and
cooperative enterprises.
2. Without imposed authority or
deliberate design, the free market efficiently disperses economic information
about individual preferences and interests. Through the signaling mechanism of
prices, the diverse interests of various individuals are finely coordinated.
Competition drives prices down just as it drives quality and service up.
3. Planned economies fail because
they are unable to artificially duplicate the communication network that is
natural to the flee market. Moreover they are necessarily coercive because they
authoritatively impose certain human ends rather than allowing different ends
to be reconciled through the medium of an open market that serves the general
welfare.
4.
5. The object of government is to
guarantee the unhindered functioning of the market. Politics is a means to
economic freedom, not an end itself. Hence, government's role should be
minimal. It must not interfere with normal market activity--neither by
correcting the outcome of market competition through redistributing income, nor
by pursuing the allegedly collective ends of society.
Oakeshott: see the discussion on Oakeshott's ideas where it is argued that he differs significantly from the classical liberalism of Hayek under "freedom" above. It also points to the instrumental nature of classical liberalism as presented by Hayek.
[BS/86] Robert Nozick (late 20th) libertarian liberalism:
1. By virtue of our ability to
create a life in accordance with our individual conception of the good, each
human being is entitled to be treated as an end rather than as a means. Human
separateness may not be diminished by leveling, averaging, or amalgamating
different human ends into a composite public welfare.
2. Government may not infringe our
basic human entitlements without our consent. For example, the right we each
have to our own property, so long as it has been legitimately acquired through
labor, exchange, or inheritance, is not subject to public regulation or
redistribution. While individual benevolence is praiseworthy, property rights
may not be compromised in order to further collective social ends such as
aiding the poor or providing health care or fostering education.
3. There is no social pie to
distribute. Property comes with owners; it is not a collective asset. Property
rights are not to be assessed in terms of their social utility or by what
others may think of the moral qualities of the owner. They are entitlements
that do not require social justification because they precede and are
independent of organized society.
4. The only legitimate function of
the state is to provide protection and make sure that the rules of the game are
being honored. This minimum state has no autonomous objectives of its own.
5. End-state theories of
justice thwart the voluntary interactions of autonomous individuals by
determining in advance what their outcome must be. Rather than allow free
individuals to pursue their own objectives and accept any outcome that is
arrived at without violating personal entitlements, end-state theorists
regularly reject and rectify what free individuals have achieved. End state
theories are, therefore, inexorably destabilizing and coercive.
[BS/101] John Rawls (late 20th) welfare liberalism:
1. Human beings are rational,
enlightened, self-interested individuals. Their rights and welfare ought to be
the central focus of social policy. Although they are bound to each other in
commerce, community, and moral life, the interests of one individual should not
be sacrificed for the interests of another.
2. Private enterprise and private
property are basic and necessary. Not only do they hold out the promise of
considerable social wealth, they are also indispensable for individual freedom
and self-determination.
3. Nevertheless, the market
mechanism, whatever its palpable advantages, is in itself an insufficient guide
to the distribution of social resources. It often fails to take fairness, moral
desert, and human dignity into account. It apportions wealth in a morally
arbitrary way--frequently with obnoxious results. At times, it allows the
unconscionable subjection of some to the interests of others. Hence, the
mechanisms of the market need to be moderated by deliberately adopted social
policies that smooth the jagged edges endemic to capitalism.
4. Private property, for all its importance,
is not an absolute entitlement. It is held in the context of a common social
life and, hence, may be adjusted and limited to foster important social
objectives. Although never to be undertaken frivolously, appropriating private
property for pressing public need is a legitimate prerogative of the duly
constituted authorities representing the popular will.
5. Our responsibility for society's
weaker members is basic and unshirkable. Beyond the shrewd counsel contained in
the adage "united we stand, divided we fall," society its a whole is
morally bound to its less fortunate fellows -- and not only as a matter of
personal charity. The democratic vision is not exhausted by formal practices
such as periodic elections or the due process of law. No less it involves a
commitment to human dignity and self-mastery. When members of the body politic
are unable to exercise their roles as active citizens because of destitution,
illiteracy, or brutal exploitation, it is a social rather than merely a private
concern.
6. Private businesses are
profit-making organizations: they do not necessarily seek the
general good. The claim that a million different businesses each pursuing its
own profit invariably harmonize with each other to serve the public welfare is
both false and irresponsible. The truth is often quite different. Private
businesses must be monitored and, if need be, restrained so as to protect the
public from their potential rapaciousness and greed.
7. The only institution that transcends
sectarian interests and possesses a total social perspective is government. As
the authorized representative of popular will, government uniquely embodies the
common aspirations of the whole political community. Government is not the
enemy! Although sluggish, top heavy bureaucracies are a danger to be avoided,
government's proper role does involve regulating, monitoring, and
administrating those aspects of business and public life that require a
society-wide perspective. It also entails operating the complex of social
welfare programs that care for those groups disadvantaged by deep-rooted social
and historical discrimination ---- those that the market mechanism cannot
avail.
8. In more concrete terries, welfare
liberals like Rawls support a series of large-scale social programs designed to
mitigate the less attractive consequences of capitalist competition. The best
known among these programs:
Welfare
liberalism in practice:
a. Unemployment insurance that cushions the blow of losing a job by providing
temporary income until new work can be found.
b. Social security programs that guarantee workers a dignified and comfortable
old age.
c. Medical programs for the indigent and aged.
d. Welfare assistance for those who are chronically unable lo care for
themselves.
e. Educational support and other opportunity-equalizing measures for those
whose circumstances place them at a disadvantage in market competition..
f. Fair housing laws, including - affirmative action programs, assuring those
who have suffered a long history of discrimination that their needs will
receive special attention in the marketplace.
g. Low-cost housing for low-income individuals.
h. Health, safely, and quality standards for trade, especially in potentially
dangerous industries such its drugs, aviation, arms, pesticides.
i.. Standards for working hours, conditions, labor disputes, minimum
wages.
j. Environmental protection laws.
k. A system of progressive taxation underlying this network of policies and
programs to assure that their costs fall most heavily on those who can best afford
to pay for them.
libertarian Commonly understood, this term refers to the idea that the state plays a minimal role in the lives of individuals whether one is referring to economic, social or intellectual life. It is, in the extreme, a set of ideas emphasizing private action to the almost total exclusion of the state whether one is referring to decisions on abortion, private defense against crime or private economic actions. However, like all "ism's" it has many variants. Robert Nozick, perhaps the most intellectually persuasive proponent of a view which might be labeled libertarian has stated: [NOZ/141] "Not only does the day seem distant when all men of good will shall agree to libertarian principles; these principles have not been completely stated, nor is there now one unique set of principles agreed to by all libertarians." -- Susser outlines Nozick's ideas as follows: [BS/86]
1. By virtue of our ability to create a life in accordance with our individual
conception of the good, each human being is entitled to be treated as an end
rather than as a means. Human separateness may not be diminished by leveling,
averaging, or amalgamating different human ends into a composite public
welfare.
2. Government may not infringe our
basic human entitlements without our consent. For example, the right we each
have to our own property, so long as it has been legitimately acquired through
labor, exchange, or inheritance, is not subject to public regulation or
redistribution. While individual benevolence is praiseworthy, property rights
may not be compromised in order to further collective social ends such as
aiding the poor or providing health care or fostering education.
3. There is no social pie to
distribute. Property comes with owners; it is not a collective asset. Property
rights are not to be assessed in terms of their social utility or by what
others may think of the moral qualities of the owner. They are entitlements
that do not require social justification because they precede and are
independent of organized society.
4. The only legitimate function of
the state is to provide protection and make sure that the rules of the game are
being honored. This minimum state has no autonomous objectives of its own.
5. End-state theories of
justice thwart the voluntary interactions of autonomous individuals by
determining in advance what their outcome must be. Rather than allow free
individuals to pursue their own objectives and accept any outcome that is
arrived at without violating personal entitlements, end-state theorists
regularly reject and rectify what free individuals have achieved. End state
theories are, therefore, inexorably destabilizing and coercive.
Kymlicka [WK/126] describes some libertarians as "mutual advantage theorists": "Mutual advantage theorists also use a contract device, but for opposite reasons [ than Rawls]. For them, there are no natural duties or self-originating moral claims [as is the case with Rawls].' --- "So there is nothing naturally 'right' or 'wrong' about one's actions, even if they involve harming others. However, while there is nothing inherently wrong in harming you, I would be better off by refraining from doing so if every other person refrains from harming me. Adopting a convention against injury is mutually advantageous...." -- He also distinguished them from neoconservatives, with whom they are sometimes confused. See neoconservative.
liberties, equal
– see equal liberties
liberties of the ancients [JR/PL/5]Rawls indicates these are usually associated with theorists such as Rousseau, --These liberties are the equal political liberties and values of public life – [emphasis is on political acts and public involvement as a citizen instead of individual rights] ---[JR/JF/143] stress on equal political rights and participation [Aristotle] cf liberties of the moderns and stress on freedom of thought and liberty of conscience with equal political liberties having in general less intrinsic vale than, say, freedom of thought and liberty of conscience – “In modern democratic society politics is not the focus of life as it was for native-born male citizens in the Athenian city-state
liberties of the moderns [JR/PL/5]: freedom of thought and conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property, and the rule of law –[ emphasis is on the individual rights] --- In modern democratic society politics is not the focus of life as it was for native-born male citizens in the Athenian city-state
liberty [JR/PL/291] "No priority is assigned to liberty as such, as if the exercise of something called ‘liberty’ has a preeminent value is the main if not the sole end of political and social justice. There is , to be sure, a general presumption against imposing legal and other restrictions on conduct without sufficient reason." But this presumption creates no special priority for any particular liberty."----Equal basic liberties "are specified by a list as follows: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law." -- [MS/68] "The system of natural liberty defines as just whatever distribution results from an efficient market economy in which a formal (i.e. legal ) equality of opportunity prevails, such that positions are open to those with the relevant talents." --in comparison to natural liberty [MS/68] "liberal equality seeks to remedy the injustice of natural liberty by going beyond formal equality of opportunity and correcting, where possible, for social and cultural disadvantages. The aim is a kind of 'fair meritocracy', in which social and cultural inequality are mitigated by equal educational opportunities, certain redistributive policies, and other social reforms."----Kymlicka [KM/135] uses the term "teological liberty" for the following: "The first principle of liberty says that we should aim to maximize the amount of freedom in society." His interpretation of this sees it as "taking the concern for the good (e.g. freedom) as fundamental, and concern for people as derivative, promoting the good becomes detached from promoting people's interests." -- He refers to a moralized definition of liberty as one that presupposes a prior theory of rights [p. 138]. A non-moralized definition of liberty is seen in the Spencerian camp. They define liberty "in a non-moralized way --- as the presence of options or choices, for example --- without assuming that we have a right to exercise those options." -- and then "assign rights so as to maximize each individual's freedom, compatible with a like freedom for all." "...whether people have a right to appropriate previously unowned natural resources depends no whether that right increases or decreases each person's freedom." -- Within the non-moralized theory is the neutral definition and the purposive definition. The neutral refers to being free in so far as no one prevents us from acting on our desires. It does not presuppose that we have a right to act on these desires, thus is a non-moralized view. These freedom are not weighted as to importance: [p. 140] "..."each neutral freedom is as important as any other."---Purposive liberty "requires some standard for assessing the importance of a liberty [for our purposes], in order to measure the amount of freedom it contains. There are two basic standards --- the 'subjective' standard says the value of a particular liberty depends on how much an individual desires it; and 'objective' standard says that certain liberties are important whether or not a particular person desires them. the latter is often thought to be preferable because it avoids the potential problem of the 'contented slave' who does not desire legal rights, and hence, on a subjective standard, does not lack any important freedoms."
