RUSSIA RELIGION NEWS


Limitations on resolution of Ukrainian question

UKRAINE IS BREAKING ITS SPIRITUAL BONDS

Legitimization of schism of churches in Ukraine may lead to serious consequences for all Orthodoxy and Ukrainian parishioners in particular

by Alexander Smirnov

Ekspert, 27 August 2018

 

In mid-April, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko sent a request to Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew to grant a tomos (an ukase or decree of the head of a church) concerning the creation of a Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox church. The decision of the president was supported by the Verkhovna Rada, despite the fact that it goes counter to the constitution of the country. According to article 35 of the basic law of Ukraine, "the church and religious organizations in Ukraine are separate from the state." At the same time, it is not written in the constitution that this pertains only to the influence of the church on government affairs. The law establishes a ban on mutual interference.

 

Moreover, the only canonical (that is, recognized by other autocephalous Orthodox churches) Ukrainian church did not request autocephaly, to say nothing of having authorized state bodies to make the epochal decision for it. As part of the Russian Orthodox Church (RPTs), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UPTs) possesses full economic and organizational independence while having the possibility of influencing the adopting of decisions of the RPTs. And this is quite satisfactory for it.

 

Ukraine is a multi-confessional country. Poroshenko could, with similar success, intervene in affairs of Catholics, Uniates, Muslims. or Jews. A decision concerning the administrative independence of Ukrainian Orthodox church servants has a profoundly political character.

 

Reverse theocracy

 

Petro Poroshenko explains such gross interference in church affairs quite frankly: "We are talking about our final affirmation of independence from Moscow. It is not just religion here; here it is geopolitics. And for me, this business of affirming the independence of the local church has the very same weight as receiving "bezviz" ["visa-free travel"] and an agreement about association with the European Union, as our common struggle for membership in the European Union and membership in NATO, which are yet ahead."

 

Presidential elections will be held in Ukraine in March 2019. No more than eight percent of voters are ready to vote for the head of state. With such disappointing results, Petro Poroshenko, who yearns to remain for a second presidential term, would not even make it to the second round of voting. An agreement concerning association with the EU has not led to the growth of the Ukrainian economy, and the visa-less regime, that does not provide the right of residence and work in the European Union, was of use to only a small number of wealthy Ukrainian tourists. In order to reverse the current situation, the head of state sorely needs a political victory.

 

Nevertheless, according to sociological surveys, a grant of independence to the Ukrainian church concerns no more than a quarter of voters, and therefore even in the event of the success of a grant, few would appreciate the victory of the authorities. Despite powerful propaganda against Russia and everything Russian, a request for a break of the Ukrainian church from the RPTs is lacking within Ukrainian society.

 

But this does not bother Poroshenko much. He even named a specific deadline for granting the tomos: by 28 July, the day of the 1030th anniversary of the baptism of Rus. The president of Ukraine was filled with optimism after Constantinople responded to him that the question was received for consideration. But the holiday passed, and Constantinople still has not granted a tomos. And this is because the patriarch of Constantinople cannot be the final arbiter and make such a decision unilaterally.

 

Nobody wants conflicts

 

The issue of granting autocephaly does not have a clearly prescribed, generally accepted procedure. Among autocephalous Orthodox churches there is no chief church or hierarch like the Roman pope, that is, a figure whose decision would be binding for all Orthodox.

 

Despite the fact that the official title of the head of the Constantinople church is announced as His Divine All-Holiness Archbishop of Constantinople--New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch, de facto he does not have the right of intervention in the internal life of another church. In sending his request for autocephaly to Patriarch Bartholomew, Petro Poroshenko prefers to call him "ecumenical," thus emphasizing his unlimited jurisdiction. However the Constantinople church is first among equals, and only specific dioceses are directly subordinate to the Constantinople patriarchate. They include the territory of Turkey, where the world center of Orthodoxy, or the "Second Rome," is located—previously Constantinople and now Istanbul; the Greek Mt. Athos, despite its very broad autonomy; the "canonical territories" of Catholics, including France, Belgium, Austria, and Hungary; as well as Korea, Panama, Singapore, and other countries foreign for Orthodoxy. The geography of dioceses of the Constantinople patriarchate is subject to a basic principle: while expanding, do not get into conflict with existing Orthodox autocephalous churches and do not enter the territory of their influence.

 

In 2008, Petro Poroshenko's Maidan predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, also urged Patriarch Bartholomew to grant the UPTs autonomy within the structure of the Constantinople patriarchate. At the time, the ecumenical patriarch was disinclined and did not go along with the political leadership of Ukraine. Today the situation is somewhat different: Poroshenko requests autocephaly and does not promise to join the jurisdiction of the Constantinople patriarchate, and thus Constantinople will not receive new dioceses, but a conflict with several autocephalous Orthodox churches is guaranteed. History has already known of several such precedents and Constantinople will try not to permit a repetition of them.

