Copyrighted material. For private use only.
MOSCOW, February 15 (Itar-Tass) - The ruling of the Ostankino Municipal Court of Moscow on recognizing as invalid the registration of the Hubbard Humanitarian Centre, a regional public organisation, came into force on Monday, a spokesman for the press service of the Moscow prosecutor's office told Tass.
The Moscow prosecutor lodged a corresponding claim last autumn. It was satisfied on October 6, but came into force only on February 14, after the court collegium on civil cases passed a resolution on it.
The press service spokesman said as well that a preliminary investigation on the case of the leader of a regional branch of the Habbard Centre under Article 171 of the Russian Criminal Code (illegal business activities) had been completed by the prosecutor's office of the North-Eastern Administrative District of Moscow and would be referred to court.
The Hubbard Centre was officially registered in Russian by the Scientological Church. It was actually a sectarian centre. In the opinion of Alexander Dvorkin, who handles the problem of religious sects at the Moscow Patriarchate, "this is a very dangerous sect. In Germany it was put under the control of the secret police. It is believed there that the Hubbard Centre is not a religious, but a commercial organisation, which is after power and money. In Greece it was outlawed early in 1998."
The organisation was named after Lafayette Ron Hubbard, American science fiction writer, who suffered from persecution mania and declared a war on what he described as "the world conspiracy of psychiatrists." He maintained, for example, that the massive extermination of Jews during the Second World War was organised not by the Nazi regime, but by "a secret union of German psychiatrist."
(posted 15 February 2000)
Acting President Vladimir Putin, a year ago the unknown head of the former KGB and now Russia's leader, was secretly baptised during the Communist era, he said in a newspaper interview published on Friday.
Putin made the revelation during a telephone phone in with readers of the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper which revealed more of a personality which remains a mystery to many Russians.
Putin dealt with religion, land reform, businessman Boris Berezovsky, the war in Chechnya and welfare for single mothers during the phone in, which was on Wednesday. The newspaper reproduced a fuller version than excerpts shown on television.
"When I was a few months old, my mum and her neighbour in the communal apartment where we lived took me to church without telling my father, he was a Communist Party member, and baptised me,'' he was quoted by the daily as saying.
"This was my first visit to church and, as you understand, it is difficult for me to remember,'' he said.
Although Putin's ratings in opinion polls ahead of a March 26 election are far higher than those of other candidates, his personality and politics remain unclear. His one clear policy has been the fight against rebels in Chechnya.
The Kremlin publicity machine has been steadily gearing up ahead of the vote and the phone in came a few days after a television interview in which Putin spoke of his pet dog and his friends as well as more serious issues.
Putin's remarks on religion came in a land where the church was severely repressed during the 70 years of Communist rule but many Russian leaders are now seen in church, particularly on important feast days.
Putin said that he went to church from time to time and wanted his children to sample religion. . . .
(courtesy of Gleb Glinka)
ACTING PRESIDENT PUTIN ANSWERS QUESTIONS IN KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
PHONE-IN
Komsomolskaia pravda, 11 February 2000-02-14
[ed. Note: the following are the questions and answers from the interview published in KP that pertain specifically to church.]
VLADIMIR PUTIN: I'M NOT GONNA TELL TALES. NOBODY NEEDS THEM.
Within half an hour the acting president of Russia lifted the phone 38 times. Some of the questions were hard-hitting. So were Putin's answers. . . .
"What do you go to church for?"
Q: I am Lidiya Vasilyevna Titova. I am an office worker in Moscow. I hear you often go to church. Is it connected with some personal experiences or troubles?
A: When I was several months old, my mother and a neighbor in the communal flat where we lived at the time took me to a church and baptized me without telling my father who was a Communist Party member. That was my first visit to the church, and, as you may guess, I find it hard to remember it.
Later, when I worked in Petersburg I went to Jerusalem at the invitation of the Israel Foreign Ministry and my mother gave me the little cross with which I was baptized so that I should sanctify it on God's sepulcher. I fulfilled my mother's will. And I must say that I was seriously impressed by the holy places. Later we went there, the whole family, as tourists, privately.
Q: Can it be said that your soul calls you to a church?
A: I told you honestly how it all happened and you can draw the conclusions.
Q: The conclusion suggests itself: if a person goes to a church of his own free will, his soul bids him to do so.
A: I simply wanted my children to become involved in it. I have been visiting church from time to time ever since.
Q: Thank you for your answer. . . .
(from Johnson's Russia List)
(posted 13 February 2000)
In January the ROMIR research center conducted a special survey (in 41 provinces of the Russian federation, 203 survey points) devoted to the institution of the family in Russian society. Full agreement with the notion that long-term continuous relations are necessary in order to be happy was expressed by 27.1% of those questioned, while 44.3% expressed agreement with it; 12.5% of respondents did not give a yes or no answer and 12.8% disagreed. Another 3.3% found the question difficult to answer.