liberty, worth of [JR/PL/326] Rawls refers to this with regard to the usefulness to persons of their liberties. Rawls discusses in the context of discussion on material means needed to take advantage of liberties and opportunities.
logocentric: [GBM, 170] John Searle referring to the deconstructionists indicates that "'logocentrism' which is one of the aims of deconstruction to, well, deconstruct ... [means] roughly the concern with truth, rationality, logic, and 'the word' that marks the Western philosophical tradition."
love: [MAC, 191] “Aquinas’ conception of the will follows Augustine’s closely in connecting the will with love; what we will we enjoy, both in willing it and in achieving it, and Augustine’s account of the enjoyment of something as ‘to cling to it with love for its own sake.’” ---[CS] Schrag discusses Aristotle’s “friendship” as being like love but requiring reciprocity thus looks to St. Augustine who sees love as freely given and nonpossessive in nature – then uses Kierkegaard extensively re: as emphasizing the dynamics of love as suspending both the teleological and the deontological ethics—love is never simply the motivating force in deliberation on how to achieve certain ends, not is it reducible to an obligation to perform a duty at the beckoning of a categorical imperative --- it cannot e defined in terms of prescription for self-realization attuned to pre-determined ends of nature, nor is it base don the dictates of a moral law – it transcends both an ethic of virtue and a morality of unconditional imperatives – hence the ethical and moral theories of Aristotle and Kant come up short --- the paradox is that love as a gift that is freely given cannot e commanded, and as such involves, not only a paradoxical suspending of the ethical, but also a transcending of the edicts and commands of institutionalized religion --- the “fittingness” that provides the principal ingredient of the ethical sphere, defining the ethical in terms of an ethic of fitting response, is lifted out of the requirements of reciprocity, is tempered by a love that is unconditional, and then descends back into the economy of intramundane concerns and preoccupations. – the paradox is that love is within the public affairs of everyday life but has to come from outside of it – there is an interaction and dynamic with transcendence and immanence intertwined –p. 128: it is a convergence without coincidence, conjuncture without concordance, overlapping without assimilation, and union without absorption.
loyal opposition [JR/JF/49] an essential idea of a constitutional regime – govt. and opposition agree on constitutional essentials thus legitimating both government and opposition
marginal utility, diminishing [RE/42] the more goods one has, the less difference it makes whether one acquires additional goods (broadly speaking and all else being equal), and, therefore, that value tends to be optimized (again, all else being equal) if goods are distributed to those for whom they are most needed, thus increasing their use value without adding to or subtracting from the total amount of exchange value in existence." --- [RE/125] "the good diminishes in value as the person who possesses it acquires more and more additional goods."
Marxism Many more variants of Marxism exist than is often
recognized. One should read also through socialism below. A major idea
is that of historical materialism which sets the stage for
thinking about society from the standpoint of the economic relationships in
society. E.g.: [DHCT/190] "Marx's historical materialism entails a
rejection of objectivism and subjectivism. For him social reality is neither
something wholly 'outside the subject' [objectivism] nor is it simply a
creation of human thought [subjectivism]. Rather, reality is conceived as
formed and constructed through practice and labor. Through practice and labour
the human species synthesizes and alters the material world and thereby
transforms nature qua known as well as itself. The objects of human
perception are themselves the products of the self-generative and
self-formative activity of the species. What we understand by nature or the
human species changes over time as both are actively transformed. The process
of knowing cannot be separated from historical being."--"But as Marx
often suggested history is not made as actors might consciously and immediately
wise. Circumstances exist, generated prior to any given instance of history in
the main, which condition the social act and limit the extent to which any
co-ordinated action may be fully explained as the pursuit of rational
ends." ----Another key idea is that of the nature and role of labour.
[DHCT/235]Marx has, according to Marcuse, a mid-20th century Marxist, a
definition of labor, with which Marcuse agreed, critical to his theory:
"labour is ‘the becoming-for-itself of man within
externalization…--the ‘self-creating or self-objectifying act of
man’. In [Marcuse’s] view, labour is the condition of human
existence independent of all social forms, the foundation of every
activity." – Held quoting Marcuse: "In his labour man
supersedes the mere objectivity of objects and makes them into ‘the means
of life’. He impresses upon them the form of his being, and makes them
into ‘his work and his reality’…. The objective piece of
finished work is the reality of man; man is as he has realized
himself in the object of his labour. It is precisely in labour that
specifically human universality is realized." – Held,
explaining Marcuse: "It is not the single, isolated individual who is
active in this process. All labour is within the sphere of community; it is social,
always ‘with and for and against others’." ---Economic
determinism is an idea especially much debated with the extreme
position being that Marx indicated that everything is determined by the
economic system, e.g., law, culture, and politics simply reflect the economic
relationships. Although economics has turned out to be a key component in much
of social analysis this extreme view is often referred to as "vulgar
Marxism" and contemporary Marxists argue that not even Marx was that
extreme. -- Class society is one of the key ideas still in
evidence today as part of social analysis but with some important changes. Marx
referred to the development over time of two major classes -- the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie ( the workers and the owners of the means of production).
Today contemporary Marxists see many groups in society such as ethnic and
gender groups but still maintain some significance to the economic groups in
the realms of economic and political power relationships. -- Marxism as
presented in the mid-19th century by Marx called for societal programs such as
free public education and progressive income tax which are now part of every
contemporary society. -- Marx's most famous phrase, perhaps, was "From
each according to his ability to each according to his need."
While this has been interpreted by some as a strict leveling of incomes and
property in society, most of the history of socialism and contemporary Marxist
thought has relied on what is now called welfare liberalism or social democracy
and the notion of societal responsibility for seeing to "true" equal
opportunity in life's needs such as education, health, protection from
exploitation [labor conditions], political activity [with economic power
minimalized], housing, and the basic nutritional needs of life. -- Marxism
sought a basic change in the social relationships between those who
controlled economic power and those who were simply participants without
claim to the basic economic resources. For some Marxists this meant revolution
and overturning the government in power. For some this meant labor organization
and democratic political power. For some this means worker control of
businesses [ which does take place today in some businesses]. For some this
meant mainly more democracy so that the people could use democratic political
power to redistribute resources in the society [ taking taxes in larger amounts
from the rich than the poor and then providing public education for all is a
form of this redistribution]. -- Marx argued against the right to property
but this was in the sense of a social relationship in which some people
controlled others. This was not meant to be in the sense of not having a home,
savings, etc. The basic idea was to eliminate the possibility of one person or
group having economic control over others. -- Alienation was a
key idea of Marxism speaking to the estrangement of the worker from the
product. In simplest terms it referred to the artisan who no longer had pride
in his work but was simply a part of the great industrial enterprise. Marx saw
this as robbing persons of their identities. ------Marxism is identified
with the political systems of the
maximin rule [JR/JF/97] decide on the worst outcome for each of several alternatives and then choose the alternative whose worst outcome is better than those of the other alternatives – looks like the difference principle but not so and Rawls says that in Theory failed to explain this -- look to a balance of reasons in comparing alternatives --- “The only question is whether, given the highly special, indeed unique, conditions of the original position, the maximin rule is a useful heuristic rule of thumb of the parties to use to organize their deliberations.” – there are 3 conditions which when they obtain it is rational to be guided by the maximin rule – these three positions obtain in the original position thus the two principles would be agreed t rather than the principle of average utility [The conditions and discussion is at JF/98-99] ---[Sheffler in jr/sf/432] Interprets Rawls : the use of maximin is said to be rational when there is no reliable basis for assessing the probabilities of different outcome, when the chooser cares very little for gains above the minimum that could e secured through reliance on maximin, and when the other options have possible consequence that the chooser would fin intolerable. Rawls strategy is to try to establish that the choice between average utility and his two principles satisfies these conditions because (1) the parties have no basis for confidence i the type of probabilistic reasoning that would support a choice of average utility, (2) his two principles would assure the parties of a satisfactory minimum, and (3) the principle of average utility might have consequences that the parties could not accept.
meritocracy See liberal conception of justice for fair meritocracy. Meritocracy generally refers to rewards going to those who deserve them due to superior talent. For example one should gain success in politics on the basis of one's talents and not due to one's birth. Likewise civil servants should be appointed on the basis of merit and not on "connections", "family ties", etc.. Sandel quotes Daniel Bell at MS/73: "A meritocracy is made up of those who have earned their authority....Meritocracy , in the context of my usage, is an emphasis on individual achievement and earned status as confirmed by one's peers....While all men are entitled to respect, they are not all entitled to praise. The meritocracy, in the best meaning of that word, is made up of those worthy of praise."
