In a rather long article, Nezavisimaia gazeta writer Maxim Shevchenko describes the current church situation in Ukraine. After remarking that the church disputes in Ukraine remind one more of a premodern era, Shevchenko gives basic information about the four principal forces in the Ukrainian church warfare. He concludes by arguing against the idea that Ukraine should have ecclesiastical autonomy from Moscow and criticising the Moscow patriarchate for its ineffectiveness in maintaining healthy church relations with Ukraine.
Summary: At present in Ukraine there are five "apostolic
Christian churches," not counting the Armenian church which
comprises a very small number of that ethnic group. In this
article, the Roman Catholic church is ignored because it, too,
is mostly an ethnic Polish institution. The remaining four
churches are the following:
1. Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). Has
5654 parishes, making it the largest of the four. Headed by
Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan) of Kiev and all-Ukraine.
2. Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: 3079 parishes; headed
by Archbishop Ivan Miroslav of Lvov (Lviv).
3. Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate): 1332 parishes;
headed by "Patriarch Filaret (Denisenko) of Kiev and all-Ukraine."
4. Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church: 1290 parishes;
headed by "Patriarch Dimitry (Yarema) of Kiev and all-Ukraine."
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)--UPTsMP, comprises a majority of Orthodox believers of Ukraine, but it tends to be viewed as an "instrument of Russian imperialism" by nationalists and therefore has no support from state officials. UPTsMP has most of its strength in regions where the soviet antireligious activity was strongest (eastern Ukraine) and is weakest in western regions (Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol, and Kiev).
The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church--UGKTs, has most of its parishes in western region. History has made this church strongly nationalistic and anti-Moscow. By the end of the nineteenth century there were virtually no UGKTs in Russian empire, but many in Austrian empire. So Austria used UGKTs for anti-Russian goals and thus established in it anti-Russian attitudes. After the annexation of the regions inhabited by UGKTs--i.e., western regions annexed in 1940s--Stalinist policy further promoted the anti-Russian attitudes. Specifically, Stalinist policy forced liquidation ofUGKTs by merger with RPTs. This really was an anti-church maneuver by the state because it forced RPTs to take the blame for bolshevization and thus UGKTs became a force of anti-Moscow Ukrainian nationalism.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate)--UPTsKP has most of its strength in western regions, Lvov, Rovno, Ternopol, and Volynia. It came into being as the result of the expulsion of Metropolitan Filaret by Moscow patriarchate in 1992; at the time he was the exarch for Ukraine. In 1992 Filaret was defrocked by the Bishops Council of RPTs, for having cooperated with the Soviet state "more closely than circumstances required." Then he was supported by the former president of Ukraine, Kravchuk, for promoting an autocephalous Ukrainian church. Filaret was spuported by several Orthodox bishops, including Andrei of Lvov and this movement acquired many Orthodox parishes with the help of special military forces (OMON), although such aid failed to win control of the Pochaev lavra. UPTsKP has been joined by questionable churchmen from various countries. There have been talks between UGKTs and Filaretists for creation of a Ukrainian National Church, but these have not gotten far. (But a possible schism in UGKTs might lead to the creation of a Ukrainian National church, since some UGKTs are quite pro-Roman and pro-Polish and they might separate from other UGKTs who are more nationalistic Ukrainian.)
The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church--UAPTs, also in concentrated the western regions where UGKTs is strong. Canonical legitimacy of UAPTs is highly questionable (in 1920 it was a Ukrainian form of renovationism); its history of collusion with Nazi occupiers is a blot on its record. In postwar period UAPTs was led by Bishop Mstislav Skrypnik, who lived in North America. After mid-80s, UAPTs began to grow on Ukrainian soil, with most of its priests and bishops being consecrated by Biship Ioann Bondarchuk, who forsook RPTs and was unfrocked by Moscow. When Filaret was separated from Moscow, he tried to link up with UAPTs to create the Kiev patriarchal church. He worked with Metropolitan Antony (Masendich) who was Mstislav's deputy. When Mstislav died in 1993, Antony aspired to become patriarch, but Filaret opposed him. So Antony returned to the RPTs with several bishops, and he was appointed by Moscow bishop of Barnaul. Instead, Vladimir (Romaniuk) was chosen patriarch in Kiev, which led to conflict with Filaret. In July 1995 Vladimir died under mysterious circumstances. Then Filaret tried to usurp the Kiev patriarchate. This led to the end of any imagined cooperation between UAPTs and UPTsKP, with about 1000 parishes of UPTsKP siding with UAPTs, against Filaret, supporting Dimitry (who had been elected patriarch by a rump group of UAPTs earlier).
In conclusion, the writer argues that autocephaly for Ukraine would be undesirable, at least for the present. He cites a congress of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods of Ukraine in May 1995, where speakers argued against autocephaly. He says: "Autocephaly in Ukraine is not a matter of free decisions. The church question in Ukraine long ago became a political question." It could lead to forcing many Orthodox who want to be under Moscow into a very difficult position; it could lead to political breakup of Ukraine. Moscow, he says, should not take a neutral position on the matter or abandon Ukraine.