The results of the survey showed that 73.3% of Russian do not consider marriage an out-dated means for organization of the family. Of those question, 20.3% did consider the institution of marriage out-dated while 6.4% of citizens found the question difficult to answer.
At the same time 42.3% of respondents state that it is very important to discuss problems arising between spouses within the family and 50.&% state that it is relatively important. Spending time together is considered very important for a good climatw within the family by 29% of Russian and relatively important by 52.8%.
To the question whether a child needs a home with a father and mother in order to grow up happy, Russians displayed a rare unanimity: 92.9% of citizens are absolutely sure of such a necessity. Also 78.3% of those questioned said that a woman needs to have children in order to feel herself complete. With regard to the situation of a woman's wanting to have a child but not wanting to have such relations with a man, 51.6% of those questioned expressed approval while 24.9% disapproved of such a woman's position.
However 19.8% of Russian recognized that in each specific case everything depends on the circumstances. With regard to whether a many should have children in order to feel himself complete, only 29.8% of those questioned answered that they fully agreed, 38% agreed; 12.7% gave a niehter yes nor no answer, 15.1% disagreed and 4.4% had difficulty answering.
Thus this survey has confirmed the results of other research by ROMIR about the important role of the family in the life of Russians. Besides this, typically, respondents in large part state that children should grow up in complete families. Nevertheless, there is a traditional approach to the role of children in the lives of men and women: the completeness of a woman is directly linked with the presence of children while at the same time children are not so important for the well-being of a man. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 13 February 2000)
MOSCOW (Compass) -- The European Court of Human Rights has asked the Russian Federation to submit observations by March 10 on "Pitkevich v. Russia," the first religious rights case submitted from Russia to the European Court.
The case contests the impeachment of city court judge Galina Pitkevich of Noyabrsk on religious grounds. Pitkevich, a member of the Pentecostal Living Faith Church, was accused of using her position to attract people to the church, discussing religion in the court building, and inviting co-workers and parties involved in cases under her jurisdiction to church services.
Pitkevich denied the allegations and submitted affidavits by witnesses that their testimonies against her were falsified in the hearing. The Slavic Center for Law and Justice is representing Pitkevich in court.
Vladimir Ryakhovsky, a leading attorney with the Slavic Center, expects the European Court to rule in Pitkevich's favor. "It will be a lesson for the Russian Federation that freedom of conscience is an international problem and not an internal problem of the government," he said.
"The next time some local official wants to violate an individual's rights or limit the activities of a religious organization, it will already be clear that the case may be more than a local or even federal judgment, but European."
The Slavic Center attorneys successfully defended the Kirov Christian Center in the Kirov regional court when Judge Olga Khakhalina denied an appeal on February 1 from the regional department of justice to liquidate the church. Judge Khakhalina reprimanded the local justice department for "blatant violations of the constitutional rights and freedoms of the citizens," according to a Slavic Center information release.
Named by the local justice department as grounds for liquidation were destruction of families, harming health by use of hypnosis, and violation of citizens' personal rights.
According to Ryakhovsky, this case was initiated by a member of the congregation of local Orthodox priest Fr. Alexander Korotayev when she became concerned that her granddaughter had joined a "sect." The woman secretly videotaped a Kirov Christian Center church service and turned the tape over to her priest. Fr. Korotayev gathered material and pressed the local prosecutor to open a case against the church.
The Kirov case follows a series of similar attempts to liquidate so-called "nontraditional" churches by claiming they use psychiatry, including hypnotic influence. The first prominent case involved the Word of Life Church in Magadan last year; the main charge was that the pastor "hypnotized" church members to extort money (tithes).
Ryakhovsky commented that financial gifts made to Orthodox churches even by non-believers or unrelated businesses are considered normal and blessed. But when an offering is made to Pentecostal, Baptist or other confessions the pastor is accused of hypnotizing the person into giving.
Charismatic and Pentecostal churches have suffered from these types of attacks. Part of it stems, in Ryakhovsky's opinion, from the fact that the Charismatic style of worship is still comparatively new in Russia and unfamiliar to most.
These churches also tend to be larger, attract young people and are more dynamic. The churches actively reach out to the surrounding community and, through home groups, involve every member.
"Of course some people are unhappy about this, such as people who are used to sitting and waiting until someone comes to forgive them of their sins. Or if they are used to thinking that we are the only church and seeing everyone else as a sect," he said.
Ryakhovsky remains optimistic about the political situation as it relates to freedom of religion. He sees new and younger representatives taking their places in government who think progressively on religious freedom matters, and he expects more favorable change.