meta-ethical level [SB/152] "... the clarification of moral and political principles, ... with respect to their logic of justification." See normative level for contrast. –[SB/40] Alasdair MacIntyre has plausibly argued that often the distinction between meta-ethics and substantive ethics is spurious to the degree that a philosophical meta-ethics, including a theory of moral justification, has substantive moral implications.
metaphysical [Noesis] "Branch of philosophy concerned with providing a comprehensive account of the most general features of reality as a whole; the study of being as such. Questions about the existence and nature of minds, bodies, god, space, time, causality, unity, identity, and the world are all metaphysical issues. From Plato onwards, many philosophers have tried to determine what kinds of things (and how many of each) exist. But Kant argued that this task is impossible; he proposed instead that we consider the general structure of our thought about the world. Strawson calls the former activity revisionary, and the latter descriptive, metaphysics." ---[RHC 1984] The dictionary provides a short, useful definition: "the branch of philosophy that treats of first principles or the ultimate nature of existence, reality, and experience, especially as developed in self-contained conceptual systems."---[OED] "That branch of speculative inquiry which treats of the first principles of things, including such concepts as being, substance, essence, time, space, cause, identity, etc.; theoretical philosophy as the ultimate science of Being and Knowing. \" The OED indicates "various inaccurate or extended uses. Used by some followers of positivist, linguistic , or logical philosophy: concepts of an abstract or speculative nature which are not verifiable by logical or linguistic methods. The OED has quotes to illustrates these inaccuracies. --Rawls: [JR/PL/29] There is "no accepted understanding of what a metaphysical doctrine is." e.g., may argue that to say that no metaphysical conception of the person is necessary is already to indicate a metaphysical position -- likewise to consider persons as units of deliberation and responsibility may be said to involve certain metaphysical theses about the nature of persons as moral or political agents" -- Rawls doesn't deny the possibility but argues that "no particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of persons, distinctive and opposed to other metaphysical doctrines, appears among its premises, or seem require by its argument."
mind: [MAC 356] “”This is a point at which it is important to remember that the presupposed conception of mind is not Cartesian. It is rather of mind as activity, of mind as engaging with the natural and social world in such activities as identification, reidentification collecting, separating, classifying, and naming and all this by touching, grasping, pointing, breaking down, building up. Calling to, answering to, and so on. The mind is adequate to its objects insofar as the expectations which it frames on the basis of these activities are not liable to disappointment and the remembers n which it engages in enables it to return to and recover what it had encountered previously, whether the objects themselves are still present or not.
minimal state see night-watchman state
modernism see postmodernism
modus vivendi [JR/JF/192] illustrated by a treaty between two states whose national interests put them at odds thus a treaty that is not advantageous for either state to violate it but both states are already to pursue their goals at the expense of the other should the conditions change --- avoid simply a modus vivendi by having an overlapping consensus by having a political conception that is affirmed by citizens irrespective of the political strength of their comprehensive vie
moral autonomy see autonomy, moral
moral character [JR/LP] p. 25 --- liberal peoples are both reasonable and rational, and their rational conduce, as organized and expressed in their lections and votes, and the laws and policies of their government, is similarly constrained by their sense of what is reasonable thus moral character
moral conception – see conception, moral
moral desert [JR/JF/73] jf “recognizes at least three ideas that in ordinary life are viewed as ides of moral desert.” “First, the idea of moral desert in the strict sense, that is, the moral worth of a person’s character as a whole (and of a person’s several virtues, as given by a comprehensive moral doctrine; as well as the moral worth of particular actions; Second, the idea of legitimate expectations (and its companion idea of entitlements), which is the other side of the principle of fairness (Theory, par. 48); and Third, the idea of deservingness as specified by a scheme of public rules designed to achieve certain purposes.” --- In public life we need to avoid the idea of moral desert and to fin a replacement that belongs to a reasonable political conception.” --- “The idea of a legitimate expectation is suggested as precisely such a replacement: it belongs to a political conception of justice and is framed to apply to that domain.”
moral domain, conception, theory, judgment, point of view See also other references beginning with the word moral. ----[JR/PL/10]Rawls refers to a moral conception as one in which "its content is given by certain ideals, principles and standard; and that these norms articulate certain values, in this case political values." --- [SB/181] Benhabib relates Blum's interpretation of Kohlberg's concept of morality as "impartialism." "Impartialism demands that the moral pint of view articulate impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principle." This is differentiated from a morality of care which is not impartial but is concerned with evaluation of persons, motives and character. Moral domain refers to the phenomena of thoughts, judgments, decisions involving the actions necessary to achieve the good life. What comprises the domain and in which parts of human activity and thinking it is found (e.g., is it in the private realm as compared to the public realm). Benhabib [SB/72] describes Habermas' thought [with which she is not in full agreement] as follows: "It is not that deontology describes a kind of moral theory juxtaposed to a teleological one; for Habermas, deontological judgments about justice and rights claims define the moral domain insofar as we can say anything cognitively meaningful about these phenomena." Benhabib prefers a "weak" deontological interpretation within the communicative ethics which is: "the fairness of moral norms and the integrity of moral values can only be established via a process of practical argumentation which allows its participants full equality in initiating and continuing debate and suggesting new subject matters for conversation. Thus understood, communicative ethics is a theory of moral justification. Justification in ethics should be considered a form of moral argumentation." ---- Benhabib's interpretation of Kohlberg indicates a conception "based upon a strong differentiation between justice and the good life." --[SB/153] Benhabib quoting Kohlberg: "We say that moral judgments or principles have the central function of resolving interpersonal or social conflicts, that is, conflicts or claims or rights...Thus moral judgments and principles imply a notion of equilibrium, or reversibility of claims. [i.e., others will do likewise] In this sense they ultimately involve some reference to justice, at least insofar as they define 'hard' structural states." -- thus relationships of care involving family and friendship are more "personal" than "moral" "'in the sense of the formal point of view.'" "Ancient and medieval moral systems, by contrast, show the following structure: a definition of man-as-he-ought-to-be, a definition of man-as-he-is, and the articulation of a set of rules or precepts that can lead man as he is into what he ought to be. In such moral systems, the rules which govern just relations among the human community are embedded in a more encompassing conception of the good life. This good life, the telos of man, is defined ontologically with reference to man's place in the cosmos."--- Benhabib offers an alternative to Habermas and Kohlberg at [SB/185]: "My thesis is that Habermas as well as Kohlberg conflate the standpoint of a universalist morality with a narrow definition of the moral domain as being centered around 'issues of justice.' These however, are different matters. How we define the domain of the moral is a separate matter than the kinds of justificatory constraints which we think moral judgments, principles and maxims should be subject to . Universalism in moral theory operates at the level of specifying acceptable forms of the justification of moral principles, judgments and maxims. 'Universalism' in morality implies first of a all a commitment to the equal worth and dignity of every human being in virtue of her or his humanity; secondly, the dignity of the other as a moral individual is acknowledged through the respect we show for their needs, interests and points of view in our concrete moral deliberations. Moral respect is manifested in moral deliberations by taking the standpoint of the other, as a generalized and concrete other, into account. Third, universalism implies a commitment to accept as valid intersubjective norms and rules of action as generated by practical discourses, taking place under the constraints specified above."----moral judgments [SB/153] Benhabib quoting Kohlberg: "We say that moral judgments or principles have the central function of resolving interpersonal or social conflicts, that is, conflicts or claims or rights...Thus moral judgments and principles imply a notion of equilibrium, or reversibility of claims. [i.e., others will do likewise] In this sense they ultimately involve some reference to justice, at least insofar as they define 'hard' structural states." –hence justice and the good life are strongly differentiated --- at [SB/154] she describes the Aristotelian-Christian world-view [ancient and medieval moral systems] has having a definition of man-as-he-ought-to-be, and the articulation of a set of rules or precepts that can lead man as he is into what he ought to be. In such moral systems, the rules which govern just relations among the human community are embedded in a more encompassing concept of the good life. This good life, the telos of man, is defined ontologically with reference to man’s place in the cosmos – the ancient and medieval teleological conception of nature was destroyed through the attack of medieval nominalism and modern science, the emergence of capitalist exchange relations and the subsequent division the social structure into the economy, the polity, civil associations and the domestic-intimate sphere thus radically altering moral theory – morality is thus emancipated from cosmology and from an all-encompassing world view that normatively limits man’s relation to nature – justice alone becomes the center of moral theory when bourgeois individuals in a disenchanted universe face the task fo creating the legitimate basis of the social order for themselves – what ought to be is not defined as what all would have rationally to agree to in order to ensure civil peace and prosperity [Hobbes, Locke], or the ought is derived from the rational form of the moral law alone [Rousseau, Kant] As long as the social bases of cooperation and the rights claims of individuals are respected, the autonomous bourgeois subject can define the good life as his mind and conscience dictate --- the conception of privacy is enlarge with the intimate domestic-familial sphere subsumed under it----moral point of view [SB] "The moral point of view corresponds to the development stage of individuals and collectivities who have moved beyond identifying the 'ought' with the 'socially valid,' and thus beyond a 'conventional' understanding of ethical life, to a stance of questioning and hypothetical reasoning." [Benhabib's description is similar to the Platonic emphasis on moving beyond convention and opinion to knowledge of the good, albeit they have different paths indicated on how to achieve this.]-----moral theory This generally refers to theory concerning matters of "the good life." Benhabib [SB/79] referring to the discussion between matters of justice and of morality: "I concur with critics of deontology ... that a strong deontological theory which views justice as the center of morality unnecessarily restricts the domain of moral theory, and distorts the nature of our moral experience. But a universalist and communicative model of ethics need not be so strongly construed. Such a theory can be understood as defending a 'weak' deontology, according to which the argumentative establishment of norms is the central criterion of their validity. Such a theory can also allow moral debate about our conceptions of the good life, thus making them accessible to moral reflection and moral transformation. Of course, this is a far weaker result than may be preferred by a strong teleologist but it remains for such a teleologist to show that under conditions of modernity one can indeed formulate and defend a univocal conception of the human good. So far Habermas is right: under conditions of modernity and subsequent to the differentiation of the value spheres of science, aesthetics, jurisprudence, religion and moral we can no longer formulate an overarching vision of the human good. Indeed, as Alasdair MacIntyre's definition of the good life, namely 'the life spent in seeking the good life for man,' very well reveals, as moderns we have to live with varieties of goodness."