 

In the late 20th century a serious conflict between the RPTs and Constantinople flared up because of the Estonian Orthodox Church. From 1923 and until the end of the German occupation there existed in Estonia an Orthodox church under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople patriarchate with the right of autonomy, and in 1996 Constantinople reasserted its jurisdiction over it. The RPTs regarded this as interference in its affairs and cut off eucharistic fellowship with the Constantinople patriarchate, which is the equivalent of breaking relations. However they managed to resolve the situation peacefully. After negotiations, both churches made a compromise, agreeing to the existence in Estonia of two Orthodox churches, with the possibility for parishes to select their jurisdiction.

 

In 1970, the RPTs granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in America, which became the 15th autocephalous church, recognized only by the Russian, Bulgarian, Georgian, and Polish Orthodox churches. Constantinople still considers it to be a part of the RPTs.  Thirty years earlier, in 1943, the Georgian Orthodox Church acquired autocephaly. It is possible that the Moscow patriarchate bowed to the wishes of the leader of the U.S.S.R., who had once studied in the Tiflis Ecclesiastical Seminary. However Constantinople recognized the Georgian autocephaly only in 1990.

 

Recognition of the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church dragged out the longest. The self-proclaimed autocephaly of 1870 was recognized by Constantinople only in 1953. Being located in the Ottoman empire, the Constantinople patriarchate was forced to make compromises with the Turks and to close its eyes to persecution of Orthodox within the empire. Including the Bulgarians.

 

By the way, there is nothing surprising about the location of the Constantinople Mother-Church in the very heart of a Muslim state. The borders of the jurisdiction of local Orthodox churches even today are not required to coincide with political boundaries of states. Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, despite the fall of Yugoslavia, remain part of the Serbian Orthodox Church. While proclaiming independence, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are under the jurisdiction of the Georgian Orthodox Church. The limits of the competence of the Constantinople patriarchate, which in the past were in no way bound to the borders of Byzantium and the Ottoman empire, nevertheless are unrelated to the political boundaries of modern Turkey.

 

Despite its status of "first among equals," Constantinople in some way aspires to the role of uniter of world Orthodoxy. In 2016, the Constantinople patriarchate conducted a Pan-Orthodox Council, in whose preparation the RPTs took an active part. It was planned to discuss at the council, among other things, a procedure for granting autocephaly that would be common for all local churches.

 

However before the start of the council, another outbreak of the "Ukrainian question" occurred. Several hierarchs of the Constantinople church suggested that they would entertain the possibility of recognizing their jurisdiction over the Ukrainian church. Representing the majority of their parishioners, the Russian, Georgian, Bulgarian, and Antioch Orthodox churches refused to participate in the Pan-Orthodox Council.

 

Today, any decision in the absence of a consensus, much less an attempt to give autocephaly to the UPTs in spite of the wish of the RPTs and even the UPTs itself, will inevitably lead to conflict, which will put an end to attempts by Constantinople to play a unifying role. And indeed the basis for an independent local church turns out to be extremely dubious. The schismatic associations proposed by the Ukrainian government that call themselves "Orthodox churches" are, to put it mildly, not recognized by the autocephalous churches of the world.

 

Ukrainian schismatics

 

Besides the UPTs of the Moscow patriarchate, there exist in Ukraine another two uncanonical Orthodox churches—the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UPTsKP). Petro Poroshenko proposes them as the foundation for building a new UPTs.

 

Both of these churches arose in periods of the collapse of great states—the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. UAPTs appeared in Ukraine after the revolution of 1917 and ceased its activity in the Ukr.S.S.R., and briefly returned to Ukraine during the German fascist occupation. In 1989, the UAPTs again revived in Kiev, conducting a council in 1990 and electing its own primate, Stepan Skripnik, a nephew and adjutant of Semen Petliura. Skripnik presented himself as a rather colorful figure, whose personal fate repeated the fate of the UAPTs.

 

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate was formed in 1992 as the result of schismatic activity within the canonical UPTsMP. In 1990, Patriarch of Moscow and all-Rus Pimen died unexpectedly, and the Holy Synod of the RPTs elected as the caretaker of the patriarchal throne, the interim head of the RPTs, Metropolitan of Kiev Filaret (Mikhail Denisenko). Thus, Filaret  expected, not unreasonably, to become the new primate of the Russian church. However, a Bishops' Council (the supreme administrative body in the RPTs) elected as the new head of the RPTs Patriarch Alexis II. Metropolitan Filaret returned to Kiev, where in the same year he was elected primate of the UPTs and receive the title of metropolitan of Kiev and all-Ukraine, and the UPTs itself received practically complete economic and organizational autonomy within the RPTs.