He views acting president Vladimir Putin as a normal, thinking person who won't try to fence the country in with the old system. Citing a debate televised late last year, [Ryakhovsky noted that] Putin publicly stated that Russia is a multi-confessional secular state and must treat all religions equally under the law.
Ryakhovsky is also undisturbed by the fact that the chairman of the Duma's committee on religion is once again communist Viktor Zorkaltsev. "Zorkaltsev is a specialist on religion. Of course, I don't agree with his communist viewpoint. But as an individual, he is thoughtful, orderly and willing to reasonably discuss and debate issues."
In commenting on the Duma's need to extend the reregistration deadline for churches, which failed to happen by the end of the last session, he says the newly elected Duma is currently tied up in settling its own internal problems. But the matter once taken up could be settled "in five minutes."
"Sooner or later they will be forced to extend the deadline. Clearly it is only a technical problem," he said.
But the longer they delay, the more problems it will create in attempts to liquidate churches and religious organizations that failed to get reregistered, which includes most churches. That will stir up problems both in Russia and internationally, he said.
(posted 13 February 2000)
[translator's note: This article is another product of the Moscow patriarchate that on the surface seems to have little religious content while expressing hostility to western liberal values and discontent with western policies with regard to Russia. The article, written by a spokesman for the patriarchate, appeared in the secular press (it was in both the NG-religii supplement and the regular edition of NG, which now have been editorially separated); the patriarchate also sent a copy by electronic mail to RRN.]
The continuing crisis that was evoked by the coming to power in Austria of a government of conservatives and right-wing radicals issued a serious challenge to future prospect for the European Union. Of course, it is impossible to sympathize with the previous declarations of the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, Jeorg Haider, regarding sympathy for Hitler's policy of labor and respect for SS veterans as "people of honor." But the central line of the uproar goes much deeper: first, regarding the problem of the free entry of poor immigrants into the Austrian labor market and generally into the Alpine republic (which will inevitably happen in accordance with the rules of EU after its expansion to include central European countries). Second, what has happened touches upon the question of the structure of the European Union as well as its religious bases.
Decisions in this international organization. which is more clearly being transformed into a united parliament and government for the fifteen member countries, are made on the basis of consensus. The Haiderites, incidentally, have often threatened to block the entry of new states into EU by exercise of the veto. However today it is obvious that the leading countries of the union, England, France, and Germany, are not prepared to abandon their political and ideological principles even in the face of the democratic wishes of one of the member nations of EU.
The declaration of the leaders of these countries, as well as the leadership of Portugal which now is chairing the European Union and is in continuous consultations with the "big three" on the Austrian question, testifies that democracy ends at that point when someone conscientiously refuses to follow the group of secular humanistic slogans that make up the general European ideology. After all, the main thing is not assessment of Hitler. It is much more substantial: that at the very heart of Europe there was clearly proclaimed and then supported by the electorate a call for preference for narrowly nationalist interests over the idea of political and economic absorption of prospective members of EU through their "enlightenment" even if that would mean temporary economic and social difficulties.
All of this has become a most serious lesson for Russia which, it seems, had not understood that a naive gravitation "to Europe" must be considered with a sober assessment of all the plusses and minuses of integration, an integration, incidentally, that is inescapable and thus necessitates a responsible and strategic approach.
The events in Chechnia, Yeltsin's resignation, the ascent of Putin to the summit of the Russian political Olympus, and the consequences of this change for Chechnia--all of these inevitably reflect upon the relations between Russia and the West and that means that it warms up discussions about the philosophical bases of their partnership and competition. One cannot but agree with the idea of the convergence of nations, especially those that are united by a common history and culture. However, in my view, unification and "inclusion," about which much is said these days, are different concepts. Integration not "into Europe" but Europe proper, from the Atlantic to Vladivostok, cannot mean a "professor-student" relationship and certainly not a "ruler-subject" one. There must be a two-way street. Participants must have equivalent rights. From my point of view such an understanding of integration must surely presuppose a movement toward an understanding by the western part of Europe of the entire spectrum of collectivist values and interests as an integral part of the continent's philosophical basis.
Sacrificing personal interests for the sake of communal existence and operating within the categories of eternity and globalism continue to be the essence of Russian consciousness. This national characteristic merged both Peter and Marx and the contemporary westernization, and thus it is not likely to disappear in the long term. Even economic reforms have become possible more not on the basis of the "fruits of individualism" as a consequence of the "remnants of the socialist way of thinking." A real admirer of Weber, surely, was supposed to expect the bankruptcy of the state and the introduction of external administration immediately after nonpayment of the budgeted amount as well as after the government's renunciation of the debt.