moral doctrine of justice cf political doctrine of justice [JR/PL/xvii] Rawls notes the unrealistic idea of a well ordered society in [TJ] and also justice as fairness presented as comprehensive or partially comprehensive doctrine to be accepted as such regarding the two principles -- problem is that not simply a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines but a pluralism of "incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines" –political liberalism assumes that this pluralism is the normal result of reason within a free constitutional regime thus Rawls argues that instead of justice as fairness based on a comprehensive doctrine for a well-ordered society, justice as fairness presented as a political conception of justice that accounts for competing comprehensive doctrines.
moral ideas, political conceptions [JR/LP] p. 174 Political conceptions of justice are themselves intrinsically moral ideas --- they represent a kind of normative value – a matter of (moral) right and wrong – “We must hold fast to the idea of the political as a fundamental category and covering political conceptions of justice as intrinsic moral values.” – e.g. some see Lincoln’s criticism of slavery, which existed throughout many states were, simply moral criticism, a matter of right and wrong, and certainly not a matter of politics, but Rawls argues political then ceases to be normative and is simply what the people establish
moral individualism [WK/235] Kymlicka's term for "the view that individuals are the basic unit of moral value, so that any moral duties to larger units (e.g. the community) must be derived from our obligations to individuals."
moral liberty: Rousseau's concept of living in accordance with
laws that one prescribes for oneself [Richard Dagger in "
moral neutrality [SB/44] "What is meant by the term 'neutrality' cannot be that universalist ethical theories are indifferent when faced with a way of life based on violence versus one based on parliamentary democracy, or unable to choose between a way of life which defines a woman's place on the basis of scripture versus a way of life which considers women as equal moral being endowed with the right and the capacity to choose and pursue their conceptions of the good. What should be meant by the term 'neutrality' is that the norms embodied i the legal and public institutions of or societies should be so abstract and general as to permit the flourishing of many different ways of life and many different conceptions of the good."
moral person [JR/TJ/561] "a moral person is a subject with ends he has chosen, and his fundamental preference is for conditions that enable him to frame a mode of life that expresses his nature as a free and equal rational being as fully as circumstances permit. Now the unity of the person is manifest in the coherence of his plan, this unity being founded on the higher-order desire to follow, in ways consistent with his sense of right and justice, the principles of rational choice. Of course, a person shapes his aims not all at once but only gradually; but in ways that justice allows, he is able to formulate and to follow a plan of life and thereby to fashion his own unity."
moral personality –[JR/PL/302] two powers of the moral personality: "capacity for a sense of right and justice (the capacity to honor fair s of cooperation and thus to be reasonable), and the capacity for a conception of the good (and thus to be rational). In greater detail, the capacity for a sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and normally to be moved by an effective desire to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice as the fair s of social cooperation. The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue such a conception, that is, a conception of what we regard for us as worthwhile human life. A conception of the good normally consists of a determinate scheme of final ends and aims, and of desires that certain persons and associations, as objects of attachments and loyalties should flourish. Also included in such a conception is a view of our relation to the world --- religious, philosophical, or moral --- by reference to which these ends and attachments are understood."
moral powers [JR/PL/18] "a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good" --- [JR/JF 18-19]“the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation.” and (2) capacity for a conception of the good” it is the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good.” – “In saying that persons are regarded as having the two moral powers, we are saying that they have the requisite capacities not only to engage in mutually beneficial social cooperation over a complete life but also to be moved to honor its fair terms for their own sake.” (these two powers according to Rawls define moral persons and moral personality / TJ par.2-4) [what about the power to love and to care? Feminist theory places heavy emphasis especially on the latter. Is this related to a public conception of justice or should be fitted as part of one or more of the comprehensive doctrines that relate to but don’t define public justice?]
moral realism: "It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true. Moral realism is not a specific substantive view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are true. Still, much of the debate about moral realism revolves around either what it takes for claims to be true or false at all (with some arguing that moral claims do not have what it takes) or what it would take specifically for moral claims to be true (with some arguing that moral claims would require something the world does not provide)."Geoff Sayre-McCord Stanford Ency.moral psychology Scheffler in [JR/SF/435] –discussing Rawls’ idea of moral psychology: his principle embody an idea of reciprocity or mutual benefit, and because reciprocity is the fundamental psychological mechanism implicated i the development of moral motivation, the motives that would lead people to internalize and uphold his principles are psychologically continuous with developmentally more primitive mechanisms of moral motivation. – Rawls is referring to psychological stability, self-respect, and the strains fo commitment t, thus the importance of reciprocity – in a society whose basic structure was regulated by the two principles, allegiance to those principles would, under favorable conditions, develop naturally out of preexisting psychological materials – this is in contrast with utilitarianism which does not embody and idea of reciprocity
moral realism [IEP] "Moral realism is the view that moral
principles have an objective foundation, and are not based on subjective human
convention. There are two main types of moral realism. The first is commonly
associated with Plato and is inspired by the field of mathematics. When we look
at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be timeless
concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in
the universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and humans ca not alter them. Plato
explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that they are
abstract entities that exist in a spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values
also are absolute truths and thus are also abstract, spirit-like entities. In
this sense, for Plato, moral values as spiritual objects. Medieval philosophers
commonly grouped all moral principles together under the heading of
"eternal law" which were also frequently seen as spirit-like objects.
17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as spirit-like
relationships rather than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they
exist in a sprit-like realm.
A second type of moral realism is that moral values are divine commands
issuing from God's will. Sometimes called voluntarism, this view was inspired
by the Judeo-Christian notion of an all-powerful God who is in control of
everything. God simply wills things, and they become reality. He wills the
physical world into existence, he wills human life into existence
and, similarly, he wills all moral values into existence. Proponents of this
view, such as medieval philosopher William of Ockham, believe that God wills
moral principles, such as "murder is wrong," and these exist in God's
mind as commands. God informs humans of these commands by implanting us with moral
intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture.
The opposite view of moral realism is called moral skepticism, which
denies any objective status of moral values. Technically moral skeptics do not
reject moral values themselves. They simply deny that moral values exist as
spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God. Moral skepticism
is closely associated with a position called moral
relativism, which is the view that moral standards are grounded in social
approval. With some moral values, social approval seems to vary from culture to
culture. For example, in Mainland
mother is at risk. Other moral values are more fixed from culture to culture,
such as prohibitions against stealing. Even these, though, are grounded in
social approval insofar as similar social needs give rise to similar moral
rules."
moral skepticism See moral realism.
moral space [NOZ/57] also referred to as moral boundary thus Nozick constantly refers to crossing the boundary of another. "A line (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area in moral space around an individual. Locke holds that this line is determined by an individual's natural rights, which limit the action of others. Non-Lockeans view other considerations as setting the position and contour of the line." Nozick is concerned with whether any actions may be permitted that cross the boundary or are they permitted provided that they compensate the person whose boundary has been crossed.
moral system, conventional and postconventional [SB/42] "By a 'conventional moral system.' I understand one in which as distinction between social acceptance and hypothetical validity has become articulable, even though one possible justification of norms may be that 'they are good and fair because they reflect our way of life, which is superior to those of others.' A s a system of postconventional morality, by contrast, communicative ethics distinguishes among modes of argument leading to hypothetical validity. thus no way of life is prima facie superior to another and the prima facie validity it confers upon certain normative practices cannot be taken for granted if one cannot demonstrate with reason to others who are not members of this way of life and even to skeptics among one's way of life as to why these practices are more just and fair than another."
Münchausen trilemma [HA/18] item 1: an infinite regress, which seems to arise from the necessity to go further and further back in the search for foundations, and which, since it is in practice impossible, affords no secure bases/second item: a logical circle in the deduction, which arises because, in the process of justification, statements are used which were characterized before as Anita foundation, so that they can provide no secure bases and third in: the breaking off of the process at a particular point, which, admittedly, can always be done in principle, but involves an arbitrary suspension of the principle of sufficient justification. Words such as" self-evident" or "based upon immediate knowledge" are often used to indicate the break off of the foundation process
mutual advantage theorists [KM/126] "Mutual advantage theorists also use a contract device, but for opposite reasons [ than Rawls]. For them, there are no natural duties or self-originating moral claims [as is the case with Rawls].' --- "So there is nothing naturally 'right' or 'wrong' about one's actions, even if they involve harming others. However, while there is nothing inherently wrong in harming you, I would be better off by refraining from doing so if every other person refrains from harming me. Adopting a convention against injury is mutually advantageous...."
narrative [CS/23] narrative is a form of meaning making that organizes human experience into meaningful episodes, functioning as a lens through which the apparently independent and disconnected elements of existence are seen as related parts of a whole [uses Donald Polkinghorn’s words here] –at p. 26: narratives need to be told by someone to someone – if not, it is not a narrative
nation [JR/LP] p 25 goes along with Yael Tamir’s view that nation is distinct from the idea of government or state – refers to a pattern of cultural values as comprising the idea of nation
nationalism: Walker Connor in his book Ethnonationalism
provides some help in understanding key terms used often interchangeably as
ethnicity, nationalism, state, nation-state, nation. The following comes from
his text except for some comments in brackets unless otherwise attributed to
another source. It is helpful to have some understanding of differences that
might exist (I use "might" since not all definitions are agreed to in
this area.) (p. 94) "Since the nation is a self-defined rather than an
other-defined grouping, the broadly held conviction concerning the group's
singular origin need not and seldom will accord with factual data." -- The
important fact is how the group identifies itself; thus while anthropologists
may identify Pushtuns (major grouping in
nation state: See nationalism above for extensive discussion of terms such as nation, state, nationalism, ethnicity. Michael Walzer in On Toleration at p. 25 , nation state "means only that a single dominant group organizes the common life in a way that reflects its own history and culture and, if things go as intended, carries the history forward and sustains the culture. It is these intentions that determine the character of public education, the symbols and ceremonies of public life, the state calendar and the holidays it enjoins. Among histories and cultures, the nation-state is not neutral; its political apparatus is an engine for national reproduction. National groups seek statehood precisely in order to control the means of reproduction. Their members may hope for much more....But what justifies their enterprise is their passion for survival over time."
