The recent elections revealed the presence of a social phenomenon which in one of my speeches I designated by the term "Ziuganat," that is the electorate of comrade Ziuganov. This phenomenon was most interesting because it clearly shows how in the course of two generations it is possible for what is called the national memory and religious cousciousness to be obliterated. This regards a significant layer of the population which once was viewed as the basic structure of the nation. The core of the Ziuganat was the Russian "red belt," the regions of the Black Earth, the Don, Kuban, Stavropol, Orenburg, and western Siberia....

[in this omitted paragraph Innokenty makes reference to articles by Father Georgy Chistiakov.

The issue is how Ziuganov has played the church card and how the Moscow patriarchate has fallen into a trap.

The fact that Ziubganov tried to enlist the support of the Orthodox electorate is generally known. In this regard he especially emphasized that the communist party of the Russian federation had "renounced atheism." It is curious that he used this dubious thesis for both domestic consumption and for export, as in the case of his press conference at Davos. Although, I think, the world's economic elite deeply scorned the ideological aims of Ziuganov's party. In the final analysis, don't restrict yourself by the opinions of people with various views but work together in business matters and go on being an atheist.

As regards the position of the Moscow patriarchate, after the December elections to the duma it returned to its earlier aspirations not to dispute with existing authority and as the same time, as the saying goes, provide itself an emergency airfield. It required no special efforts to look favorably upon the powers that be. The second goal was achieved, on the one hand, by a repetition of earlier declarations that the church stands apart from the political struggle and, on the other hand, by a continuation of the social demagogy of the chief leaders of the Moscow patriarchate and their active participation in "patriotic" measures like the notorious World Russian Sobor. Already in March the Holy Synod issued a declaration that called the clergy and the media that worked under the imprimatur of the church to refrain from participating in the election campaign on anyone's side. In the context of the time this favored Ziuganov inasmuch as his changes at that time were highly rated by sociologists. In the communo-nationalist circles that aspired to power under Ziuganov's aegis, there were (and apparently remain) their own views of the future church policy. Servile hierarchs and clergy which guarantee the ideological and, if necessary, police-investigative service of the "church line" are what they would need. And in this regard their disatisfaction clearly showed itself even on the pages of Sovetskaia Russia referring to "that Ridiger (i.e. patriarch Alexis)" who had the gall in Germany to apologize for the violence of soviet occupiers toward the German people. And the same kind of dissatisfaction, although in private conversations, was expressed against "that ecumenist Gundiaev."

Communists always demanded complete devotion to themselves and devotion to their political course and not some kind of "nonpolitical stance" such as the Moscow patriarchate declared. In this regard these forces already have control over their own cadres within the administration of the patriarchate. Evidence of that is provided by the statement of a small group of clerics in support of Ziuganov which occurred in May and provoked a great noise within the Moscow church public. At that time this was viewed as just a political ploy of the communist leader. It is necessary to note that in this regard the ploy was extremely unsuccessful for Ziuganov inasmuch as even those regular church-going Muscovites who did not intend to vote were moved to go to the polls and vote for Yeltsin.

I cite just one passage from the "Appeal to our Countrymen" which was signed by Ziuganov himself along with Archpriest A. Shargunov, Hegumen Andrei Krekhov, and the priests Guriny, Vostrikov, Gnyp, Krasovitsky (who by the way adheres to the Church Abroad), Kuziaev, Peresleginy, Sakharov, Shumilov, and Tsarevsky. These and several others predicted that if Ziuganov came to power one of the first steps would be the "adoption of amendments to the law on mass media, prohibiting the propaganda of violence, depravity, cynical egoism, and unrestrained profitmaking." It seems to be a concern for public morals but it really means the introduction of ideological censorship. In this way the words of Father Sergei Bulgakov would again be placed in "special collections" because his economic doctrine can be reduced to the simple truth: "the owner controls the economy." In this aspiration (and that's just what it is) it is possible to detect that very "propaganda of cynical egoism and unrestrained profitmaking."

For me, and not for me only, all of this recalls February 1922. At that time there also was a call, also by a small group of clergy only not from Moscow but Petrograd and not 'patriotic' but 'progressive' clergy (although there were among them prerevolutionary 'patriots'). And again for a 'good end.' Only then it was not the "defense of morality" but confiscation of church valuables for "salvation of those who were starving along the Volga." Now all the troubles of those years are well known. It was not the starving people whom the bolsheviks intended to save using church finances. And it is well known that one of the goals of the campaign, which was begun by the appeal of the "progressive Petrograd clergy," turned out to be the destruction of the very structure of the Russian church.

This all led, in the final analysis, to the need for the patriarch to support Yeltsin in the upcoming elections, despite all earlier declarations. It is necessary to say that a healthy (and, glory to God, as we saw, the larger) portion of Russian society, including church people, were able to overlook his ability to "set aside principles." In conclusion I want to say that in its majority Russian society displayed a healthy instinct of selfpreservation and diverted the threat hanging over it. I dare to think that the chief cause of this achievement was not so much Yeltsin's staff and his preelection populism (which could have quite unpleasant consequences) as it was the public behavior of Ziuganov, which Russian were able to observe on television. The intellectual deception of the communo-nationalist leaders and their false tone had a negative effect upon all who were more or less inclined toward rational views.

But this still does not mean that the earlier myths and illusions no longer threaten those views, and about this we must continue to write. (translated by PDS)