The massive inclusion of the idea of the ultimate value of the individual and individual interests that was emphasized in our constitution still has not led to a reception of this idea as a unifying principle. The people responded to different signals. This was evidenced, for example, after the plunge in Primakov's popularity after the turnabout over the Atlantic and the outbreak of support for Putin when he seized the initiative in the Chechen campaign, which, incidentally entailed a demonstration of independence from the judgment of the West. At the same time that policy triumphed which rejected the language of carefully formulated ideologies, programs, and conceptions that strive for expression through overt acts, emotion, and television image. Words--spoken or written--are now too compromised to be taken seriously. Thus the nonverbal channels of communication of convictions and sentiments are becoming the most effective (it is no accident that there often was mentioned the contradiction between "word" and "deed" in one of the recent campaigns.)
Everything concerns us, whether the Balkans, Africa, or the Moon. It is because of this "universal concern," as well as many purely historic reasons, Russia simply is not able to be satisfied in international relations with the role of informed, second-rank partner. While participating in the work of the European structure, we cannot renounce the right of a decisive vote, including the possibility of speaking and acting from the supposedly outdated "collectivist" position.
Quite recently the country "on conditions of the victor" joined the Council of Europe, enduring a rather humiliating procedure of reexamination. At the same time there was practically no consultation with Russia when the CSCE was excluded from real European power, transferring to NATO and the European Union the center of the adoption of fundamental military and political decision. In the end we sort of had to agree to forget about the presence of higher values, like the existence of the individual, and we were left with the ideological debates of western colleagues. However after the Balkans and the world economic crisis, the weakness of the "only true doctrine" was unexpectedly revealed. We suddenly began to understand that in practice it was being distributed by a minority of the population of the world, no more than the "golden billion," whose influence on the rest of the plant has absolutely disproportionate control over its resources and the results of the labor of its population.
Under Primakov and the tenure of his minister of foreign affairs Russian public opinion declared that the value of extreme individualism had been virtually rejected by the majority of countries of Africa, Asia, China, and especially the Islamic world (however, the events in the northern Caucasus made a search for allies on this matter extremely difficult). It now is obvious that western voters, not only in Austria, can hardly be prepared to sacrifice their corporate achievements in the name of the unification of the "citizens of Europe" in the face of a single system of macropolitical tasks.
The search for an original path was continued in the programmatic article, "Russia on the brink of the millennium," by Vladimir Putin, who predicted that "the new Russian idea arises as an alloy, an original unification of universal, common human values with indigenous Russian values that have withstood the tests of time." At the same time he justly recognizes the presence in the public consciousness of an element of paternalism (which I would rather call communalism).
However now it is necessary to clothe strategic conclusions in concrete affairs, trying to propose to the west a genuinely multipolar model of integration, however difficult this may be for economic reasons. In the aforesaid article, Putin stresses the importance of the inclusion of Russia in the World Trade Organization. Whatever, one should not overlook the growing opposition of nonwestern countries to the policies of WTO--at a recent "ministerial circle" they sternly blocked all initiatives intended to expand the competence and authority of this newly created structure, which still managed to distinguish itself by its secrecy and lack of democracy. So while it is necessary to become a part of this organization, of course, it is necessary on the basis of qualifications that can be supported simultaneously by the West and the "third world."
For sure we cannot survive without control of the problem of debt or foreign investment. But even with great success in overcoming difficulties in these two areas we cannot avoid the great efforts in creation of the qualitatively new economy or efforts that have no precedent in all times and among all nations (the only thing that approximates it is the situation of Germany which under the conditions of the Marshall Plan took twenty years). That means that it is necessary to count on not only an "economic miracle" but on a two or three decade period of joyless and thankless work whose success is unthinkable without harmonious relations with Europe and the world. However, building such relations must achieve the regeneration of Russia as one of the genuine centers of world politics and world economy. Until that is accomplished, we must remain in unity with the West a genuinely equal dialogue that includes the very bases of a structured world order. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 13 February 2000)
[tr. note: this article was the lead article on the front page of the newspaper]
The celebrations have faded away and the work routine has returned; life must go on. The holidays were magnificent and new faces emerged in the presidency. In the period at the end of the century two authorities have been identified. The first is the secular. The second is the ecclesiastical. They now are side-by-side. The government has conducted a service in the church of Christ the Savior; the clergy has welcomed the flock hand-in-hand with the acting president inside presidential offices in the Kremlin. Obviously a new historical stage has been reached in our development and it forces us to return to the fundamental question: what is Rus today? What does it believe in? For many this question is obvious. Actually, it is explosive.
In a conversation with Nikita Mikhailkov, an Orthodox person, I identified myself an atheist. We both respected each other. I had no expectation that Nikita Sergeevich would become an atheist. But Nikita Sergeevich looked at me with pity and said: inevitably you will come to the church.