natural duties [MS/110 summarizing Rawls' comments at JR/TJ/114-115] "Natural duties are those moral claims that apply to persons irrespective of their consent, such as the duties to help others in distress, not be cruel, to do justice, and so on. Such duties are 'natural' in the sense that they are not tied to any particular institutions or social arrangements but are owed to persons generally." Rawls [JR/TJ/115] indicates the position of justice here: ""From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice. This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us."
natural law This had taken various forms. It is often
referred to as the law of conscience, the conscience of mankind, the moral
law known to persons through reason as a reflection of universal
humanity (thus crimes against humanity, e.g., Nuremberg trials), self-evident
natural rights of man (John Locke, Declaration of Independence: "we
hold these truths to be self-evident"), the law written on the hearts of
men (Christian Bible). ---It has secular (Aristotle, Stoics,
natural liberty See liberal conception of justice
necessity [RE/163] "the degree of necessity of a good or outcome means, by definition, the extent to which that good or outcome contributes to the subjectively experienced well-being of a given consumer." -- thus Ellis argues one can assign a quantitative measure of "degree of necessity" to various kinds of goods determined by the extent to which workers choose to incur the increased risks necessary to obtain those kinds of goods. --- How to measure? Ellis draws on various empirical studies to relate wealth and risk: "all else being equal, risk averseness is approximately directly proportional to worker 'wealth' or economic well-being, if the latter defined in terms of the workers' total income as discusses above." -- "Studies that use works' assets as the operational definition of 'wealth' find smaller correlations between risk averseness and wealth, but the correlations are still found to be statistically significant." --- [168] a worker's risk averseness increases at least as rapidly as hoes her wealth or economic well-being --- people with less income more willing to spend to widen roads than build parks as compared to people with higher incomes and this is due to degree of necessity
negative freedom see freedom
non-cognitivist: See cognitivist.
neo-Aristotelianism
[SB/24-25] Benhabib distinguishes between 3 strands of
neo-Aristotelianism. (1) "a neo-conservative social diagnosis of the
problems of late-capitalist societies. Such societies are viewed as suffering
form a loss of moral and almost civilizational orientations, caused by
excessive individualism, libertarianism, and the general temerity of liberalism
when faced with the task of establishing fundamental values." "The
basic causes of the current crisis ... [are] political liberalism and moral
pluralism...." (2) the second refers to those who
"lament the decline of moral and political communities in contemporary
societies. But unlike the neoconservatives, the 'communitarian'
neo-Aristotelians are critical of contemporary capitalism and technology. The
recovery of 'community' need not only or even necessarily mean the recovery of
some fundamentalist values scheme; rather communities can be reconstituted by
the reassertion of democratic control over the runaway megastructures of modern
capital and technology. The communitarians share with neoconservatives the belief
that the formalist, ahistorical and individualistic legacies of Enlightenment
thinking have been historically implicated in developments which have led to
the decline of community as a way of life. Particularly today, they argue, this
Enlightenment legacy so constricts our imagination and impoverishes our moral
vocabulary that we cannot even conceptualize solutions to the current crises of
welfare state type democracies which would transcend the
'rights-entitlement-distributive justice' trinity of political
liberalism." (3) The third strand "refers to a hermeneutical
philosophical ethics, taking as its starting point the Aristotelian
understanding of phronesis." Gadamer is the key example here. He
"was the first to turn to Aristotle's model of phronesis as a form of
contextually embedded and situationally sensitive judgment of
particulars." "From Aristotle's critique of Plato, Gadamer extricated
the model of a situationally sensitive practical reason, always functioning
against the background of the shared ethical understanding of a community.
" "From Hegel's critique of Kant, Gadamer borrowed the insight that
all formalism presupposes a context that it abstracts from and that there is
not formal ethics which does not have some material presuppositions concerning
the self and social institutions. Just as there can be no understanding which
is not situated in some historical context, so there can be no 'moral
standpoint' which would not be dependent upon a shared ethos, be it that of the
modern state." -- Summing up, Benhabib says: "These three
strands of a neoconservative social diagnosis, a politics of community and a
philosophical ethics of a historically informed practical reason from the core
elements of the contemporary neo-Aristotelian position." ------ [Wallach,
John. 1992. “Contemporary Neo-Aristotelianism.” Political Theory.
Vol. 20, Issue 4, 613 – 641. Retrieved from EbscoHost,
neoconservative [WK/155] Kymlicka wants to distinguish libertarians from neoconservatives although both emphasize free market practices. "libertarians ... support the liberalization of laws concerning homosexuality, divorce, abortion, etc., and see this as continuous with their defence of the market. Neo-conservatives, on the other hand, ' are mainly interested in restoring traditional values ... strengthening patriotic and family feelings, pursuing a strong nationalist or anti-Communist foreign policy and reinforcing respect for authority', all of which may involve limiting 'disapproved lifestyles' [quoting and citing Brittan]
neoliberalism This is a widely-used term today, referring
mainly to allowing market forces to operate in economics with minimal
intervention from government. A good example is Hayek's ideas:
[BS/82] Friedrich Hayek (mid-20th) [Hayek's brand
of liberalism is a large component of what is referred to as neoliberalism
today.]
1. Human institutions arise out
of tile unplanned interaction of individual human interests. Without firsthand
knowledge of each other and without any necessary agreement about values, the
spontaneous, self-seeking activities of separate individuals create order and
cooperative enterprises.
2. Without imposed authority or
deliberate design, the free market efficiently disperses economic information
about individual preferences and interests. Through the signaling mechanism of
prices, the diverse interests of various individuals are finely coordinated. Competition
drives prices down just as it drives quality and service up.
3. Planned economies fail because
they are unable to artificially duplicate the communication network that is
natural to the flee market. Moreover they are necessarily coercive because they
authoritatively impose certain human ends rather than allowing different ends
to be reconciled through the medium of an open market that serves the general
welfare.
4.
5. The object of government is to
guarantee the unhindered functioning of the market. Politics is a means to
economic freedom, not an end itself. Hence, government's role should be
minimal. It must not interfere with normal market activity--neither by
correcting the outcome of market competition through redistributing income, nor
by pursuing the allegedly collective ends of society.
neutrality, moral See moral neutrality
night-watchman state [NOZ/26] also called minimal state --State is "limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts, and so on...."
nominalism [RHC] "the doctrine that general or abstract words, or universals do not stand for objectively existing entities, and that universals are no more than names assigned to individual physical particulars which alone have objective existence."--[GBM, 144] Richard Rorty describes himself as a nominalist" "those for whom language is a tool rather than a medium, for whom a concept is just the regular use of a mark or noise -- cannot make sense of Hegel's claim that a concept like 'Being' breaks apart, sunders itself, turns into its opposite, etc., nor of Gasche's Derridean claim that 'concepts and discursive totalities are already cracked and fissured by necessary contradictions and heterogeneities.'" "Nominalists see language as just human being using marks and noises to get what they want." --This applies, for example, to wants for food, sex, understanding the origin of the universe, establishing a private autonomous philosophical language, and to enhance our sense of human solidarity. [GBM, 149] John Caputo refers to the traditional view of language as "a 'medium,' either of representation, as in the realist correspondence theory of truth, or of expressions, as in the more romanticized idealist theories that language is the way Spirit, Thought, History, or Being comes into words and so comes to be as Spirit, History, or Being. " Rorty wants to kick this habit of seeing language as medium and sees it is simply as a tool" by means of which we make our way around the world."
non-foundationalist [JR/JF/31] “the idea of justification paired with full reflective equilibrium is nonfoundationalist in this way: no specified kind of considered judgment of political justice or particular level of generality is thought to carry the whole weight of public justification. Considered judgments of all kinds and levels may have an intrinsic reasonableness, or acceptability, reasonable persons that persist after due reflection The most reasonable political conception for us is the one that best fits all our considered convictions on reflection ad organizes them into a coherent view. At any given time, we cannot do better than that.”
nonutilitarian consequentialism This is the basic idea presented by Ellis [RE/127] -- "a type of consequentialism that measures value in terms of use value rather than exchange value." -- See above "diminishing marginal utility" for use value significance --- [128] "If the person who ought to have a certain good to a lesser extent has it, whereas someone who ought to have it to a grater extent does not have it, it follows that goods are (prima facie) not distributed as they ought to be distributed. In this sense, we can say that nonutilitarian consequentialist distributive 'justice' is the condition in which all goods are had by those who ought to have them -- which essentially implies an allocation of resources in favor of those for whom the resources would e used to supply the most 'necessary' goods possible, and thus an allocation essentially favoring the least advantages, just as Rawls would require...." This nonutilitarian consequentialism would also be similar to Rawl's system in that deviations from the distribution of goods in proportion to people's needs (i.e., use for the goods) would be justified if such deviations led to an increase in the total quantity of use value (in contrast to exchange value) and if this additional use value could in turn be distributed 'fairly' according to the same criteria, that is, if the additional goods so produced can be distributed so as to increase the among of use value available to people generally accordingly to the just distributing system as defined above." -- the system calls for maximizing overall value but , unlike utilitarianism, it is not simply overall value increase that is the goal but the increase in use value which then leads to distributive justice since use value indicates value increases for those for whom goods have the most value and these would be those with fewer amounts of the goods ( e.g., a $100 tax refund for someone making $10,000 a year has more use value in the sense of the significance of what can now be obtained over what previously could be purchased [perhaps a drug that is necessary but financially out of reach without the additional $100] than the $100 has for someone making $100,000 a year for whom the $100 will make no really significant increase in what could be obtained now compared to before.
normative sociology [NOZ/247] "the study of what the causes of the problems ought to be...." "We want one bad thing to be caused by another. "If X is bad, and Y which is also bad can be tied to X via a plausible story, it is very hard to resist the conclusion that one causes the other."
normative level , substantive [SB/152] Benhabib uses to refer to the concrete content of moral and political principles. See meta-ethical for contrast
nous: Greek word. [MAC, 91] Nous , that is to say, is the
exercise of a capacity for understanding what the conclusion is of a
nondemonstrative mode of argument or enquiry.”