 

However, this proved to be insufficient for Filaret, and he was transformed from being a critic of Ukrainian autocephaly to being its clear advocate. Back in 1991 he demanded from the RPTs recognition of the autocephaly of the UPTs, counting on becoming its patriarch. But after complaints by bishops of the UPTs against pressure on the part of Filaret, the Bishops' Council of the RPTs removed him from office. After this, Filaret tried to become head of the UAPTs after becoming the deputy of Patriarch Mstislav (Stepan Skripnik).

 

After failing to become patriarch of the UAPTs, Filaret, along with other defectors from the UAPTs, organized a third church: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. After a short struggle for power in the new organization, Denisenko became head of the UPTsKP. All this time, Filaret was supported by the first president of Ukraine, the former head of the department of agitation and propaganda of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk; the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine; and Ukrainian nationalist organizations.

 

In 1997, at a Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, Filaret was expelled from the church and pronounced anathema for his schismatic activity. The only good thing that can be said about Filaret Denisenko is that he managed to create schism even within the ranks of the schismatics. And while he continues to dream about becoming head of some church, it is not possible to speak about the unification of the UAPTs and the UPTsKP.

 

Price of the question

 

The UPTs of the Moscow patriarchate unites more than 12,000 parishes and 250 monasteries and it owns the Holy Dormition Kiev Caves and Holy Dormition Pochaev lavras. The UPTsKP has in all about 5,000 parishes and the UAPTs has only 1,000 total. Even taken together, the uncanonical Orthodox churches possess fewer parishes, monasteries, and ecclesiastical academic institutions, the larger portion of which are located in western Ukraine, than the UPTsMP.

 

As soon as Poroshenko reported that he "solved the question" with the Constantinople patriarchate regarding granting autocephaly, Filaret Denisenko began talking about how the property of the UPTsMP would be transferred to him. "The government transferred its property to use by the Ukrainian church of the Moscow patriarchate. But when the Ukrainian church will be recognized here, then the lavra—both the one and the other—will be transferred to the Ukrainian church," Filaret declared.

 

According to Ukrainian legislation, church property belongs to parishes that do not intend to be under the administration of either the UAPTs or UPTsKP. Denisenko maintains: "There will be no violence after the tomos, and the property will belong to the parishes, like now." However if parishes did not wish previously to come under the jurisdiction of a schismatic upon whom they church pronounced anathema, they would hardly want to do so after a tomos. Therefore, Filaret will not succeed in taking away such desired property without force and government help. In its turn, the government will not be able to help, since it needs the operation in the southeastern part of the country and also those preaching with enthusiasm hatred for a fraternal people.

 

Dialogue of the patriarchs

 

A visit by Patriarch of Moscow and all-Rus Kirill to Istanbul and his meeting with Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew are scheduled for 31 August. Most likely, the main topic of discussion of the clergymen will be the Ukrainian question. The positions of the RPTs are sufficiently firm: even if Patriarch Bartholomew decides to grant a tomos concerning autocephaly, the greaer portion of parishes of the canonical UPTs may not recognize it. Opposition to a decision on the part of the local church that is "granted independence" is clearly not the reaction that the Constantinople patriarch would wish to meet.

 

The steadfastness of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that, despite the pressure of the government, does not wish to leave the bosom of the RPTs is a serious argument for Constantinople. The violence that may accompany the redistribution of property in Ukraine after receiving a unilateral tomos may affect negatively the reputation of the Constantinople patriarchate in the world. In addition, the full rejection of this decision on the part of the RPTs and the rupture of relations with Constantinople, which possibly will be joined by a number of other local churches, is guaranteed.

 

Oddly enough, the Roman Catholic Church may act as yet another deterrent factor. After hundreds of years of schism and pronouncing anathemas on one another, in 1965 there finally was a meeting of Roman Pope Paul VI and Patriarch of Constantinople Athenagoras. Then practically a half century later, in 2016, the patriarchs of two branches of Christianity met again, this time the Patriarch of Moscow and all-Rus Kirill and Roman Pope Francis. It would be illogical and even stupid, after have spent so much effort and time on reconciliation with Catholics, to permit a split within Orthodoxy itself.

 

Last but not least, international politics may become an argument against granting autocephaly to the UPTs. Recently, relations of Russia and Turkey have undergone positive changes, to a great extent due to clumsy actions by Washington, which is trying to impose sanctions on everyone in a row. In the event of an escalation of the conflict over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Ankara, which does not recognize the international status of the Constantinople patriarch and considers him the pastor of Turkish Orthodox exclusively, will not miss the opportunity to remind him about it. (tr. by PDS, posted 28 August 2018)

 

Russian original posted on Interfax-Religiia site, 27 August 2018


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