I understood that an Orthodox adept considers an atheist a person who is somehow incomplete. Probably I respected his convictions more than he did mine. But what he said was in good faith.
Then things developed so that it became clear; even continuous appeals to God did not keep a person from stating falsehood publicly. Or carrying out a public deception.
Atheism is considered godlessness, but this is a terminological question. If god is conscience, then I believe in it. If god is faith in human efforts, then this is my God. If god is the force that can remove any sins, that is, forgive one's self and falsehood and the like, then I do not want to have anything to do with such a god.
Atheism also is a faith. That nobody will do our work for us. That life, alas, is terminal and considering it only the preparation for immortality, filled with supplications and worship, means to cast to the wind the time that is granted us. That the energies and means could be better devoted to building homes for people rather than chapels for prayer, because it is not the almighty miracle worker who reveals but knowledge and labor. This respect for the faith of others and acknowledgment of how much good there is on earth is made in the name of God. But one must recall how much evil has been done. Because it is easy to hide behind this name. Our home-bred fuhrers swear by Orthodoxy and a writer has lost his talent through intolerance and an artist has sown hatred. In the name of Orthodoxy the splendid singer Zhanna Bichevskaia teaches on her radio broadcast to find an enemy in anyone who believes differently. The remarkable actress Ekaterina Vasileva has decided to please not those people who like her but God. That is her right and perhaps it became brighter in the heavenly chambers. But earth lost some luster because of this.
I could go on at length explaining why my faith is dear to me, but I do not have the right to impose it upon anyone. Previously I have suggested that others do not have the right to impose their faith on me. Meanwhile it is happening, and as time goes on it is becoming more overt.
Others have begun deciding for a person what kind of faith must be professed in order to feel one's self at home in your native land. Orthodoxy is being recognized unconditionally as beyond dispute and this notion is more often being identified with the "Russian" concept. It has become the test of worth and kinship. It is no accident that Nikita Sergeevich, in TV debates with Kirienko, so slyly and significantly screwed up his eyes as he challenged his opponent to sing the "Our Father." It's like in the old times when a heretic was required to make the sign of the cross and if he did not want to it meant that he was a wizard. If Kirienko has been a Muslim would that have been a political disadvantage? And if he is an atheist? In our country atheists are a majority, but atheism has been so discredited that it literally now is outside the law and an atheist has to feel alien. That is also true of the Muslin and my protestant neighbor, Catholic acquaintance, and the people in the synagogue. But nevertheless they all consider themselves Russian, because they were born in Russia and they honor alongside their God the Russian culture, Russian language, and the Russian way of life. Now they also have become literally second-class citizens.
Faith is an intimate and personal thing but it has become something like party membership, only instead of the red ticket it is necessary to wear over your heart a holy cross of the required type. The civil authority has been united with the authority of the church. Government leaders cross themselves for the television camera as if it is a test of loyalty, and in this demonstrative observance of ritual there is something of political significance. It's as if the two authorities are sanctifying each other and giving a pledge of loyalty, instructing the flock: do likewise! And immediately several TV channels, including the state channel, broadcast this order to the whole country as previously the party congresses did.
Does this mean that a new system of faith is coming which is invincible because it is the only one trusted in the land? Will there again be people in two castes--with the "Our Father" and without it? Will there again be a dual morality which hasn't disappeared and will be prescribed and written in tablets?
So that there would not be homogeneity in countries which we call civilized--and I include the former USSR in this--the church once and for all was separated from the state. The state cannot support, let alone demonstratively or with political significance, any single confession. There are many faiths in our world and each has the right to expect to be respected. Otherwise democracy has ceased.
Faith is a free, sincere, and conscious feeling and it also is quiet. A shout is incompatible with sincerity; force is incompatible with spirituality; intolerance is incompatible with love for neighbor. They are compatible only with a new fanaticism, frenzy, and searches for enemies. There is a startling calm and glorious moment in protestant services: people who are unacquainted turn to each other to shake hands. This moment unites everyone, both worshippers and various tourists who have dropped by the church. Everyone is equal because all are people on Earth. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 12 February 2000)
ATHENS, Greece (AP) -- The head of the Russian Orthodox Church accused the Vatican of expansionism Friday in a blow to efforts for closer ties between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox religions.
The comments by Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow, in a rare and wide-ranging interview published Friday, reflect significant rifts within the Christian Orthodox churches. As leader of the biggest church, Alexy's cooperation is vital for any deep ecclesiastical changes -- such as trying to heal the nearly 1,000-year split with the Roman Catholics.
Alexy has so far been cool to any overtures from Rome. In the interview with the Greek monthly Religions Info, he again lashed at the Vatican for allegedly going back on a promise to reduce support for the Eastern Rite Churches, which follow Orthodox customs and trappings but are loyal to the pope.