object-dependent desires [JR/PL/82] "here the object of desire, or the state of affairs that fulfills it, can be described without the use of any moral conceptions, or rational principles." -- e.g., food and drink, status, power, glory, property, wealth
objectivism It's good to compare objectivism, subjectivism and an emphasis on economic or other social and natural contexts in approaching reality. E.g., [DHCT/190] "Marx's historical materialism entails a rejection of objectivism and subjectivism. For him social reality is neither something wholly 'outside the subject' [objectivism] nor is it simply a creation of human thought [subjectivism]. Rather reality is conceived as formed and constructed through practice and labour."
objectivity [JB]"Such a dual perspective provides a more modest conception of objectivity: it is neither transperspectival objectivity nor a theoretical metaperspective, but always operates across the range of possible practical perspectives that knowledgeable and reflective social agents are capable of taking up and employing practically in their social activity. It is achieved in various combinations of available explanations and interpretive stances. With respect to diverse social phenomena at many different levels, critical social inquiry has employed various explanations and explanatory strategies. Marx's historical social theory permitted him to relate functional explanations of the instability of profit-maximizing capitalism to the first-person experiences of workers. In detailed historical analyses, feminist and ethnomethodological studies of the history of science have been able to show the contingency of normative practices (Epstein 1996; Longino 1990). They have also adopted various interpretive stances. Feminists have shown how supposedly neutral or impartial norms have built-in biases that limit their putatively universal character with respect to race, gender, and disability (Mills 1997; Minnow 1990, Young 2002). In all these cases, claims to scientific objectivity or moral neutrality are exposed by showing how they fail to pass the test of public verification by showing how the contours of their experiences do not fit the self-understanding of institutional standards of justice (Mills 1997; Mansbridge 1991). Such criticism requires holding both one's own experience and the normative self-understanding of the tradition or institution together at the same time, in order to expose bias or cognitive dissonance. It uses expressions of vivid first-person experiences to bring about cross-perspectival insights in actors who could not otherwise see the limits of their cognitive and communicative activities." ----[JB] "In these cases, why is it so important to cross perspectives? Here the second-person perspective has a special and self-reflexive status for criticism. Consider the act of crossing from the first-person plural or “we perspective” to the second-person perspective in two reflexive practices: science and democracy. In the case of science the community of experts operates according to the norm of objectivity, the purpose of which is to guide scientific inquiry and justify its claims to communal epistemic authority. The biases inherent in these operative norms have been unmasked in various critical science studies and by many social movements. For Longino, such criticism suggests the need for a better norm of objectivity, “measured against the cognitive needs of a genuinely democratic community” (Longino 1990, 236). This connection can be quite direct, as when empirical studies show that existing forms of participation are highly correlated with high status and income, that lower income and status citizens were often unwilling to participate in a public forum for fear of public humiliation (Verba, et al 1995, Mansbridge 1991, Kelly 2000). Adopting the second-person perspective of those who cannot effectively participate does not simply unmask egalitarian or meritocratic claims about political participation, but rather also suggests why critical inquiry ought to seek new forums and modes of public expression (Young 2002, Bohman 1996)."
obligation obligation may be seen as a sense of obligation
or as an obligation itself which is different -- this distinction allows
for a seen of obligation that is distinct from the obligations imposed by
community, hence his argument against Sandel, who, he argues doesn't make the
distinction [Richard Dagger in "
Occam's Razor [MetaP] "The simplest definition of Occam's
Razor is "Don't make unnecessarily complicated
assumptions". It can be used as a philosophical way of sorting the simple
theories from the complicated ones. When scientists select theories, they don't
just use the criterion of agreement or disagreement with observations. They
also have aesthetic principles, and a desire for an elegant, universal theory.
They use these aesthetic principles to remove the cloud of trivially
competing theories that necessarily surround every theory. Occam's razor is a
working rule of thumb, not the ultimate answer."
ontogeny [SB/192] individual development ---[DHCT/279] "Habermas sees a number of stages of development: the ‘symbiotic’ (where there are no clear indications of a demarcation of subjectivity); the ‘egocentric’ (subject and object are differentiated but judgments are linked to a ‘body-bound perspective’); the ‘sociocentric-objectivistic’ (clear differentiation of the environment into physical and social domains, awareness of the ‘perspectival character of one’s own standpoint’), and the ‘universalistic stage’ (subject can become free of the ‘dogmatism of the given and existing’. systems of ego demarcation become reflective)." – [Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg are key writers in this area.] – [DHCT/280] Held quotes Kohlberg on stages of consciousness: "At the preconventional stage, at which actions, motives, and acting subjects are still perceived on a single plane of reality, only the consequences of action are evaluated in cases of conflict. At the conventional stage motives can be assessed independently of concrete action consequences ; conformity with certain social role or with an existing system of norms is the standard. At the postconventional stage, these systems of norms lose their quasi-natural validity; they require justification from universalistic points of view."
Ontological/ontoplitical [WC/1] Connolly indicates that ontology is the study of the fundamental logic of reality apart from appearances. These terminations are both too restrictive and too radical for what he has in mind. For example he indicates that the logos in ontology already suggests a fundamental logic, principal, or design of being. But it can and has been urged that the most fundamental thing about being is that it contains no such overriding design. He prefers to call the phenomenon "Ontopolitical interpretation" which he says may come closer, than Onto, because every political interpretation invokes a set of fundaments about necessities and possibilities of human being, about, for instance, the forms into which humans may be composed and the possible relations humans can establish with nature. To say either that something is fundamental or that nothing is fundamental, then, is to engage in political interpretation. Hence, every interpretation of political events, no matter how deeply it is sunk in a specific historical context or how high the pile of data upon which it sits, contains an ontopolitical dimension
orexis: Greek word. [MAC, 126] appetite – Aristotle distinguished two species, that which is a rational wish (boulesis) and that which is not
organizational principle of a society [DHCT/272] refers to Habermas’s view that "the organizational principle of a society determines ‘ranges of possibility’ within which: productive forces can be utilized; new productive forces can be developed and system complexity can be heightened." – "By organizational principle of society Habermas understands those innovations which institutionalize levels of societal learning. "
original position [JR/JF/14-18] “jf adopts the idea that “the fair terms of social cooperation are to be given by an agreement entered into by those engaged in it.” – must specify a point of view from which a fair agreement between free and equal persons can be reached; but this point of view must be removed from and not distorted y the particular features and circumstances of the existing basic structure.” – parties not allowed to know the social positions or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent – don’t know persons’ racial or ethnic groups, gender or various native endowments such as strength and intelligence thus behind a veil of ignorance ---[80-81] original position “models what we regard – here and now – as fair conditions under which the representatives of citizens, viewed solely as free and equal persons, are to agree to the fair terms of social cooperation (as expressed by principles of justice) whereby the basic structure is to be regulated.” --- “models what we regard – here and now – as acceptable restrictions on the reasons on the basis of which the parties (as citizens’ representatives, situated in those fairer conditions, may properly put forward certain principles of justice and reject others.” --- “it provides a way to keep track of our assumptions.” --- “also brings out the combined force of our assumptions by uniting them into one surveyable idea that enables us to see their implications amore easily.” ---[JR/JF/83] –“the parties are artificial persons, merely inhabitants of or device of representation: they are characters who have a part in the play of our thought-experiment.” --- [JR/JF/86] Rawls indicates that “the argument from the original position could be presented formally. I use the idea of the original position as a natural and vivid way to convey the kind of reasoning the parties may engage in.” --- not a real assembly but we can enter it at any time “by reasoning in accordance with the modeled constraints, citing only reason those constraints allow.”--- [JR/JF/88-89] In original position assume persons not guided by envy, adversity to high risk, desire for power but if it turns out that citizens regulated by the basic structure do end up being guided by such motivations than must reconsider the principles since society is unstable and well-develop society arrives at definition of justice that produces stability
ought implies can This is an oft-stated idea that holds that [RE/66] "it is meaningless and absurd to prescribe that people should do what they cannot do by virtue of the constitutions of their essential psychology" --- Ellis challenges this with the argument that it is entirely possible for people to value justice, honest, courage, etc. even though difficult to completely fulfill these oughts. Thus no reason why these should not be counted as morally "desirable." Thus happiness is not the only value. Ellis uses this argument re: his challenge to utilitarian ideas as presented by Bentham and Mill.
outlaw states see states, outlaw
overlapping consensus [JR/JF/29] “a public basis of justification that all citizens as reasonable and rational can endorse from within their own comprehensive doctrines. If this is achieved, we have an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines…, and with it, the political conception affirmed in reflective equilibrium.” – this can be achieved since jf [at 33] has the following three features: “Its requirements are limited to society’s basic structure, its acceptance presupposes no particular comprehensive view, and its fundamental ideas are familiar and drawn form the public political culture.” – more than a modus vivendi [JR/JF/184 “ a consensus in which the same political conception is endorsed by the opposing reasonable comprehensive doctrines that gain a significant body of adherents and endure form one generation to the next.” – idea of an overlapping consensus not used in Theory – in Theory never discussed whether justice as fairness is meant as a comprehensive moral doctrine or as a political conception of justice – reader might reasonably conclude is set out as part of a comprehensive view – the focus now on the political conception of justice as fairness “corrects the view in Theory, which fails to allow for the condition of pluralism to which its own principles lead.”
passions: Akratic: Greek word. [MAC, 128] re: Aristotle --- passions not yet under a person’s rational control, because in one way or another his knowledge of what is good is not brought to bear on them (Plato) – not vicious since simply is a lack of knowledge to do right thing – the enkratic person “does what the rational and virtuous person does, but his motivations are not the same as those of the fully virtuous. It is in spite of his passions, at least to some degree, that he does what he does in judging and acting rightly, although his character is sufficiently formed to issue in prohairesis, rational desire.”
patriotism [JR/LP] p. 111-112 “A proper patriotism is an attachment to one’s people and country, and a willingness to defend its legitimate claims while fully respecting the legitimate claims of other peoples.“
peoples, decent [JR/LP] p. 60 calls the following liberal society a decent people: a liberal society is to respect its citizens’ comprehensive doctrines – religious, philosophical, and moral – provide that these doctrines are pursued in ways compatible with a reasonable political conception of justice and its public reason
peoples, liberal [JR/LP] p. 29 they seek to protect their territory, to insure their free political institutons and liberties and free culture of their civil society – tries to assure reasonable justice for all its citizens and for all peoples – a liberal people can live with other peoples of like character in upholding justice and preserving peace – p. 35: What distinguishes peoples from states – and this is crucial – is that just peoples are fully prepared to grant the very same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals. – may still accept some inequalities in various cooperative institutions such as the UN
perfect procedural justice See procedural justice
perfectionism [MetaP] This is not just a theory about politics: it is a substantive, perfectionist, moral theory about the good. And, on this view, the right thing to do is to promote development, and only a regime securing each individual extensive liberty can accomplish this. This moral ideal of human perfection and development dominated liberal thinking in the latter part of the nineteenth, and foremost of the twentieth, century: not only Mill, but T.H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse, Bernard Bosanquet, John Dewey and even John Rawls [who , however, says his political liberalism is not a perfectionist comprehensive doctrine] show allegiance to variants of this perfectionist ethic and the claim that it provides the foundation for a regime of liberal rights. [MS/xi] Sandel uses Aristotle as the classical example of perfectionist, asserting that when rights are based "on the moral importance of the purposes or ends rights promote, [this way of tying justice t conceptions of the good] ...t is better described as teleological, or ( in the jargon of contemporary philosophy) [parentheses are Sandel's] perfectionist.
Perfectionism Aristotelian heritage Christman perfectionism generally refers to the view that human life can be appraised in terms of certain excellences, progress toward which marks greater comparative value of a particular life. Such views come in a variety of forms and commonly follow Aristotle in thinking that the essential characteristics of humans – their rationality or capacity of practical wisdom for example – carry with them standards of flourishing (virtues) that could, in principle be used to evaluate a given human life. Extending the view to social and political relations would imply that social institutions should be constructed to promote humans’ development of those virtues. (104 --- need not accept teleological metaphysics of Aristotle but simply the more modes view that human beings were structured in such a way that certain traits or capacities happen to be basic to their leading good lives. Such views rest on a conception of human nature, either expressed as a structural account of the essence of human existence, thought, and actions (104 – citing Hurka and Nussbaum) or as a generalization of what virtually all human pursue virtually all the time (citing Sher) – some of these theories are self-consciously LIBERAL in including autonomy as one of its elements (citing Raz, Wall) ---However, what marks off a perfectionism doctrine usually is that the specification of the good for human beings , according to which flourishing or excellence can be measured, is meant to be valid independent of human desires for, and judgments of , that good. --- cf liberals and value commitments are valid for a person only if that person autonomously embraces that value for herself --- only if the person rationally and reflectively identifies with the value being promoted (health, happiness, or prosperity, etc) could such a value apply to her life in the first place – thus autonomous accepted --- perfectionists counter by claiming that such a conception of value is controversial (citing Hurka, Sher, Sumner, Griffin) and question claim that pursuits must be rationally endorsed by the person in order for them to have value or that such non-autonomous values will always get less weight than some reflectively endorsed pursuit, e.g. would choosing to count blades of grass as one’s life ambition have more value than being induced, non-autonomously to enlighten oneself by the great artworks of the world? --- the positive view of perfectionism is that is advances the view about the human good and a parallel argument that a state’s politics should be guided by the aim of advancing that good for its citizens --- does this mean coercion? NO, nothing intrinsic to this that indicates coercion [in fact, Aristotle does not seem to include this at all] – in fact, coercion could be counterproductive , e.g. forcing religious views on someone --- the values in question are expected to emerge out of the particular history and mode of social life peculiar to that collectivity but on the other hand the perfectionist doctrine can put forward values and ideal that are allegedly valid for any culture or community --- Christman argues that a perfectionist view about values coming out of the community must include the free, open, and tolerant social practices of the sort liberalism demands, thus overriding the neutrality that liberal theory requires. ---the challenge for perfectionism is to produce a set of objective values that are described specifically enough to determine particular social policies – but it is notoriously difficult to specify a view of human nature that does not already have value assumptions buried in the account, value assumptions that are controversial from some reasonable point of view, e.g.. artists who pursued physically destructive life styles to perfect their art (although question is open as to whether they could have been as creative – and perhaps more—if they had not led such physically destructive lives) -- but such persons would object to the state imposing such perfectionist values [smoking and laws against it? drugs? ] ---of course, this could be merely a matter of priorities re accepted values but then the individual must decide herself, a right protected by liberalism --- in addition the inference from statements concerning the essence of human beings to conclusions about objective values faces the age-old difficulty of supporting value claims with descriptive premises – we might reject the Humean perspective that statements of fact and statements of value can always be logically separated and that no inference from one to the other is possible – nevertheless, any particular inference from descriptions of basic human organism structure to conclusions about objective human values of the nature of human flourishing are always vulnerable to the objection that the account of human nature used as the premise in the argument contains values assumptions of the very sort they are meant to support, namely , specific accounts of the human good (cites Hurka) – one challenge raised by the perfectionist positions is that if individual citizens order their own lives in terms of what they take to be objective values, and base their allegiance to political authority on those values, then why must the organs of the state restrict the justification of policies to considerations that make no mention of such justification of policies to considerations that make no mentions of such values.? In other words why must the state be barred from referring to objective values in its justification of policies when its citizens refer precisely to such values in their own reason for following those policies?
perfectionism utilitarianism Christman util. as perfectionism in disguise? – rests on a contentious conception of what is good in life, i.e., their own happiness as cf to the happiness of others – aims at individual well-being when many are tied into the collective well-being of their family or others – not just personal values and pleasures but impersonal values, i.e., worthwhile pursuits outside of ourselves
performativity See society and Benhabib
person –this refers also to the various ideas of “the
self” which are critical to the direction one takes in political
philosphy[JR/PL/18] [See also person, liberal conception and person,
political conception and moral person -- also see ontogeny
for stages in personal development] [See also society, community and
transcendence which are relevant to the debate on the source of values and the
interrelationship between individuals and other persons --- See also “love” above and Schrag’s
comments]-----Glenn Tinder refers to “essence”: person essence: [GT/26ff] Tinder’s discussion of
“essence” is to ask what is basic to the “self” or the
“person”. It is to seek that which distinguishes us from dogs,
horses, mountains, trees, etc. It is to ask if there is a
“universal” distinction as “humans” which then leads
also to the question as to whether there is a universal essence for all humans
that means some basic universal elements found in everyone’s most basic
“self”. --- Hobbes and universal essence is that all have “a
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in
death.” ----In ancient world person
"understood, in both philosophy and law, as the concept of someone who can
take part in, or who can play a role in, social life, and hence exercise and
respect its various rights and duties." Rawls adds the phrase
"complete life" "because society is viewed …as a more or
less complete and self-sufficient scheme of cooperation, making room within
itself for all the necessities and activities of life, from birth until death.
A society is also conceived as existing in perpetuity: it reproduces itself and
its institutions and culture over generations and there is no time at which it
is expected to wind up its affairs. Since we start with democratic thought, we
also think of citizens as free and equal persons. The basic ideas is
that in virtue of their two moral powers ( a capacity for a sense of justice
and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgment,
thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. Their
having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating
members of society makes persons equal." [p. xlv] In moral philosophy
person viewed as capable of exercising moral rights and fulfilling moral duties
but in political liberalism the person is seen as a free and equal citizen, the
political person of a modern democracy with the political rights and duties of
citizenship and standing in a political relation with other citizens -- the
citizen is a moral agent since a political conception of justice is a
moral conception but the kinds of rights and duties and the values considered
are more limited. -- Immanuel Kant's reference to rational beings seems
appropriate here also: [KMM/185] "Rational nature is distinguished from
the rest of nature by setting itself an end. This end would be the content of
every good will." -- Given this emphasis he then went on to set forth one
of his most important principles: "So act toward every rational being
(yourself and others), that he may for you always be an end in
himself...." -- at p. 197: "A rational being must regard
himself as an intelligence (not from the viewpoint of his lower faculties)
belonging, not to the world of sense, but to that of the intellect."
---[MS/6] Sandel paraphrases and quotes Kant with regard to
"subject": "[Kant's] answer is that the basis of the
moral law is to be found in the subject, not the object of practical reason, a
subject capable of an autonomous will. No empirical end but rather 'a subject
of ends, namely a rational being himself, must be made the ground for all
maxims of action' ...." Further illustration at MS/7 is Kant's
epistemology and the person perceived as "a subject made up,
as it is of mere appearances he must suppose there to be something else which
is its ground -- namely his Ego as this may be constituted in itself...."
This something further, which we cannot know empirically but must none the less
presuppose as the condition of knowing anything at all, is the subject itself.
The subject is something 'back there', [here one sees the transcendental
aspect] antecedent to any particular experience, that unifies our diverse
perceptions and holds them together in a single consciousness. It provides the
principle of unity without which our self-perceptions would be nothing more
than a stream of disconnected and everchanging representations, the perceptions
of no one."--Quoting Fried at MS/10: More important than any choice, the
value of personhood "is the presupposition and substrate of the
very concept of choice." Sandel points out the general sociological
conception of person [not Sandel's particular notion] in the context
of the discussion of Rawls, Kant, etc. and deontological notions of
right and good.: "The vaunted independence of the deontological
subject is a liberal illusion. It misunderstands the fundamentally 'social'
nature of man, the fact that we are conditioned beings 'all the way down'.
There is not point of exemption, no transcendental subject capable of standing
outside society or outside experience. Sandel also indicates at MS/20
notions of the self as a "concatenation of various contingent
desires, wants, and ends" with no clear unity or as a subject
independent of its contingent wants and aims. He refers to these positions as
the radically situated subject [fully conditioned by various desires,
etc.] and the radically disembodied subject [no desires, etc.]. Sandel
at MS/92 indicates the distinction between the ancients who assumed that man is
by nature a being who discovers his ends rather than as the
deontologists conceive him as a being who chooses his ends.-- [MS/54-55]
Sandel in describing Rawls' idea of the person distinguishes
between the self as subject which possesses motivations and the self which is a
subject made up of motivations, interests, desires. For Rawls the self
is one that possesses motivations, etc. and is not a subject
"of" interests, etc., that is, is not constituted of these interests,
motivations, etc. -- referring to Rawl's notions of self, Sandel
summarizes: "To be a deontological self, I must be a subject
whose identity is given independently of the things I have, independently, that
is , of my interests and ends, and my relations with others. Combined with the
idea of possession, this notion of individuation powerfully completes Rawls'
theory of the person. " [NOZ] Nozick indicates various traits
for "a being" when referring to human beings that
include: rationality, free will, and moral agency thus "a being able to
formulate long-term plans for its life, able to consider and decide on the
basis of abstract principles or considerations it formulate to itself and hence
not merely the plaything of immediate stimuli, a being that limits its
own behavior in accordance with some principles or picture it has of what
an appropriate life is for itself and others, and so on."