Some Orthodox have accused the Vatican of using them to aggressively win souls in the former Communist countries.
"This entire situation has blackened our relations with the Roman Catholic Church," he said. "Religions must come into contact with each other, but not fight for occupation and dominance."
Theologians say the Russian church's fear of the West is understandable.
"I think we in the West need to be more sensitive to the Russian experience of the West," said Nicholas Constas, an assistant professor of theology at Harvard Divinity School. "The last time the Russians encountered Western liberal thought it was in the form of Marxism, and I'm not sure they're interested in sampling any of the other flavors."
But Alexy also referred to his often testy relation within the Orthodox ranks. He challenged the centuries-old structure making the ecumenical patriarch -- based in Istanbul, Turkey -- the "first among equals" among the Orthodox leaders.
The present ecumenical patriarch, Bartholomew I, has been a leader in trying to forge common ground between Orthodox and Roman Catholics, which split in 1054 over the issue of papal authority.
Alexy said there is not a "theological problem" with the theory of making Russia a second pole of leadership among the faith's complex patchwork: 16 separate churches covering most of the faithful.
Copyright 1999 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
(posted 12 February 2000)
Contrary to the fears of some religious rights advocates, Russian religious minorities have not experienced a new wave of repression this year, according to Lawrence Uzzell, director of Keston News Service. For the long term, however, a general decline of liberties in Russia bodes ill for religious freedom, Uzzell believes.
Uzzell told the U.S. State Department's religious liberty advisory panel on January 24 that authorities largely have not taken advantage of the Duma's failure to extend the December 31 deadline for compulsory registration of every church, which leaves thousands of unregistered congregations potentially vulnerable. Uzzell told the panel that once again the old Russian maxim had proved accurate: "The salvation of Russia is the poor implementation of bad laws."
One notable exception, however, is the charismatic "Church of Christ" congregation that is being threatened with closure by the Chuvash Ministry of Justice.
Uzzell predicts that for the next six months the status of religious freedom will remain stable due to preoccupation with the presidential campaign and consolidation of a new government. "Compared with other issues, such as how to carve up Russia's economic assets among the elite's various corrupt factions, religious questions simply are not all that important to those at the top," Uzzell said. "What they want most from religious leaders is servile silence on issues such as the Russian army's atrocities against civilians in Chechnya, and that they already have."
Uzzell says, however, that in the long run "the picture is darker" for civil liberties. Russia's most likely next president, Vladimir Putin, "has presided over the most startling assault on freedom of the press since the mid-1980s," Uzzell contends. "On his watch, Russian officials have slandered and intimidated journalists whose reports on Chechnya differed from the official line, even swapping a correspondent of the U.S.-funded Radio Liberty for Russian soldiers held prisoner by the Chechens. They have threatened a Russian journalist specializing in the study of official corruption with forced confinement to a psychiatric hospital. In the recent parliamentary election campaign, they in effect turned news presenters on state-owned television into press secretaries for the party in power."
Uzzell believes that these developments are tied to religious liberty. "In the long run religious freedom is not likely to thrive if other freedoms are being crushed," Uzzell asserts. "Even though the latest news on church-state relations is far better than many feared it might be, this is no time for complacency."
WHEN BAD LAWS AREN'T ENFORCED
by Paul Goble,
RFE/RL, 9 February 2000
The Russian government is not enforcing the provisions of its law on religion, a pattern of behavior that in the short term has encouraged some observers but one that over the longer haul entails more serious consequences.
Many religious leaders and human rights activists in both Russia and the West were concerned that the Russian authorities would move against various minority religious groups after the Duma failed to extend the deadline for their registration with the state beyond December 31.
Because the law places tight limitations on religious groups without registration -- they cannot own property or conduct public services, among other things -- some church leaders predicted that Moscow would use its provisions to close these groups down or drive them underground.
So far, that has not happened.
This week, Lawrence Uzzell, the director of the religious watchdog organization Keston Institute in the United Kingdom, noted that once again "the salvation of Russia is the poor implementation of bad laws." And he predicted that the Russian authorities are unlikely to change their approach dramatically in the run-up to the presidential elections at the end of March.
For the current Russian leaders, Uzzell said, "religious questions simply are not all that important." Instead, he continued, "what they want most is servile silence on issues such as the Russian army's atrocities against civilians in Chechnya, and that they already have."
Indeed, by having on hand a law they are not enforcing, the Russian authorities put themselves in a particularly strong position to affect the behavior of religious congregations. Those who are cooperative won't be touched, while those who show any independence from Moscow's line can be harassed or worse -- and that entirely within the law.
But as Keston's Uzzell notes, "in the long run, the picture is darker."
First, Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin already "has presided over the most startling assault on freedom of the press since the mid-1980s." Freed from the attention arising from the ongoing election campaign, he is likely to move against religious minorities both to shore up his support with the Russian Orthodox hierarchy and play to the rising tide of Russian nationalism in the population at large.
Second, as Uzzell notes, "in the long run, religious freedom is not likely to thrive if other freedoms are being crushed." That is precisely what is happening now. Putin has demonstrated little interest in defending freedom of the press or the other freedoms that form the foundation of a free civil society.
Putin's regime has "slandered and intimidated journalists whose reports on Chechnya differed from the official line," Uzzell notes, "even swapping a correspondent of the U.S.-funded Radio Liberty for Russian soldiers being held prisoner by the Chechens."
Under Putin's direction, Russian officials have "threatened a Russian journalist specializing in the study of official corruption with forced confinement to a psychiatric hospital," Uzzell says. Moreover, "in the recent parliamentary election campaign, Moscow officials in effect turned news presenters on state-owned television into press secretaries for the party in power."
This pattern of non-enforcement of a bad law subverts the very possibility of a law-based state. Many Western governments have praised Moscow for not enforcing this and other pieces of legislation, and given how pernicious some Russian laws are, their attitudes are entirely understandable.
But over time, such praise has the effect of allowing the Russian government to gain support from those concerned about civil liberties while retaining the ability to change its course at any time via non-democratic means.
If Russian believers and Russian citizens more generally cannot count on the government to enforce its laws and especially if they see that the West praises Moscow for not enforcing some laws, then these believers and these citizens can have little confidence in any laws that the Russian government may promulgate. In the end, they are likely to lose confidence in the meaning of law altogether.
Consequently as welcome as Moscow's nonenforcement of its law on religion may be to many now, the Russian government's continuing ability to decide which laws it will enforce and which ones it will ignore casts a dark shadow over the possibility that Russia will emerge as a democratic, law-based state anytime soon.
A PRECARIOUS STEP FORWARD
Loosened rules in Russia may mean better times for religious
freedom
by Beverly Nickles,
Compass Direct, in Moscow
Defenders of religious freedom gained a small but significant victory in a court case challenging the '15-year' clause included Russia's country's controversial 1997 religion law.
The clause limits the rights of religious organizations that fail to show proof of their existence in the local area for at least 15 years.
Challenging the rule were the Christian Church of Glorification in the Khakasiia Republic and the Jehovah's Witnesses in Yaroslavl. Both had previously been denied reregistration by local authorities who cited the 15-year requirement.
The court ruled that an organization already registered before the September 1997 adoption of the new law or as part of a centralized religious structure would not be bound by the 15-year requirement. The ruling leaves thousands of local independent groups--those founded after adoption of the law--restricted to worshiping in small private groups.
By the time the cases were tried together in Russia's Constitutional Court last November, both organizations had already secured reregistration as part of centralized religious organizations.
According to Anatoly Krasikov, president of the Russian chapter of the International Religious Liberty Association, there should not have been a case because the original reregistration problem no longer existed. But to reject the cases would have resulted in a scandal, he says. Krasikov called the Constitutional Court decision "not just legal, but political."
Two Steps Backward
Meanwhile, the court backed off from declaring the 15-year clause unconstitutional.
The court's statement stressed: "The state has the right to provide for definite safeguards in order not to grant the status of a religious organization automatically, and not to permit the legalization of associations that violate human rights and commit illegal and criminal actions, as well as prohibit missionary activity (including forms of proselytism) if it is incompatible with respect for freedom of thought, conscience, and other religions."
Krasikov calls this "one full step forward" in that it limits the 15-year rule, but "two steps backward" because the spirit of the court's decision makes the law appear constitutional. "We will need to return to the Constitutional Court and establish concrete facts of violations of fundamental religious rights of citizens written into the country's constitution" and Russia's international obligations, he says. This particular case dealt with only one point of a law riddled with violations of religious rights.
The law has allowed discrimination against Protestants and Catholics, including excessive taxation and evictions, while favoring the Russian Orthodox Church.
Vladimir Ryakovski, expert witness and president of the Christian Legal Center, also expressed hope that the Constitutional Court would return to test the constitutionality of restrictions in the 1997 law. "I think this is the first successful step," he said in Russian media reports.
Reregistration extended
Another trouble spot in the 1997 law is the requirement that all religious organizations reregister with the government by December 31, 1999. The requirement proved impossible to fulfill for the majority of religious entities. According to the 1997 law, those failing to reregister by the deadline could be declared illegal and face "liquidation" or have their activities severely curtailed.
The Ministry of Justice waived the reregistration deadline until the new Duma (the lower house of Russia's parliament) could consider the proposal to extend the deadline for another year. But the Ministry of Justice can only recommend, and does not hold authority to order the waiver. Much will depend on how local authorities handle the situation.