Additionally is "the ability to regulate and guide its life in
accordance with some overall conception it chooses to accept. Such an overall
conception, and knowing how we are doing in terms of it, is important to the
kind of goals we formulate for ourselves and the kind of beings we
are."-----Benhabib [SB] refers to the conception of the
person as one who embodies various attributes; thus instead of perceiving of
the person as an abstract, generalized "person", the person is
conceived as a being with feelings, interests, values and other attributes .
The "embedded" aspect refers to the embedding of the various socializing
influences around the person and the embedding of various attributes of the
specific person as compared to a generalized concept. Benhabib uses
these terms extensively along with the "generalized other",
and the "concrete other." The generalized other is the
abstract, unified, generic concept of the other as compared to the concrete
other which refers to the specific attributes of particular persons and seeks
to build discourse, truth seeking, moral decisions, etc. around this concept of
the concrete other rather than the generalized other. [SB/10]Specifically:
"According to the standpoint of the 'generalized other' [Kant, Rawls
in her analysis], each individual is a moral person endowed with the same moral
rights as ourselves; this moral person is also a reasoning and acting being,
capable of a sense of justice, of formulating a vision of the good, and
of engaging in activity to pursue the latter. The standpoint of the 'concrete
other,' by contrast, enjoins us to view every moral person as a unique
individual, with a certain life history, disposition and endowment, as well as
needs and limitations." -- The generalized other is reflected in
the liberal tradition of a democratic polity through recognition of civil,
legal and political rights , all of which are to great persons equally within
the framework of the law. The concrete other is involved in those
ethical relations "in which we are always immersed in the
lifeworld."--"To stand in such an ethical relationship means that we
as concrete individuals know what is expected of us in virtue of the kind of
social bonds which tie us to the other." ---[SB/197] Benhabib
quotes Young's description of the "empathetic, connected self"
which "presupposes a state 'in which persons will cease to be opaque, other,
not understood, and instead become fused, mutually sympathetic, understanding
one another as they understand themselves. Such an ideal of shared
subjectivity, or the transparency of subjects to one another, denies difference
in the sense of the basic asymmetry of subjects.'"--[SB/198] Benhabib:
"The objection that the self, views as a unified center of desire,
is a fiction again overstates the issues. Young seems to celebrate
heterogeneity, opacity and difference at the cost of belittling the importance
of a coherent core of individual identity. Not all difference is empowering,
not all heterogeneity can be celebrated; not all opacity leads to a sense of
self-flourishing. We do not have to think of 'coherent identities' along the
lines of the sameness of physical objects. We can think of coherence as a
narrative unity. What makes a story unitary can be the point of view of the one
who tells it, the point of view of the one who listens to it, or some
interaction between the meaning conveyed and the meaning received. Personal
identity is no different. As Hannah Arendt has emphasized, from the time of
our birth we are immersed in a 'web of narratives,' of which we are both the
author and the object. The self is both the teller of tales and that
about whom tales are told. The individual with a coherent sense of
self-identity is the one who succeeds in integrating these tales and
perspectives into a meaningful life history. When the story of life can only be
told from the perspective of the others, then the self is a victim and sufferer
who has lost control over her existence. When the story of life can only be
told from the standpoint of the individual, then such a self is a
narcissist and a loner who may have attained autonomy without solidarity. A coherent
sense of self is attained with the successful integration of autonomy and
solidarity, or with the right mix of justice and care. Justice and autonomy
alone cannot sustain and nourish that web of narratives in which human beings' sense
of selfhood unfolds; but solidarity and care alone cannot raise the self to
the level not only of being the subject but also the author of a
coherent life-story." ---[SB/214] Benhabib refers to the Death of
Man thesis with a "weak version" of it and a "strong
version" of it: "The weak version ... would situate the
subject in the context of various social, linguistic and discursive
practices." "The traditional attributes of the philosophical
subject of the West, like self-reflexivity, the capacity for acting on
principles, rational accountability for one's actions, and the ability to
project a life-plan into the future, in short, some form of autonomy and
rationality, could then be reformulated by taking account of the radical
situatedness of the subject." The strong version of the thesis ...
is perhaps best captured in Flax's own phrase that 'Man is forever caught
in the web of fictive meaning, in chains of signification, in which the
subject is merely another position on language." The subject thus
dissolves into the chain of significations of which it was supposed to be the
initiator. Along with the dissolution of the subject into yet 'another position
in language' disappear of course concepts of intentionality, accountability,
self-reflexivity and autonomy. The subject is that is but another position in
language can no longer master and create that distance between itself and the
chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can reflect upon
them and creatively alter them."-- At [SB/217] Benhabib refers to
the social self when referring to the cultural codes which are
socialized into a person thus defining one in terms of culturally diverse
codes, thus social individuals. In this context she discusses the competence to
become a linguistic being, meaning "how a human infant can become
the speaker of an infinitely meaningful number of sentences in a given natural
language." ---[RP/88] Plants refers to the situated self idea
"in which the self is socially constituted and the reason for actions
available to the self are those which are available as the common stock in the
community." ---[LT/83-84] Thiel describes the postmodernists'
perspective: Postmodernists deny any single, uniform human nature.
There is no essence to humanity. "Identities are complex patterns of norms
and desires, modes of thinking and behaving, that are formed over time owing to
the integration of individuals within dense social networks." Thiel quotes
Jean Baudrillard's extreme structuralism : "[we] " are now wholly
enslaved to commodities and images." - Other postmodernists,
according to Thiel, "argue that our identities remain the object of fairy
constant contestation. Power and resistance, Foucault insists, always go hand
in hand." ---Richard Dagger sees a concept of the abstract self which
is a general sense of the self, always a part but never the whole of the
particular self I or anyone else has and the concrete self which is a self
distinct from everyone else's. Self-knowledge, self-identity, and
self-reflection are part of the concrete selves. This distinction is critical
to Dagger's differentiation between Rawls' and Sandel's argument since he sees
Rawls' comment on the self as prior to its sends as referring to the abstract
self which allows room for conceiving also of the self as concrete and thus
influenced by its environment. He argues that Sandel conflates the two thus
criticizing Rawls for not recognizing the impact of community on the self. [
Richard Dagger in "
person, liberal conception of [JR/PL/370] "This conception of the person can be said to be liberal (In the sense of the philosophical doctrine) because it takes the capacity for social cooperation as fundamental and attributes to persons the two moral powers [a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good] which make such cooperation possible. These powers specify the basis of equality. Thus citizens are regarded as having a certain natural political virtues without which the hopes for a regime of liberty may be unrealistic. Moreover, persons are assumed to have different and incommensurable conceptions of the good so that the unity of social cooperation rests on a public conception of justice which secures the basic liberties. Yet despite this plurality of conceptions of the good, the notion of society as a social union of social unions shows how it is possible to coordinate the benefits of human diversity into a more comprehensive good." [MS/10-11] Sandel describes the liberal conception of the person as having specific traits if justice is to be primary: [Note the links between "person", "subject" and "agent". ]"We must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. In particular we must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, conditioned to be sure, but part of us always antecedent to any conditions [i.e., not determined by social conditions, etc.]. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the purposes we pursue. Deontological liberalism supposes that we can, indeed must, understand ourselves as independent in this sense." See also person for various perspectives.
person, political conception [JR/PL/30] to consider how person are seen as political conception need to look at how citizens are represented as free persons. First, they are "free in that they conceive of themselves and of one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good." They are viewed as "capable of revising and changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds." This includes the noninstitutional or moral identity since citizens "usually have both political and nonpolitical aims and commitments." The political and nonpolitical give moral identity and shape to a person's life. One can have a conversion of nonpolitical identity without changing political identity, i.e., conception of oneself. A second view on being free is citizens regarding "themselves as being entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their conceptions of the good (provided these conceptions fall within the range permitted by the public conception of justice.). Rawls calls this "self-authenticating sources of valid claims" and contrasts it with social hierarchical arrangements (e.g., religious, aristocratic) in which people not viewed as such. Third view is that citizens "are viewed as capable of taking responsibility for their ends and this affects how their various claims are assessed." "…citizens are thought to be capable of adjusting their aims and aspirations in the light of what they can reasonable expect to provide for. (note Rawls qualifiers of "given just background institutions and given for each person a fair index of primary goods [as required by the principles of justice]"). See also person for various perspectives.
personality, moral see moral personality
perspectivism [LT/83] originally proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900): "Nietzsche maintained that 'objectivity' as traditionally conceived was a 'nonsensical absurdity.' He denied that there was 'knowledge in itself' that did not bear the marks of the situated individuals who created it. Only interpretation from particular points of view exists. Nietzsche insists that 'there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing'." --- This relates to later postmodern thought. See postmodernism.---- [MAC 352] “The relativist challenge rests upon a denial that rational debate between and rational choice among rival traditions is possible; the perspectivist challenge puts in question the possibility of making truth-claims from within any one tradition.”
phenomenalism [DHCT/301 ""crudely, the doctrine that phenomena – the immediately perceived – are the only objects of science"
philosophy A general definition of philosophy often runs along the lines of Webster's short dictionary definition (2nd ed.): "love of, or search for wisdom" -- "theory or logical analysis of the principles underlying conduct, thought, knowledge, and the nature of the universe" -- "the general principles or laws of a field of knowledge, activity, etc. -- " a particular system of principles for the conduct of life" --[SB/224] Benhabib illustrates how some present thinking challenges the very nature of philosophy itself from the post-modern perspective: "this is the view that philosophy is a metadiscourse of legitimation, articulating the criteria of validity presupposed by