"Rule of law still doesn't work well in Russia," Krasikov says, and there are violations of religious rights everywhere in the country, including Moscow. On a positive note, he says that a full legal process was already in place to allow for legal appeals for churches and individuals who feel their rights were violated. "But there's still a question as to whether a decision in one locality will carry over to another," he adds.
A stable future
There are other signs that religious freedom in Russia may be improving.
Prime Minister and Acting President Vladimir Putin, who is likely to take the presidential spot in the upcoming election, pledged in recent public statements to uphold fundamental rights, including freedom of conscience.
But a recent position paper on Russia's future, posted on the Internet under Putin's name, does not mention religion.
Stephen Shenfield, an expert on Russia at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, says that absence may be a good sign: "The very fact that religion is nowhere mentioned in the document is a hopeful sign, because it implies that religion belongs to the private sphere instead of to the state." This may constrain further movement toward making the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) a semi-official state religion.
Another significant development occurred last November, when the Russian Orthodox Church helped organize a conference of 33 traditional Christian churches, including Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants of various denominations from former Soviet countries. Participants discussed theology, missions, morals, and Christian cooperation in what was reported as "a fraternal spirit."
Krasikov says the interdenominational conference came about because the ROC, itself caught in the mire of the 1997 religion law, "came to understand the dangers of this law to the church." He said a similar cooperative effort was already in motion in 1994, but was "frozen" when the battle began over the 1997 law.
Vsevolod Chaplin, speaking for the ROC Patriarchate from its Office of External Affairs, states emphatically that the ROC "didn't change its opinion toward this law."
He says the ROC still supports the 1997 law because the earlier law created a vacuum that could not protect the country against destructive activities of questionable religious groups. But he agrees that the future looks more stable for religious freedom. "The peak of the struggle for souls is going away," he says.
Chaplin says the ROC already had good relations with other confessions in the 1970s and 1980s. The conflict started in the late 1980s with the influx of foreign missionaries, peaking in 1992 and 1993. Chaplin says it is possible that the wounds inflicted several years ago are starting to heal.
(posted 11 February 2000)
A special all-Russian survey has shown that 60.1% of Russians are able to say that they are believers. The survey was conducted by the independent research center Russian Public Opinion and Market Research using a representative sample of 2000 persons in 41 regions of the Russian federation. Of the respondents, 26.9% consider themselves nonbelievers, 4.4 % are convinced atheists, and 8.6% of those surveyed found the question difficult to answer.
In the opinion of 55% of the survey participants, religion gives adequate answers to questions of morality and ethics, while 23% of citizens disagree and 22% had no response.
According to 42.4% of those questioned, religion gives adequate answers regarding problems of family life, with 34.7% disagreeing and 22.9% giving no answer.
Religion provides 57.3% of respondents answers to spiritual questions, while 19.7% do not find answers to spiritual questions in religion; 23% of those questioned had no response.
Russians are least inclined to find in religion answers to questions about the social problems that Russia is facing. Only 17.7% of respondents agree that religion can afford such a possibility and 53.1% disagree; 29.2% had no response.
At the same time 67% of citizens think that it is important to perform a religious ceremony in connection with the birth of a child; 22.4% do not think that performance of a ritual is important and 10.6% could give no answer. It is important for weddings to be performed in church according to 46.3% of those questioned, while for 40.2% that is not important and 13.5% gave no answer. Church funerals are considered important by 69.2% of respondents, while the performance of this ritual is not important for 18.6% of respondents; 12.2%, answer.
Thus it is possible to conclude that religion is playing an ever greater role in various aspects of the life of Russians and it is acquiring ever greater significance in the value system of our countrymen. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 9 February 2000)
ATTITUDE OF RUSSIANS TOWARD SUPERNATURAL PHENOMENA
ROMIR
31 January 2000
In January the independent research center ROMIR conducted a special all-Russian survey (2000 respondents, in 41 provinces of Russian federation, 203 survey posts) on a representative sample devoted to the attitude of Russians toward supernatural phenomena. The investigation produced the following results:
Only 26% of residents of our country believe that there is life after death; 45% of those questioned do not believe there is while 29% of citizens find the question difficult to answer. At the same time 25.2% believe that there is a hell and an equal number of respondents believe there is a paradise. Around 30% of citizens have no response to both questions.
Many more of those questioned (55.7%) believe that sin exists, while 26.1% do not believe that. Also a rather substantial portion of Russians believe in the existence of telepathy (41.5%). Only 24.4% of citizens believe in transmigration of souls.
On the whole, the rather high level of interest in the issue of supernatural phenomena is holding steady, which is somewhat strengthened at times of intensified crisis situations. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 13 February 2000)
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